EUR A/S FRIED AND WHA PDAS SHAPIRO MEETINGS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 004095

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED AND WHA PDAS SHAPIRO MEETINGS IN
MADRID

Classified By: DCM Bob Manzanares, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried,
accompanied by WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro, visited Madrid
November 15-16 for meetings with Spanish officials to discuss
cooperation to advance Broader Middle East reform, the
upcoming NATO summits, and areas for possible collaboration
in Latin America. Fried and Shapiro met with Spanish
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana, Deputy Foreign
Minister Bernardino Leon, MFA Director General for Foreign
Policy Rafael Dezcallar, and ranking members of the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense commissions. A/S
Fried thanked Spanish officials for Foreign Minister Miguel
Angel Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future,
emphasizing the importance of demonstrating a shared U.S.-EU
commitment to democratic reforms in the Broader Middle East.
Casajuana and Dezcallar indicated that Egypt is attempting to
insert restrictive language regarding NGOs in the statement
being prepared for the November 27-28 Barcelona Process
Summit, much as it did at the Forum for the Future.
Separately, Dezcallar requested USG public acknowledgement
that the Spanish government had requested clarification of
the alleged CIA rendition flights that landed at Spanish
airfields. A/S Fried raised Spanish public support for the
lifting of the EU China arms embargo, saying the USG had
hoped to lower the profile of this contentious issue.


2. (C) On NATO, A/S Fried discussed the USG's rationale for
the two-summit strategy, particularly the need to improve
NATO's capability to meet current and future mission
requirements and the USG's desire to use NATO as the primary
forum for transatlantic security dialogue. Spanish
counterparts agreed on the need to bring NATO's capabilities
up to date, but also asserted that the EU should be the main
European interlocutor in transatlantic discussions since more
and more European foreign policy is being determined in
Brussels. Casajuana and Dezcallar said Spain was generally
pleased with plans for coordinating ISAF and Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan, but Dezcallar cautioned that the Zapatero
government's mandate was limited. On Latin America, A/S
Fried and PDAS Shapiro expressed concern regarding
Venezuela's destabilizing influence in the region and said
the Spanish arms sale to Chavez sent the wrong political
message and contributed to Venezuela's weapons build-up. NSA
Casajuana said the political decision to sell to Chavez had
been made six months ago and that now it was "up to the
companies" to complete the deal. However, Deputy FM Leon
(protect) insisted that President Zapatero had not yet made a
final decision on the aircraft component of the sale (the
Spanish government subsequently announced its support for
both the aircraft and ship components of the sale). On Cuba,
Spanish officials said Madrid remains convinced of the need
to maintain normal relations with the Castro regime in order
to be in a position to influence his successors and requested
the USG urge the Czech Republic and Poland to tone down their
criticism of Spain in EU councils. They agreed with A/S
Fried and PDAS Shapiro on the need to work together to
resolve crises in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in Latin
America. End Summary.

//MIDDLE EAST REFORM//


3. (C) A/S Fried thanked Spanish interlocutors for Spain's
financial contribution to the Foundation for the Future and
for FM Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future
meeting in Bahrain. Fried said Moratinos' presence
symbolized U.S.-EU unity in promoting democratic reforms in
the Middle East. He discussed the outcomes of the meeting,
acknowledging USG disappointment with Egypt's position on
NGOs, but also the USG's determination to continue working in
a persistent, but non-confrontational manner to advance
democracy and freedom in the Broader Middle East. A/S Fried
said the U.S. and Europe should have ambitious objectives,
but understand that progress towards those objectives may be
incremental.


4. (C) Casajuana said Spain was pleased to have been invited
to Bahrain and noted that the EU was encountering similar
problems with Egypt in the runup to the November 27-28
commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona
Process. Casajuana expressed confidence that acceptable
language would eventually emerge, but said Egypt was
sufficiently concerned that Mubarak would not be attending
the event. Dezcallar indicated that Tunisia was raising
objections on NGO language as well. Dezcallar said Spain was
pleased with USG support for the Alliance of Civilizations,
which Spain believes will serve as a vehicle, through the UN,
to encourage developing countries to become more involved in
reforms.

