Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MANILA2042
2005-05-04 08:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Manila
Cable title:  

DEPORTATION OF SAUDI TERROR SUSPECT AT BEHEST OF

Tags:  PTER EFIN PREL SA RP XC XF 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002042 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, USIP - SOLOMON
NSC FOR GREEN
SEOUL FOR ERIC JOHN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015
TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL SA RP XC XF
SUBJECT: DEPORTATION OF SAUDI TERROR SUSPECT AT BEHEST OF
SAUDI AMBASSADOR

REF: A. MANILA 1961

B. TD-314/20397-05

C. TD-314/17381-05

D. MANILA 2016

Classified By: Political Officer Joseph Saus
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002042 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, USIP - SOLOMON NSC FOR GREEN SEOUL FOR ERIC JOHN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL SA RP XC XF SUBJECT: DEPORTATION OF SAUDI TERROR SUSPECT AT BEHEST OF SAUDI AMBASSADOR REF: A. MANILA 1961 ¶B. TD-314/20397-05 ¶C. TD-314/17381-05 ¶D. MANILA 2016 Classified By: Political Officer Joseph Saus for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. A new case of Saudi diplomatic interference, protection, and deportation of a suspected terrorist financier underscores the ambiguous role of official and unofficial Saudi nationals here in the Philippines. While the most recent case could serve as an opportunity for cooperation (should the judicial and law enforcement process be allowed to run their natural course) we see a disturbing trend involving the Saudi envoy and senior Philippine police and immigration officials. Saudi public pronouncements against terrorism are contradicted by a developing pattern of effective Saudi Embassy influence on GRP officials to release suspected financiers. The large number of Filipino workers in the Kingdom and the hundreds of millions of dollars they annually remit gives the Saudis tremendous leverage over the GRP. The Saudi Ambassador has professed to us a commitment to work with the US in providing development assistance to poor Muslim areas in Mindanao, and to countering extremist thought in Muslim communities. End Summary. Behind-The-Scenes -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) According to Lt. Col. Winnie Quidato, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer seconded to the Philippine Bureau of Immigration (BI),PNP officials recently arrested a Saudi national named Talhi, who was on a watchlist of immigration violators. Quidato claimed that, after a dinner meeting with Saudi Ambassador Mohammed Ameen Wali on May 2, PNP Chief Lomibao ordered the PNP to turn Talhi over to the BI and that Wali then convinced BI Commissioner Alipio Fernandez to sign the deportation order handing over custody to the Saudi Embassy. Quidato further claimed that Talhi had admitted to giving $8,000 to Cotabato Mayor Sema (whose meetings with suspected terrorist financiers caused us to suspend a USAID road project -- ref a). Quidato also noted that Ambassador Wali "typically" uses the presence of about one million Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the KSA as leverage in dealing with the GRP. (Comment: RMAS reports indicate Tahli may have terrorist finance links and is associated with Mayor Sema -- ref B. Talhi will likely be deported soon, given that he is now fully out of the Philippine judicial process. End Comment.) ¶3. (S/NF) There are precedents for such Saudi diplomatic interference in terrorist cases in 2005. After the arrest in Zamboanga on January 17 of Al Sughayir, a known financier of al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),Ambassador Wali successfully pressured the GRP to deport him on January 18, according to press reports as well as intelligence. In another case, GRP officials arrested Abdullah Nasir Al-Arifi in March 2005 upon arrival in Manila from Saudi Arabia following identification of his name on an Interpol list of suspected terrorists, again according to press reports and intelligence. Wali similarly interceded to take direct custody of Al-Arifi, who was then deported back to Saudi Arabia (ref C). ¶4. (S) Comment: Septel in other appropriate channel will report on Wali's comments on these cases, his promises of enhanced cooperation with the USG in counterterrorism in the Philippines, and his assurances that his government has instructed him to share information with us here. He clearly has powerful access and influence with senior GRP law enforcement officials, undoubtedly stemming from the important role the remittances of OFWs in Saudi Arabia play in keeping the weak Philippine economy afloat. With Saudi cooperation, we significantly impede the ability of Saudi-based financiers to provide financial assistance to terrorists operating in Mindanao. On the other hand, we cannot yet dismiss the possibility that the Saudi Ambassador's priority objective is to safeguard and protect at least certainly possibly well-connected Saudi citizens -- regardless of their possible links also to terrorist groups. Ricciardone

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