MASSIVE STRIKES AGAINST HIGH VALUE TERRORISTS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 000463 SIPDIS STATE FOR SES-O, EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, USIP - SOLOMON NSC FOR GREEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2015 TAGS: PTER PINS PREL MOPS MY RP SUBJECT: MASSIVE STRIKES AGAINST HIGH VALUE TERRORISTS IN MINDANAO REF: A. MANILA 281 ¶B. 04 MANILA 5625 Classified By: Political Officer Joseph Saus for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. A January 27 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) massive aerial and artillery attack against several high value terrorist suspects (including ASG leader Janjalani and key JI operatives linked to the Bali bombing) killed as many as five terrorists and wounded three. Confirmation and identification of the killed and wounded await an examination of the assault site. GRP/MILF talks slated for early February in Kuala Lumpur appear on track, with the cease-fire still technically in place. End Summary. Attacks On a "Who,s Who" Of Suspected High Value Terrorists -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) contacts on January 28 confirmed to poloff that a massive artillery and aerial bombardment operation took place around Datu Piang, Maguindanao on January 27. The attacks reportedly targeted a spectrum of wanted terrorist leaders, including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader Khadafi Janjalani, ASG commanders Abu Solaiman and Isnilon Hapilon, as many as three Jemmah Islamiyah operatives (including Dulmatin, the bomb maker for the Bali bombing),and MILF commander Abdul Wahid Tondok -- wanted by GRP authorities in connection with a January 9 raid (ref a) against a local AFP detachment that left seven soldiers dead. (Note: The three ASG members are on the USG's Rewards for Justice Program list. end note) ¶3. (SBU) The specific target area was in the Liguasan Marsh, the same general area as the November 19 attack against a suspected hideout of Janjalani (ref B). The marsh is a popular refuge for rebels and terrorists because its swampy terrain severely hampers (if not prohibits completely) concealed ground maneuvers. ¶4. (S) The AFP used four OV-10 aircraft with 500 pound bombs, six artillery guns firing air-burst rounds, two MG-520 helicopters with rockets, two forward air controllers, and an AFP military intelligence fusion unit. US assistance in the operation included operations and intelligence fusion at the 6th Infantry Division Headquarters and at the brigade level, satellite imagery of the target area, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flights and video footage. Each OV-10 dropped two or three bombs on the target areas, followed by artillery. Individuals were seen departing the area on foot and by boat during the operation. ¶5. (C) According to AFP officials, five suspected terrorists were killed and three wounded, although so far without identification and recovery of remains or injured. (Comment: Emboffs believe that the AFP likely has inflated the number of true casualties. End Comment.) Major General Zulkifeli, chief of the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT),told poloff that he was still unclear about the exact extent of the bomb damage, but promised to inspect the scene of the assault on January 28, as well as visit with evacuees. Tentative Talks Not Affected -------------- ¶6. (C) The MILF has not responded militarily to this attack, although the MILF on its website accused the GRP of "scuttling the cease-fire." According to MILF contacts, the MILF will formally protest the attack at the next joint meeting of the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) but nonetheless consider the cease-fire still in effect. The CCCH and representatives from at least one cease-fire monitoring NGO along with the IMT will examine the site of the attack. Privately, MILF officials told poloff they "knew" that the MILF was "not the target" and that the attack was away from "MILF areas." GRP officials close to the peace negotiations predicted to poloff that the attack will not adversely affect GRP-MILF talks slated for early February in Kuala Lumpur, claiming that the AFP operation was coordinated with the MILF in advance. Comment: MILF Not That Miffed -------------- ¶7. (C) The MILF has so far responded with restraint, similar to its reaction after the November and January AFP attacks. In those instances, the MILF mildly protested AFP attacks against MILF elements or activities considered unsanctioned or outside the command and control of the MILF's Central Committee, without allowing cooperation within the CCCH and with the IMT to suffer. Public disapproval in MILF areas appears surprisingly tempered so far, enabling this measured MILF response. Even more encouraging, private statements by MILF officials are supportive of goals to rid Mindanao of suspected terrorists. All indications continue to point to a resumption of talks in the next two weeks. Ricciardone