//NATO//


5. (C) A/S Fried discussed the USG's view that the 2006 NATO
Summit should focus on transformation and improving
capabilities, holding off NATO enlargement until the 2008
Summit since candidate countries will not be prepared by

2006. He said the new challenges facing the U.S. and Europe
in the 21st century had transformed NATO into a global actor
and into the security instrument of the transatlantic
democratic community. NATO members had to give the
organization the tools to respond to its new and future
missions. A/S Fried underlined the point that the USG was
not implying a need for massive increases in European defense
budgets, but rather suggesting that NATO had to be ready to
act when called upon, rather than waiting while the Secretary
General went to each member to solicit funds and other
resources. He said Washington took seriously recommendations
by European friends to consult more frequently with Europe,
noting the increased use of the NAC as a forum for discussing
issues of mutual interest. The U.S. was not talking about
coalitions of the willing or about using NATO as a toolbox,
but instead wanted all NATO members to agree on how to
improve the capabilities of the organization as a whole.


6. (C) Casajuana said Spain was in full agreement on the need
to improve NATO's capability to undertake new missions,
exemplified by NATO operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, Casajuana said that Spain would have to place any
increase in defense spending in the context of the European
Security and Defense Policy for both practical and political
reasons. As a practical matter, Casajuana suggested it would
be in the USG's interest to see the EU strengthen its defense
capacity, which the EU could then "bring together with NATO."
Politically, said Casajuana, EU countries are increasingly
transferring foreign policy decisions to Brussels, making the
EU, rather than NATO, the proper forum for transatlantic
dialogue on foreign policy issues. In response, A/S Fried
noted that then-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had been among
those calling for the increased use of NATO as a
transatlantic link. He said the USG was not pursuing a fixed
policy, but would instead work within NATO or with the EU as
the circumstances warranted. A/S Fried emphasized, however,
NATO remains the key vehicle for transatlantic security.


7. (C) Casajuana and Dezcallar said Spain was satisfied with
the Op Plan and the direction of planning for the fusion of
ISAF and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, though Dezcallar
cautioned that Spain's role in Afghanistan was constrained by
its limited mandate to participate in the ISAF mission only.
By contrast, Dezcallar expressed frustration with the results
of NATO earthquake relief operation in Pakistan, both because
Spain had borne most of the costs of the operation and
because logistical complications had resulted in negative
press coverage of the Spanish role. Dezcallar said it was
unfair that the NATO member that happened to hold the
rotating command of the NATO Response Force should be
expected to shoulder the financial burden of a given
operation. A/S Fried agreed and said such problems
highlighted the need to use the 2006 Summit to deal with
practical solutions to improve NATO capabilities (including
more common funding).

//CIA TRANSIT FLIGHTS//


8. (C) Dezcallar drew attention to the issue of the alleged
transit of CIA aircraft through Spanish airports as a
priority for the Zapatero Government. He requested that the
USG acknowledge that the Spanish government had raised the
issue of the flights with the Embassy in March 2005, as the
impression that the Spanish government had ignored the
flights was generating significant negative press. With
respect to the flights themselves, Dezcallar asked that the
U.S. provide as much information as possible so that the GOS
would have the full facts of the case.

//EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO//


9. (C) In his meeting with Deputy FM Leon, A/S Fried
expressed the USG's desire to reduce the profile of the EU
China arms embargo as a point of U.S.-EU friction. Spain's
public support for the lifting of the arms embargo during the
visit of Hu Jintao did not help our effort to keep the issue
off the front burner. Leon said Spain had worked to keep
that element of the visit low key, within the context of EU
support for the Code of Conduct, and in the context of
support for improved human rights practices by the Chinese
government.

//VENEZUELA//


10. (C) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro reviewed USG concerns
regarding Venezuela, recounting the negative role President
Chavez had played during the Summit of the Americas and the
worrisome authoritarian drift of the Chavez government.
Shapiro reviewed the new U.S. policy halting the sale of
lethal weapons to Venezuela and said the USG would look very
closely at any requests to transfer of U.S.-origin components
to Venezuela. Fried and Shapiro expressed the USG's
continued opposition to Spain's sale of aircraft and ships to
the Chavez government, both because Chavez would use it to
claim Spanish endorsement of his government and because it
contributed to a massive and destabilizing Venezuelan arms
buildup. Shapiro asked the Spanish government to speak out
in defense of Venezuelan civil society, the Church, and the
private sector; urge Spanish foundations and political
parties to work with and help fund counterparts in Venezuela;
and actively defend the rights of the large Spanish community
in Venezuela. On Colombia, Shapiro urged increased Spanish
support for the Colombian government and Spain's active
assistance in the implementation of the Peace and Justice
law.


