ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 005166 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR EAP, INR/EAP, S/CT, AND EAP/MTS NSC FOR GREEN SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP FOR ALLEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 TAGS: PINS MOPS ASEC PREL RP SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES REF: A. MANILA 5018 ¶B. MANILA 5023 ¶C. TDX-315/63725-05 ¶D. MANILA 5098 Classified By: (U) Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Paul Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. The Philippines' once again turbulent political environment has sparked new waves of rumors that the President or her advisers are considering emergency rule or martial law, and that elements within the military are seeking to stage a coup. We assess that neither scenario yet seems probable here, but we continue to monitor the situation closely and to stress in public and private statements the need for the rule of law, our opposition to any and all extreme measures -- by the government or opposition -- and the negative impact any such action will have on US assistance. We also seek at every opportunity to focus the GRP on our substantive agenda, which is considerable and productive in many areas. END SUMMARY. WHAT GMA IS THINKING -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Senior GRP officials presented an aide memoire that reflects the views of at least some key Arroyo advisors to Secretary Rice and Director for National Intelligence Negroponte, and attached it to a letter on Iraq to President Bush. It claimed that "political opportunists and destabilizers have forged understandings with Communists, terrorists and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists to remove the President" and urged "vocal support for our President" from the USG to help with this "increasingly serious and dangerous situation." Intel reporting (ref C) has also indicated that senior advisors are considering -- and perhaps have begun drafting -- possible measures to implement emergency rule of some sort in the Philippines. In a one-in-one discussion with President Arroyo on November 7 on the margins of USAID Assistant Administrator Kunder's call (septel),CDA noted that we did not share the analysis in the aide memoire or believe circumstances would justify extreme measures. President Arroyo appeared somewhat nonplused, but responded only that she was "so sorry to hear" this. ¶3. (SBU) The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "in times of war or other national emergency," Congress may authorize the President for a "limited period" to "exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy" until the next adjournment of Congress. A separate clause gives the President, as Commander-in-Chief, power to suspend habeas corpus or "place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law" in cases of invasion or rebellion, even without Congressional approval -- although Congress has the right within 48 hours to revoke such a proclamation by majority vote. ¶4. (S/NF) We have made clear in our meetings with senior-level GRP officials, also including during CDA's October 21 meeting with President Arroyo (ref A) and a separate meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo on November 3, our firm opposition to emergency rule or martial law. Additionally, in a speech to Manila Rotary Clubs on November 3, CDA described USG support to democratic institutions, concluding that the USG would reject emergency rule or extra-Constitutional measures. We will continue in public and private statements to insist on the need for the rule of law, emphatically stress our opposition to any and all extreme measures, and underscore that such actions would have serious, negative impacts on US assistance, international investor confidence, and the Philippines' international image. ¶5. (S/NF) We do not believe that GMA has reached a decision to move to this next phase. One factor that bodes well is GMA's view of herself as a long-time democratic activist and a worthy successor to her respected father, former President Diosdado Macapagal. We are nonetheless concerned that her advisers may be increasingly successful in convincing her that so-called plots by the opposition are now combined with long-standing opposition to the GRP by leftist groups, notably the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA),in order to ensure her downfall. She may be increasingly inclined to react to boisterous public demonstrations as "evidence" of incipient "rebellion" and hence seek to impose at least limited emergency measures. EAP DAS John's upcoming visit will provide yet another opportunity to disabuse the GRP of any belief that the USG would view such a step by the GRP benignly. Some GRP officials may misread the relaxed USG response to the limited imposition of emergency rule following the Oakwood Mutiny on July 27, 2003 as an indication of our likely reaction to emergency rule today. In the current political environment, any emergency rule could only be justified by a blatant attempt to overthrow the government, which we do not see as forthcoming. NO EVIDENCE COUP PLOTTERS HAVE MOVED BEYOND POSTURING -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) AFP Chief of Staff General Generoso Senga has publicly called for the military to remain apolitical, as has Secretary of National Defense Avelino Cruz, who used a recent SIPDIS address at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) to urge the AFP to "remain insulated from partisan politics." If the past is any guide, any coup attempt would likely have to involve a number of elite units and be directed against a series of specific targets: Malacanang Palace; Philippine National Police Headquarters at Camp Crame; AFP Headquarters and the Department of National Defense at Camp Aguinaldo; Fort Bonafacio; radio and television stations; and the Manila International Airport. The Scout Rangers, Philippine Marines, Navy Special Warfare Group, Special Forces, and Light Reaction Companies (LRCs) are potential sources of coup recruits. The failed Oakwood Mutiny included elements from each of these units. ¶7. (C/NF) The Philippine Marines have only one infantry battalion and a handful of light armored vehicles and artillery pieces at their Fort Bonafacio headquarters; their remaining 10 infantry battalions are deployed to Mindanao, as are two of the three LRCs. Scout Ranger, SWAG, and Special Force units were consolidated into smaller components following the Oakwood mutiny; much of their combat power, as well, is deployed to Mindanao. The only combat aircraft that could be used to support a coup are based at Sangley Point Air Station in Cavite, and consist of OV-10s and MG-520 helicopter gunships. The Presidential Security Group (PSG) and the 300-man Philippine National Police Special Action Force (SAF) have traditionally served as anti-coup forces and are expected to remain loyal. ¶8. (C/NF) It is highly likely that any coup attempt would split the military, something that AFP leaders fear, pointing to the failed effort in 1989 that pitted brother against brother and PMA classmate against PMA classmate. In the Marines, this led to the motto, "Never Again." This legacy weighs heavily on the minds of field grade and senior officers. For a coup to succeed, it would need widespread support among the entire military. ¶9. (C/NF) The AFP chain of command remains fully functional. General Senga, while not as popular as his predecessor, General Abu, retains the respect of his subordinates. Philippine Army commander Lieutenant General Hermogenes Esperon is a GMA loyalist, as is the commander of the National Capital Region Command, Lieutenant General Alan Cabalquinto. Similar to 1989, if a serious coup were attempted, fighting would probably devolve into a series of small unit actions centered around Malacanang, Camp Crame/Camp Aguinaldo, and Fort Bonafacio, and involve significant destruction. Even a failed coup attempt could undermine peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),fuel the Communist insurgency, set back defense reform, and take badly needed attention away from the counterterrorism fight. COMMENT: US VIEWS MATTER -------------- ¶10. (C) GRP and AFP officials care very much about the judgments of the USG and will watch and listen closely to our actions and words as they deliberate possible next steps. Both Embassy officials and USG visitors from Washington and PACOM can helpfully continue to disabuse any on the ground here who might mistakenly believe that we would condone or support any efforts to undermine democratic rule, whether technically permissible under the Constitution or blatantly unconstitutional. We will continue to monitor the situation, and will request Washington's assistance in pressing the message as needed. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm Jones