Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MANILA4905
2005-10-16 10:11:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Manila
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

Tags:  PTER PREL ASEC PINS MOPS EAID KCRM RP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 004905 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR S/CT(MMILLER) AND EAP/MTS
STATE ALSO FOR DS/T/ATA AND DS/ICI/RFJ
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP FOR ALLEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC PINS MOPS EAID KCRM RP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

REF: A. STATE 182130

B. MANILA 1614

C. STATE 151998

D. MANILA 2434

E. MANILA 2991

Classified By: (U) Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Paul Jones
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 004905 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR S/CT(MMILLER) AND EAP/MTS STATE ALSO FOR DS/T/ATA AND DS/ICI/RFJ SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP FOR ALLEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC PINS MOPS EAID KCRM RP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON REF: A. STATE 182130 ¶B. MANILA 1614 ¶C. STATE 151998 ¶D. MANILA 2434 ¶E. MANILA 2991 Classified By: (U) Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Paul Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Embassy Manila's comprehensive counterterrorism efforts -- ranging from the military to humanitarian to public diplomacy -- are deliberately integrated to meet the ever-present terrorism threat in the Philippines. You will see all major players during your visit: Executive Secretary Ermita; Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism Defensor; Defense Secretary Cruz; Interior Secretary Reyes; Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Senga; Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Lomibao; and National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) Director Garcia. You should use your meetings to push for interagency cooperation, institutional reform, and anti-terrorism legislation. You'll want to convey our confidence in the constitutional framework for resolving political differences, and our opposition to martial law, which would undermine the fight against terrorism. End Summary. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) The terrorism threat here is real. Porous borders, weak institutions, fragile government, a long-running Muslim insurgency, and ever-present corruption make the Philippines highly vulnerable. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists continue to elude government forces in Mindanao, while the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples' Army maintains a country-wide presence bent on destabilization. The Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) represents a growing worry because of its ties to foreign financing and the ability of its members -- Christian converts to Islam -- to "blend in." The Philippines has a recent history of terrorist attacks on its own territory. The February 28, 2004, bombing of Superferry 14, which killed over one hundred Filipinos, was the second worst terrorist attack in Asia after the October 2002 Bali bombings, while the February 14, 2005, "Valentine's Day" bombs in Manila and Mindanao devastated crowds of shoppers and commuters. ¶3. (C) Amid these challenges, President A
rroyo is fighting for her political life, as she struggles to cope with allegations she engaged in cheating to win the 2004 presidential election. The government's political woes have not yet had a significant impact on the AFP and the PNP -- our two principal counterterrorism partners, but could have an effect over time. Either a declaration of martial law or a coup attempt would prove disastrous to either institution. COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS: USAID - ECONOMY AND LIVELIHOOD -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Our counterterrorism engagement in the Philippines ranges from humanitarian relief and development to the military and public diplomacy. USAID's Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) program has reintegrated over 28,000 former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants into productive society as successful farmers, and stands poised -- should a peace agreement be signed with the Moro Islamic National Liberation Front (MILF) -- to provide similar assistance to the MILF. USAID's broad spectrum of development programs (in infrastructure, education, governance, health, economic growth, environment, and energy) in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao have made a positive impact in communities otherwise vulnerable to exploitation by bad elements. JUSMAG - TRAINING AND REFORM -------------- ¶5. (C) Joint US Military Assistance Group-Philippines (JUSMAG-P) plays a vital role in our efforts to improve Philippine capabilities. The US-trained and equipped Light Reaction Companies (LRCs) and Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs) are the tip of the spear in the counterterrorism fight. Although the AFP failed to capture Janjalani during Operation Layas Pagad this summer, it did, as a direct result of US support and training, conduct sustained combat operations in the field for over 60 days. Over the longer term, JUSMAG-P support for the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program will prove key to the GRP's ability to stand alone without US assistance, capable of meeting the needs of the Philippine people and serving as a reliable coalition partner. JSOTF - INTELLIGENCE FUSION AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition to helping the AFP fuse intelligence with operations in the hunt for wanted terrorists, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has broadened its scope to include civil-military operations in Mindanao. This approach, coupled with USAID's longer-term programs, attacks the environment in which the terrorists thrive. JSOTF-P's efforts in support of the AFP will initially focus on the island of Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago, an established ASG stronghold, with the goal of changing perceptions of the AFP and Philippine government among the citizens of Mindanao. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY - GETTING THE STORY OUT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Philippines is an exuberant media environment. Much of our effort ends up devoted to ensuring that journalists get their facts straight. However, we also take every opportunity to get our side of the story out. Initiatives, such as our recently published "Muslim Life in the Philippines," have found a ready audience, and we have in the works a film chronicling the successful joint US-AFP effort to defeat the ASG on Basilan. PAS works hand-in-glove with both USAID and JSOTF-P to ensure that perceptions of our efforts on every front are positive. REWARDS PROGRAMS - SYNERGIES -------------- ¶8. (S) Our rewards effort builds upon the synergies between the State and DoD programs to attack the web of social, religious, and cultural ties upon which the terrorists have relied for their safety and freedom. The promise of a reward encouraged individuals to step forward to help the AFP get ASG leader Hamsiraji Sali, JI operative Zaki, and the USG has paid out rewards for numerous other terrorists. We anticipate the recently announced reward of $10 million under Rewards for Justice for Dulmatin will help bring him to justice. RMAS - CRITICAL SUPPORT -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) RMAS support and direction of the PNP's Intelligence Group (IG),Task Force Sanglahi, and the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) has proven critical to the capture of a number of terrorists and the disruption of operations directed against US interests. THEMES: ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM TASK FORCE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) S/CT's Counterterrorism Engagement Funds are helping us address critical deficiencies in the Philippine corrections system -- one of the principal recommendations of the June 20-July 7 RP-US assessment of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Engagement Funds and Global War on Terrorism Partnership Funds can also help respond to other critical needs identified in the assessment, such as improving cooperation between prosecutors and police and supporting the PNP's fledgling reform efforts. S/CT and the Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) are currently evaluating Post's proposal for sustained engagement with the interagency Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) that would create a dedicated team of police investigators, analysts, and prosecutors, who would serve as GRP's national-level response unit for terrorist attacks. In your meetings with Executive Secretary Ermita, Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism SIPDIS Benjamin Defensor, Interior Secretary Reyes, Defense Secretary Cruz, AFP Chief of Staff Senga, and PNP Chief SIPDIS Lomibao you should stress our support for effective interagency counterterrorism cooperation and police reform. PUSHING ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Philippine House has consolidated its efforts behind one anti-terrorism bill, which is now out of Committee for consideration by the full House. However, there are five different bills pending in the Senate, three of them filed by the Opposition. Nominally pro-Arroyo Senator Manuel Villar is moving to consolidate these drafts into one bill. In your interactions with all your interlocutors and the press you should stress the need to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation that will give law enforcement agencies the tools to fight and defeat terrorism. CONSISTENT MESSAGE - "RULE OF LAW, NOT MARTIAL LAW" -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Rumors continue to abound about Government planning to impose emergency rule or martial law. If there is any issue that would mobilize widespread opposition to Arroyo this is it. Martial law would splinter the AFP and PNP, undermine the nascent reform efforts currently underway, intensify economic problems, fuel the Communist insurgency, and plunge the country into turmoil. You should stress in each of your meetings the USG's confidence in the constitutional process in the Philippines, and opposition to any extraordinary measures. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm JONES

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