GWOT ASSESSMENT: BAHRAIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000498

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER BA
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: BAHRAIN

REF: STATE 60749

Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(c)(d)


1. (S) Summary. Cooperation on counterrorism issues with the
Government of Bahrain is generally good, as government
leaders well understand the catastrophic effect that a
terrorist act would have in a country and an economy that
does not have the oil wealth of its neighbors. At the same
time, the release of six Sunni terror suspects last June two
days after their arrest brought to the fore concerns we face
here, including the strength of the GOB commitment to pursue
Sunni terrorism and inadequacies in anti-terrorism
legislation. Recently improved cooperation with the Bahrain
National Security Agency (BNSA) is helping address the first
issue, while new anti-terrorism legislation, if passed, will
help on the second. Institutionally, the Ministry of
Interior under new Minister Shaykh Rashid seems poised to
play a more forceful role in CT enforcement, as evidenced by
its role in championing a new Joint Counterterrorism Center
(JCTC). Bahrain's commitment to cooperate on terrorist
finance issues is strong, and the country -- with a strong
financial structure -- is low-risk for significant terrorist
financing. In terms of resource requirements, focus should
be on continued robust ATA training, support for the
establishment of a JCTC, assistance for Bahrain's Coast Guard
to address a potential weakness in coastal defense, and
training in case management, investigation, and terror
financing for judges and prosecutors. End summary.


2. (S). The arrest and subsequent release two days later of
six Bahraini terror suspects last June highlighted two of the
core issues we face in dealing with counterterrorism issues
in Bahrain. In a country where the leadership has
traditionally focused on threats posed by the Shia majority
(concerns that have bubbled up again in recent weeks),our
challenge is to ensure that the government takes threats from
the country's small number of Sunni extremists seriously.
And Bahrain's current legislation makes it difficult to
prosecute terror suspects who have not actually carried out a
terrorist act.


3. (S) Although the six terror suspects were rearrested and
served several months in jail, they have been released (under
surveillance) as their court cases proceed through the
Bahraini judicial system. While in the end court cases may
be dismissed against all of them, the ground has shifted
considerably since their initial release last June. Their
incarceration for several months disrupted any short-term
terror plans they may have had. By rearresting them, the
Government showed more resolve than the terror suspects
expected. Since their release, the Government has maintained
a much more robust surveillance effort on their activities
than we had seen previously. And more recently, the
Government has shown a willingness to enter in joint
activities to help monitor and track the activities of these
and other potential suspects in Bahrain. Continued success
and progress on this latter point, as we pursue potential CT
targets in general, will be critical in our overall CT
efforts.


4. (S) Convicting terror suspects who have not actually
carried out a terrorist act may be more problematic. It is
possible that the Constitutional court may rule that the
article in the penal code under which last summer's terror
suspects are being charged is unconstitutional. We are told
that an Egyptian Court made such a ruling in a parallel case
in Egypt. The government has drafted and submitted to
Parliament new anti-terrorism legislation that would help
address this problem. The legislation is under attack,
however, from some members of parliament who have expressed
concerns that the legislation will have the effect of
restricting personal freedoms, including freedom of
expression (which concerns Sunni and Shia alike).


5. (S) Institutionally, two senior-level appointments appear
to be having a positive impact on Bahraini CT efforts and CT
cooperation with the United States. A year ago, the King
moved his close confident, Shaykh Rashid al-Khalifa, from
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to Minister of Interior.
In his new position, Shaykh Rashid has taken a strong
interest in CT issues, and has championed the establishment
of a Joint Counterterrorism Center (JCTC),which received a
boost from an FBI-led team's March 19-22 visit to Bahrain.
As envisioned by MOI, the JCTC will be staffed/supported by a
range of law enforcement agencies, including MOI, BNSA, the
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF),National Guard, Coast Guard,
Attorney General, Civil Aviation, and Customs. MOI hopes to
have the JCTC up and operational within four months, and will
be looking for equipment and training support (see below).
MOI envisions the JCTC as a model for the Gulf, and talks of
establishing a regional JCTC in Manama to enhance regional
cooperation on CT issues.


6. (S) A second potentially important CT-related appointment
was the naming of recently-returned former Ambassador to the
U.S. Shaykh Khalifa Al-Khalifa as Deputy at BNSA. Having
served many years at the Bahrain Embassy in Washington,
Shaykh Khalifa knows well the U.S. perspective on CT issues
and should be a positive force for CT cooperation. Although
it is not yet clear how his role and responsibilities will
evolve at BNSA, a good sign was his active positive
participation in the March JCTC discussions. MOI-BNSA
relations, BNSA's support for the JCTC, and Shaykh Khalifa's
evolving role will bear watching in the coming months.


7. (S) Bahrain is a low-risk country for terrorism financiers
using banking services for significant fund-raising. The
well-respected Bahrain Monetary Authority is the sole
regulator of all financial institutions and requires
suspicious transaction reporting. While there are about 360
financial institutions in Bahrain, the banking community is
close knit and it would be difficult to keep any large money
laundering or terrorist financing schemes secret. Indicative
of the country's positive approach on terrorist financing
issues, Bahrain volunteered to host the new regional Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA
FATF). This organization will review members' compliance
with anti-money laundering and combating the financing of
terrorism regulations. In terms of future challenges,
prosecutors and judges need additional training to develop
the capability to successfully prosecute money laundering and
terror financing cases.


8. (C) Resource requirements:

-- ATA Training: ATA has a robust training program in
Bahrain, which is expected to total USD 10 million in the
2002-2007 period. It is essential that this program be fully
funded for the remaining years of this program, including
approximately USD 2 million for proposed training courses in
2006 and USD 750 thousand for 2007.

-- Support for JCTC: Bahrain will need help to set up its
JCTC, including equipment grants (cars, computers,
surveillance equipment, software, weapons) and training.
Embassy also recommends a two-year contractor position, to
work at the JCTC in Manama (reporting to the RSO).

-- Coast Guard: Bahrain is an island country, and the
Minister of Interior has identified coastal security as a
vulnerability. He has requested assistance to upgrade
Bahrain's radar capability (USD 15 million) and its Tetris
communication system (USD 15 million),to purchase coastal
patrol boats for the Coast Guard, and to install upgrades
(FLIR and NVG) on helicopters.

-- Prosecutors: Training for prosecutors in case management
and investigation of terrorism cases is needed (perhaps
through ATA).

-- Terror Financing: Although Bahrain is putting into place
the legal framework to deal with terror financing cases, its
judges and prosecutors may not have the legal expertise to
successfully prosecute these cases. Additional training is
recommended.

-- MENA-FATF: The USG could offer training and technical
assistance to MENA-FATF members through the MENA-FATF. If
necessary, the USG could consider support to the MENA-FATF
secretariat in Manama.

SIPDIS
MONROE