THE IRAQ FACTOR: BAHRAIN'S SHIA OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000111

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM BA IZ
SUBJECT: THE IRAQ FACTOR: BAHRAIN'S SHIA OPPOSITION
RETHINKING POLITICAL BOYCOTT

REF: MANAMA 0024

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Bahraini Shia supporters of participation in the
domestic political process have begun to state their views
publicly in an environment heavily influenced by Shia
political empowerment in Iraq. In early January, the
independent Al Wasat newspaper launched a campaign explicitly
urging Bahrain's Shia to drop their boycott of the political
system and to participate in elections scheduled for spring
and fall of 2006. Al Wasat Editor-in-Chief Mansour Al Jamry,
himself a formerly exiled Shia activist leader, has railed
against the "phony slogans" of the boycotters and ran a full
page interview with top Lebanese Shia cleric Mohammed Hussein
Fadlallah, who said Bahraini Shia should "enter parliament,
object to the constitution, and call for amendments."


2. (C) Summary continued: Bahraini Shia scholar and popular
columnist Sayed Dhiya Al Mousawi wrote in his regular column
that the boycott did not achieve anything and Shias should
"try (their) luck this time with participation." Shaikh Ali
Salman, president of leading Shia opposition society Al
Wifaq, did not address the issue directly but stated in a
January 4 speech at the Al Wifaq annual conference, covered
by Bahrain's media, that the country's political leadership
had "extended its arm" to all those willing to engage in the
King's reform process. In the absence of an urgent domestic
reason for addressing elections at this time, we believe that
attention on the elections in Iraq, and what Bahrain's Shia
consider will be potential Shia electoral gains, have led
them to take a page from their Iraqi brethren's book and
advocate for political participation. End Summary.

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Al Wasat Campaign on Political Participation
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3. (C) The independent Al Wasat newspaper has printed
numerous articles and columns since the beginning of the
month urging Bahrain's Shia to participate in the country's
political system. There are no elections scheduled until the
municipal elections in spring 2006 followed by parliamentary
elections in fall 2006, but it is noteworthy and unusual for
any newspaper, but particularly Al Wasat, which is strongly
tied to the Shia community, to be addressing the question of
political participation so directly and relatively early.


4. (C) Al Wasat editor-in-chief Mansour Al Jamry was among
the Shia exiles who returned to the island under a general
amnesty following the ascension of King Hamad to the throne
in 1999 and the launch of his reform program. During the
last parliamentary elections, in 2002, most Shia abided by
the call of Al Wifaq, the preeminent Shia opposition
political society, to boycott. Al Wifaq's position stemmed
from what the organization considered to be the King's
duplicity regarding legislative branch powers. In their
view, the King offered a powerful elected lower house of
parliament (the Council of Representatives - COR) in the
National Action Charter, a reform proposal that was approved
by public referendum in 2000. Then, in the 2001
constitution, the King made the COR weaker than the appointed
upper house (the Consultative, or Shura, Council). To
protest, Al Wifaq urged Bahrain's Shia, who represent some 70
percent of the population, to boycott the 2002 elections.
While not all Shia heeded the call, the boycott campaign
significantly dampened Shia participation in the elections
and meant that those Shia elected could not legitimately
claim they represented the Shia constituency.

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Fadlallah Promotes Shia in Politics
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5. (SBU) Three years since then, Al Jamry and Al Wasat's
editorial board have taken a public stand against the "phony
slogans" of the boycotters. The paper published a full-page
interview January 3 with prominent Lebanese Shia cleric
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, who criticized Bahraini Shia
opposition for boycotting the 2002 parliamentary elections.
In the article, titled, "The Boycott is an Unrealistic
Approach to Reform," Fadlallah addresses the Shia tendency to
view issues in black and white without appreciating the gray.
He says politics is not absolute, like a fatwa (religious
opinion),but is nuanced and must be studied. Shia should
work to change the system from the inside, even if they
consider the system to be unfair.