11. (C) NSA Casajuana asserted that Spain had never seen the
sale to Venezuela as a weapons sale since the contracts were
for transport aircraft and patrol boats. He said the
political decision to sell the items had been taken six
months ago and that it was now up to the companies to
complete the transaction. Casajuana said Spain had resisted
efforts by Chavez to add political overtones to the transfer,
but intended to carry through with the sale itself. A/S
Fried said the USG viewed the transfer as a weapons sale and
was certain Chavez would use it to claim Spanish political
support.


12. (C) In a separate meeting, Deputy FM Leon (protect)
insisted that President Zapatero had not yet made a final
decision on the aircraft component of the sale to Venezuela
and urged continued USG engagement on the issue. (NOTE: On
November 25, Vice President Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega
confirmed that DefMin Bono would travel to Caracas to
finalize both the aircraft and naval vessel components of the
sale. END NOTE). On political relations with Venezuela,
Leon and Dezcallar said Spain does not view Chavez as a
friend, but believes there is still a possibility that he may
be influenced to play by democratic rules. Leon said that
both President Zapatero and former Spanish President Felipe
Gonzalez had delivered tough messages to Chavez in private
meetings with him, and cited the "Sumate" and Carlos Ayala
cases as instances where Spain had publicly criticized
harassment of civil society activists. Leon and MFA Director
General for Latin America Javier Sandomingo (who accompanied
Dezcallar) expressed particular concern regarding Chavez'
growing influence with smaller Latin American countries.

//CUBA//


13. (C) Shapiro urged Spanish officials to work with the USG
to press for a democratic transition in Cuba rather than a
succession and a continuation of the dictatorship. He said
Spain and the U.S. would likely have to coordinate closely
and respond to fast-moving events when Fidel Castro finally
passed from the scene. Casajuana agreed on the need to work
together on Cuba, but also said Spain favors a gradual
transition rather than an abrupt, and possibly destabilizing
shift. Noting that Spain's own transition took place over a
period of several years and included members of the Franco
regime, Casajuana said that Spain would focus on the words
and deeds of Castro's successors rather than on their
"Fidelista" pasts. Dezcallar asserted that in Cuba's
post-Fidel era, "a Gorbachev is more likely than a Havel."


14. (C) MFA Director General for Latin America Sandomingo
requested USG assistance in "convincing the Czech Republic
and Poland that Spain is not a lifeline for the Castro
regime." Sandomingo and Dezcallar said that Spain was being
unfairly maligned for its initiative to suspend EU
restrictive measures on Cuba. They insisted that Spain's
effort to re-establish normal relations with Havana had not
been a "total failure" and suggested "truce" on this issue in
view of the fact that no country's policy had succeeded in
dealing with Castro. A/S Fried and Shapiro pointed out that
the Czechs and Poles saw Cuba through the prism of their
recent pasts and had felt stifled within EU councils in
attempting to promote their own views.

//NICARAGUA, BOLIVIA//


15. (C) Shapiro discussed the USG's concern that former
Nicaraguan President Aleman may seek refuge in Spain for
himself or others associated with his corrupt practices.
This concern was compounded by Aleman's effort to destabilize
the political situation in Nicaragua by allying himself with
the Sandinistas. Shapiro discussed recent USG actions to
constrain Aleman that left a clear impression among
Nicaraguan observers that the USG was serious about
confronting Aleman's negative actions. Sandomingo said that
Spain's primary objective in Nicaragua was to break the
Aleman-Sandinista alliance, but that Aleman needed to be
dealt with through incentives rather than penalties. He
added that Aleman is still the power in the Liberal Party and
must be dealt with as such. He said Aleman wanted to remain
in Nicaragua, not go abroad and that most Nicaraguans did not
view Aleman as being more corrupt than other Nicaraguan
political figures. Though Sandomingo said Spain was not
inclined to close its borders to Aleman, Dezcallar
(Sandomingo's superior) left the issue open, saying the
Spanish government would employ tough measures against Aleman
if that proved necessary. A/S Fried noted that Spain had
agreed to support the G-8's 2003 and 2004 declarations and
the 2005 declaration at the Fourth Global Forum Against
Fighting Corruption, pledging to deny safehaven to corrupt
government officials. Dezcallar was unaware of these
declarations and said he would look into them.


