SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S JANUARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000101

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM ASEC KISL BA IR IZ KICC IAEA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S JANUARY
30 VISIT TO BAHRAIN

REF: A. 04 USUN 2176


B. 04 STATE 268185

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) We warmly welcome your visit to Bahrain. On the key
issues of Iran, counter-terrorism, and Article 98, you will
find the Bahraini government to be fully supportive of U.S.
foreign policy objectives and interests. However, on CT and
Article 98, you will find that there are specific areas that
the GOB has yet to adequately address. Your visit can help
push Bahrain's leadership to understand that taking action in
these areas is in both our countries' interest and will
stabilize the bilateral relationship in critical
security-related areas.


2. (S) We have requested meetings with Foreign Minister
Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Minister of Defense
LTG Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, and Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs/Minister of Information Mohammed
Abdul Ghaffar. You met with Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammed
on the margins of the UNGA in September 2004 (Ref A) and with
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Abdul Ghaffar in
November 2004 (Ref B).

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The Iranian Threat
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3. (S) Bahrain has historically worried about the Iranian
threat to Bahrain and the region, and supports a strong
policy of containing Iran. Given that Bahrain's population
is 70 percent Shia, the GOB is deeply aware of possible
Iranian interference in Bahrain's domestic affairs. Bahrain
understands that the presence of the U.S. Navy in country is
the best means to deter Iranian expansionism. In meetings
with visiting U.S. officials, Bahrain's senior leadership has
offered encouragement and support for U.S. efforts to contain
the Iranian nuclear program. They have voiced concern that
Bahrain is within range of Iranian ballistic missiles.


4. (S) The GOB is deeply suspicious of the Iranian role in
Iraq. Senior officials have spoken about the entry of "a
million" Iranians into Iraq to vote in the January 30
elections. They fear the regional instability that would be
caused by a Shia government in Iraq that is allied with Iran
and its potential impact on Shia-majority Bahrain.

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Counter Terrorism
--------------


5. (S) Since July 2004, when the (then) six Sunni extremist
terrorism suspects were re-arrested, Bahraini officials from
Prime Minister Khalifa and Crown Prince Salman down have told
us that the GOB would conduct a thorough investigation and
aggressive prosecution of the case. Most recently, in a
January 3 meeting with the King, the Ambassador said that the
United States wants the GOB to pursue the prosecution of the
remaining four suspects energetically.


6. (S) The court case against the four is inactive for the
time being while the constitutional court addresses a motion
by the defense team contesting the constitutionality of the
charges against the four for conspiracy to commit terrorist
attacks. The constitutional case could take months, and the
suspects will remain outside of detention for the period of
the trial, per the order of the judge. Bahraini security
forces are keeping the suspects under heavy surveillance. We
are concerned that anything other than a vigorous prosecution
of the suspects will send a signal that Bahrain is not fully
committed to fighting threats to public order, particularly
from domestic Sunni extremists. You will want to emphasize
this point.


7. (S) On a related CT issue, Bahrain is sending a special
forces company embedded in the UAE military contingent in
Afghanistan. The Bahrain Defense Force has taken practical
steps with both us and the Emiratis to prepare for a
projected deployment date of April 2005.

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Hung Up on Article 98
--------------


8. (S) Despite having signed an Article 98 agreement with us
in February 2003, the GOB has not yet taken steps to bring it
into force. Our primary interlocutor on Article 98, Minister
of State Abdul Ghaffar, has told us repeatedly that Bahrain
would never deliver an American citizen, whether civilian or
military, to a third country. He contends that ratification
of the agreement would have to go through the Council of
Representatives (COR),and he could not guarantee the COR
would pass the agreement. The Ambassador has suggested that
Bahrain bring the agreement into force by way of an exchange
of diplomatic notes. The Ambassador delivered draft text of
a proposed exchange of notes (provided by the Department) to
Abdul Ghaffar on January 4. Abdul Ghaffar said he would look
carefully at the materials and get back to us.

ZIADEH