6. (SBU) Turning directly to Bahrain, Fadlallah told
interviewer Sayed Dhiya Al Mousawi that Bahraini Shia should
"enter parliament, object to the constitution, and call for
amendments." He claims to have pushed Lebanon's Hizballah to
participate in politics and run for parliament. He asks,
"what has the opposition changed during their absence from
parliament? You are on the side (lines) when everyone else
is playing on the field." He justifies his position by
citing the example of Ali, the Prophet Mohammed's cousin who,
Shia believe, should have become Caliph following Mohammed's
death rather than Mohammed's companion Abu Bakr. When Abu
Bakr became Caliph, Ali continued to offer guidance and
advice rather than walk away from the system, says Fadlallah.
He says that the focus should be on the country, not the
positions of the sects, and authorities should not view Shia
as trouble makers.

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Al Jamry, Al Mousawi Amplify the Message
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7. (SBU) Al Jamry and Al Mousawi have maintained an almost
daily drumbeat echoing Fadlallah's message of encouraging
Shia to participate in politics. On the same day as
publication of the interview, Al Jamry wrote that he hopes
the interview will "encourage the silent majority" to express
their views publicly instead of "succumbing to the unilateral
views" of the boycotters. The opposition must participate
and "try to make changes from within the system." Al Mousawi
reported on January 4 that the public displayed a "massive
positive reaction" to Fadlallah's comments. "The solution to
the situation in Bahrain," he continued, "is not another
petition, but to try our luck this time with participation.
We tried the boycott and look where we stand now."


8. (SBU) On January 8, Al Mousawi wrote that boycotting the
elections "did not further issues important to Bahrain such
as education, fighting discrimination, and combating
corruption." He asks on January 9, "Which is better, a
country without a parliament or a country with a parliament
that has limited authority? Of course, the second option is
better." On January 10, he adds, "After three years of
boycott, (the boycotters) proved to all that they had no
strategy to tackle the hot unresolved issues. They focused
on conferences, rallies, petitions, and statements," when
they could have pressured the government on key national
issues.

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Cleric Qassem Cites Benefits of Participation
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9. (SBU) An interview with Bahrain's leading Shia cleric
Shaikh Isa Qassem was published in the January 12 edition of
Al Wasat. He said, "participating in the upcoming elections
falls under the category of 'benefits'" that bring more help
than cause harm. He added, "resuming negotiations and
reaching positive results on unresolved issues will...
enlarge the circle of public participation... and consensus."
When asked whether he would assist in developing a Shia
election list for the 2006 parliamentary elections, like
Ayatollah Sistani did in Iraq, Qassem replied that
participation would be decided "in light of national and
religious interests" and there was no one model for political
participation.


10. (SBU) On January 11, Al Wasat provided space for an
opponent of political participation to voice his opinion.
Political activist Abdul Hadi Al Khawaja, who was convicted
of public incitement and harming the reputation of the state
before being released by order of King Hamad in mid-November
2004, complained that if Al Wasat had been objective it would
have permitted others to write about the boycott and the
reasons for it. He said that "each group (i.e., supporters
and opponents of the boycott) is talking to itself whereas
the decision of participation or boycott must be taken based
on what people think will be in the public interest and what
serves human rights."

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Salman Recognizes Leadership's "Extended Arm"
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11. (C) President Shaikh Ali Salman opened Al Wifaq's second
annual conference January 4 with a speech addressing Al
Wifaq's activities and plans for the coming year. He did not
directly refer to the question of political participation,
but he publicly acknowledged the GOB's "blessing" for holding
the event. (Note: In their January 3 meeting, the King told
the Ambassador that the government was supporting the
conference and he expressed his pleasure that Al Wifaq had
invited people like former Lebanese PM Salim Al Hoss and
Kuwaiti thinker Muhammad Al Rumaihi to participate rather
than the "radicals from Qom." (Reftel) End Note.) Salman
also said that, in confronting society's problems, "it is
possible to rectify the situation if the people have the will
and cooperate with the leadership, which has extended its arm
to all those willing to engage in the King's reform process."