16. (C) Sandomingo discussed the recent visit of Bolvian
cocalero leader Evo Morales to Madrid, where he met with FM
Moratinos, Sandomingo, and Dezcallar. He described Morales
as more reasonable in his private meetings than in his public
events and said that Morales was difficult, but ultimately
someone Spain could "work with" if necessary. Sandomingo
said Spain expects Morales to win the Presidency and was
reluctant to isolate him. Spanish interlocutors agreed with
Shapiro's assessment that Bolivia's next leader, regardless
of who it was, would face a chaotic political situation.
Deputy FM Leon noted signs of a rift between Morales and
Chavez, with Chavez withholding funding because Morales is
reportedly showing too much independence. Shapiro responded
that the USG has seen no evidence of such a rift but would
investigate.

//CASSIRER ART RESTITUTION CASE//


17. (U) In his meeting with Dezcallar, A/S Fried raised the
issue of the Cassirer art restitution case, urging the MFA to
use its influence to convince the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum
to engage in discussions with the claimants. Fried
emphasized that the claimants preferred negotiations to a
lengthy trial process. Director General for European and
North American Affairs Jose Pons, who was present at the
meeting and was aware of this issue, said that FM Moratinos
himself had been involved in the case. (NOTE: Later in the
day, Pons informed DCM that he had obtained an update on the
case and said it would be difficult for the Spanish
government to do much more since the painting was now the
subject of a legal case in the U.S., which restricted the
Spanish government's ability to intervene. However, Pons
said the GOS would still urge the museum director to pursue a
negotiated resolution with the claimants. END NOTE).

//MEETING WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS//


18. (SBU) DCM hosted a lunch for A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro
with six members of Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs
commissions to discuss NATO, US-European cooperation on
Middle East reform, and developments in Venezuela. Fried
thanked the Parliamentarians for Spain's support of BMENA and
for FM Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future.
Rafael Estrella, Socialist Party speaker in the Foreign
Affairs Commission, and his Popular Party counterpart Gustavo
Aristegui emphasized their broad agreement that NATO should
be maintained as the principal transatlantic security
organization. They praised A/S Fried's comments on the
importance of US-Europe consultation and communication.
Jesus Cuadrado, Socialist Party speaker on the Defense
Commission, discussed the Defense Commission's efforts to
raise Spain's defense budget in the face of many competing
domestic priorities.


19. (SBU) Fried underscored NATO's growing importance as the
security arm of the transatlantic democratic community in the
world, a point well received by the Spanish Parliamentarians.
Fried reviewed the advantages both of common NATO assets,
which would allow fast response, and of a cost-sharing
mechanism that would reduce the financial burden on countries
that commit troops to NATO operations. On Venezuela, the
discussion reflected the split between the Socialists and the
Popular Party on to how to deal with Chavez, with Rafael
Estrella defending the Spanish arms sale to Venezuela (and
repeating Defense Minister Bono's claim that Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld had not opposed the Spanish sale to

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Caracas) and Aristegui calling it a terrible mistake. All
agreed with the Aristegui's characterization of Chavez as a
menace to democracy in the region. As the meeting was
breaking up, Parliamentarian Luis Mardones of the "Canaries
Coalition" told Shapiro he was concerned about the fate of
Canary Islanders living in Venezuela, especially in Yaracuy
state, where agricultural land was being seized by the
Venezuelan government.

//OUTREACH TO OPINION LEADERS//


20. (U) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro met with representatives
of several of Madrid's leading think tanks and academic
institutions, including figures from Elcano Institute, the
Socialist-affiliated FRIDE think tank, Madrid's Autonomous
University, and the Center for Peace Studies (CIP). Fried
reviewed the USG's strong interest in Europe as a partner,
not a counterweight to the U.S., emphasizing the
transatlantic community's responsibility to work together to
strengthen global security. He discussed BMENA and expressed
appreciation for Spain's role in promoting Middle East
reform. Fried highlighted the Secretary's success in
brokering the Rafah crossing agreement, noting its importance
for the Gaza withdrawal and further progress in the peace
process. Meeting participants asked A/S Fried about the
state of overall U.S. views towards Europe, whether the USG
was prepared to press for further concessions from Israel in
the Mideast peace process, and the tension between realist
doctrine and the freedom agenda in U.S. foreign policy. A/S
Fried noted that Secretary Rice had achieved a breakthrough
by brokering the agreement on the Rafah crossing; stressed
that progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace depended on
building on the Gaza withdrawal, especially building
functioning institutions in the future Palestinian state, not
abstract pressure on Israel; and emphasized the USG's
conviction that a key role of the transatlantic democratic
community should be to press for democratic reforms beyond
its borders, rather than attempt to insulate itself within a
fixed sphere.


21. (U) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro cleared this message.
AGUIRRE