THIRD COUNTERTERRORISM STAFF TALKS SET STAGE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001348 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/PMBS NSC FOR GREEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PTER RP SUBJECT: THIRD COUNTERTERRORISM STAFF TALKS SET STAGE FOR FLAG OFFICER ENGAGEMENT REF: A. MANILA 286 ¶B. MANILA 1056 Classified By: Political Officer Paul O'Friel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The third in a series of counterterrorism scenario staff talks clarified the parameters of possible enhanced US-Philippine cooperation, setting the stage for a tentatively scheduled flag officer-level seminar in May that will examine the key issues for key decision makers, especially on the Philippine side. Department of National Defense (DND) legal experts appear to be preparing arguments in anticipation of potential Philippine Congressional challenges. END SUMMARY. COUNTERTERRORISM SCENARIOS -------------- ¶2. (C) March 16-18 working-level discussions between USPACOM and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and DND counterparts focused on fleshing out the land and maritime counterterrorism scenarios developed in two earlier sessions (reftels). Strategic communications and legal working groups separately examined the public diplomacy and legal aspects of the proposed enhanced cooperation. ¶3. (C) AFP and US military planners created courses of action for each scenario that expanded significantly beyond current levels of cooperation. The third course of action in the land scenario had US operations/intelligence fusion team elements operating forward with the AFP's Light Reaction Company to coordinate US naval gunfire and air support, and US helicopters standing by to evacuate AFP casualties. The third course of action of the maritime scenario envisaged a Philippine Navy Task Force commander embarked upon a USN vessel to coordinate a combined US-RP intercept of a hostile craft, with US maritime forces in a blocking position and a Philippine officer aboard a US helicopter to direct a fire mission, if needed. SENIOR LEADERS SEMINAR -------------- ¶4. (C) Both sides agreed that the follow-on senior leaders seminar, tentatively scheduled for May 2005, would need to address questions of combined rules of engagement, intelligence sharing, legal authority and permissions, and command and control raised during the scenario development talks. This seminar would involve the USPACOM and AFP staffs from J2-intelligence, J3-operations, and J5-plans, as well as legal experts, US Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC),US Joint Task Force 515 (JTF 515),the AFP's Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),and Undersecretary- and Assistant Secretary-level participants from the DND. SYNERGY IN COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY -------------- ¶5. (C) The US-RP strategic communications working group agreed that, once policy direction was clearer, enhanced counterterrorism cooperation would be a relatively easy "sell" to the majority of the Philippine population, which is strongly pro-US. Communication themes would highlight the enduring and steadfast nature of the bilateral relationship, while emphasizing the common strategic threat faced by both countries. The RP participants observed that in highlighting the exchange of expertise and benefits of cooperation, the communications strategy would nonetheless have to make explicit that US forces would not engage in direct combat operations. Both sides agreed to collaborate further on communications strategy, including developing common terminology and press guidance. LEGAL ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (C) Attorney Jose Pascual, Secretary of Defense Cruz's Legal Counsel, and Department of Foreign Affairs legal advisor Sharon Rivera actively participated in the legal working group. In briefing the discussions of this group, Pascual emphasized that US forces in the Philippines must continue to satisfy the requirements of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Article II of the MDT, as well as the VFA, authorized activities approved by the Philippine Government. He explained further that the Philippine Supreme Court case "Lim vs. the Executive Secretary" (380 SCRA 742) -- by not defining "combat related activities" -- allowed "tremendous flexibility" in interpreting the extent of "advice and assistance" that US forces could provide to the AFP. ¶7. (C) Pascual noted that US and Philippine policymakers would have to decide whether or not to incorporate the proposed "Kapit Bisig" ("Camaraderie") counterterrorism cooperation framework in the Mutual Defense Board process. He noted that Philippine legislators had already questioned the possible inclusion of counterterrorism under the MDT umbrella. "Kapit Bisig" would likely require signed Terms of Reference (TOR) or an Administrative Procedures Agreement (APA),if it is viewed as a single activity, Pascual opined. However, if "Kapit Bisig" is viewed as an overarching cooperation framework, then discrete activities under that framework could fall under the MDT. "Kapit Bisig," as a strategic concept, would not itself require a TOR or an APA, he opined. ¶8. (C) Pascual separately commented to poloff that the lack of definition of combat related activities in the Lim case decision had definitely "created an opportunity." He noted that "we've got a tremendous gray area and we're playing with it." However, he predicted that Senators Juan Ponce Enrile and Miriam Defensor-Santiago would be quick to file legal challenges to the enhanced US-RP counterterrorism cooperation envisaged by "Kapit Bisig." Once the proposed senior leaders seminar fully framed the issues and arguments, policymakers would have to decide whether to run the risk of litigation and carry the argument to the people. In that event, Pascual said the Philippine Supreme Court could either allow activity to continue until it rendered a decision, or issue a prohibition order. Asked if the Lim case offered any firm precedent as to how the Court might rule, Pascual observed that the composition of the Court had changed since that decision, making it "impossible to predict" what the Court might do now. Pascual added that, while he himself discounted the possibility, other legal experts feared that President Arroyo's political foes might even seize such a chance to pursue grounds for impeachment. ¶9. (C) During his closing remarks at the conference, Assistant Secretary of Defense Alejandro Melchor, the senior DND official present, praised bilateral efforts to date while reiterating the need for patience on the part of the U.S., citing the GRP's need to build consensus. He also discussed a need for the DND/AFP to review further the results of the maritime scenario development, indicating possible concern with some of the more forward leaning proposed cooperation activities. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: By and large, the Philippine public remains supportive of the US-Philippine military alliance and of bilateral exercises. Some individual politicians, as well as insurgent groups, have protested US military presence during exercises and even humanitarian operations for purely political purposes and can be expected to do so again, whether or not we move to a new stage in counterterrorism cooperation. While the possibility of impeachment hearings is a constant reality for President Arroyo, especially in light of the 2001 controversy over her predecessor's impeachment, Embassy does not believe that enhanced US-RP counterterrorism cooperation would offer her opponents a successful base for impeachment. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm Ricciardone