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Split Inside Al Wifaq
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12. (C) Nizar Al Baharna, a former Al Wifaq board member who
formed the Justice and Development political society in
September 2004, told PolOff January 18 that he welcomes Al
Wasat's campaign. He said that his new society advocates
full participation in the 2006 elections with a goal of
blunting some of the political influence of Sunni
conservatives in the Council of Representatives. Al Wifaq
member Nizar Al Qari told PolOff January 18 that of the 30
members on the society's political committee, all but four
support participation in the 2006 elections. He said that
the two most outspoken advocates for boycotting the political
process are Al Wifaq Vice President Hassan Mushaima and Al
Wifaq spokesman Abdul Jalil Singace. (Note: Mushaima and
Singace visited Washington in December 2004 and spoke at the
National Endowment for Democracy. End Note.) Al Qari said
that the issue of participation is a "constant" topic of
conversation among Al Wifaq's leadership, and several board
members are pushing valiantly to convince the hardliners to
drop their opposition. Even though Ali Salman has garnered
overwhelming support in favor of participation, he does not
want to "show his cards" to the government at this point,
according to Al Qari. Al Qari anticipates a split in Al
Wifaq between Salman and Mushaima, calling the development
"inevitable."

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Comment: Iraq Election Rhetoric Promotes Participation
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13. (C) According to Abbas Bu Safwan, a reporter at Al
Wasat, Al Mousawi interviewed Fadlallah in September 2004,
but Al Wasat delayed publication of the interview until early
January. Our contacts have not commented on the decision to
run the story at this time, but we believe publicity related
to the election in Iraq helped create the right political
environment for Al Jamry to launch his campaign. Bahrain's
newspapers have run many stories about Ayatollah Sistani,
Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, and others urging Iraq's Shia to
participate in the January 30 elections, pointing out that
the elections represent a golden opportunity for Shia to have
a strong voice in governing Iraq. There is no other
compelling reason for Al Jamry to publicize this issue at
this time, with no elections scheduled until spring 2006.
But the press campaign, launched in the context of Iraq's
elections, has ignited a public debate that may require a
year before Shia leaders take firm decisions on participation.


14. (C) Comment continued: While Bahrain's Shia represent
some 70 percent of the country's citizens, only seven of the
COR's 40 members are part of the Shia-only Al Islamiya bloc,
known as the "sleeping bloc" because of its sluggishness.
(Note: There are a few Shia in the COR who are independents
or are associated with other blocs. End Note.) The Sunni
conservative Al Minbar and Al Asala blocs, which total 12
members, are much more active and set the agenda in many
ways. Dissatisfaction with the COR's activities, and Sunni
conservative deputies' focus on "moral" issues, has prompted
some sectors of society that were not involved in the 2002
elections to decide to engage in politics. The Bahrain
Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced recently that it
had established a committee and $2.5 million fund to support
business-friendly candidates in the 2006 elections (septel).


15. (C) Comment continued: With the obvious parallels
between Iraqi and Bahraini demographics - that is, majority
Shia populations - and Bahraini expectations that Shia will
do well in Iraq's elections, some of Bahrain's Shia leaders
are taking advantage of what they view as a favorable
political environment to advocate dropping the unproductive
boycott. We do not know how far this will go, and would be
surprised if Ali Salman and Al Wifaq took a formal position
to drop the boycott, at least this early in the game. But Al
Baharna's Justice and Development society, which was
initially seen as a competing alternative to Al Wifaq, may
prove to be an allied organization that serves as an Al
Wifaq-sanctioned means to Shia political participation. The
public debate has just begun, but the conditions are
improving for more robust Shia participation in Bahrain's
political system.


16. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

ZIADEH