Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MADRID1693
2005-05-04 07:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:
SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001693
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR AF SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 60862
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001693
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR AF SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 60862
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Senior Spanish Defense and Foreign Ministry
officials said they will reevaluate the caveats placed on
their forces in Afghanistan in light of Spain's new missions
there: leading a PRT and an FSB in western Afghanistan.
Current caveats on Spanish operations in Afghanistan will
become obsolete as Spain takes on new missions in the western
part of the country. If Spain maintains any caveats on their
forces in the west, they will likely be will be as limited as
possible and will not interfere with Spain's new missions,
according to these officials. End summary.
2. (C) Polcouns and poloff discussed reftel demarche to
Arturo Laclaustra, the Foreign Ministry's director general
for terrorism, international and multilateral affairs, and
the UN. We also raised the issue with Admiral Francisco
Torrente, secretary general for defense policy at the
Ministry of Defense. Both officials said the caveats the
demarche dealt with are outmoded as a result of Spain's
decision to move its forces to western Afghanistan to lead a
provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and a forward support
base (FSB).
3. (C) Laclaustra and Torrente each said the Spanish
government would soon reevaluate the caveats to determine
what, if any, would be appropriate for the new missions.
They understood our point that caveats sometimes limited the
local commander's flexibility in dealing with expected and
unexpected contingencies. Torrente noted that some of the
Spanish caveats are required for domestic political reasons
and others, such as those relating to the type missions for
which the troops have been trained and equipped, are not
really caveats, but rather clarifications of their troops,
training and capabilities.
4. (C) Laclaustra assured us that in any event, Spain "is
fully committed to its missions in Afghanistan," and "will do
what is needed to lead the PRT and FSB successfully."
Torrente emphasized that Spain will ensure that no caveats
interfere with Spain's ability to work effectively with other
nations' forces or otherwise to lead the PRT or FSB.
5. (C) Torrente also noted that he thought it was unusual
that ISAF command had never expressed concern about caveats
to the Spanish, and that the U.S. was instead raising the
issue. He thought it more appropriate for the matter to be
dealt with via NATO channels.
6. (C) Comment: We think it unlikely that Spain will deploy
to western Afghanistan with no caveats. The current
political landscape in Spain will probably require the
Spanish government to insert its national military
authorities somewhere in the wiring diagram, at least for
some of the troops' activities.
MANZANARES
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR AF SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 60862
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Senior Spanish Defense and Foreign Ministry
officials said they will reevaluate the caveats placed on
their forces in Afghanistan in light of Spain's new missions
there: leading a PRT and an FSB in western Afghanistan.
Current caveats on Spanish operations in Afghanistan will
become obsolete as Spain takes on new missions in the western
part of the country. If Spain maintains any caveats on their
forces in the west, they will likely be will be as limited as
possible and will not interfere with Spain's new missions,
according to these officials. End summary.
2. (C) Polcouns and poloff discussed reftel demarche to
Arturo Laclaustra, the Foreign Ministry's director general
for terrorism, international and multilateral affairs, and
the UN. We also raised the issue with Admiral Francisco
Torrente, secretary general for defense policy at the
Ministry of Defense. Both officials said the caveats the
demarche dealt with are outmoded as a result of Spain's
decision to move its forces to western Afghanistan to lead a
provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and a forward support
base (FSB).
3. (C) Laclaustra and Torrente each said the Spanish
government would soon reevaluate the caveats to determine
what, if any, would be appropriate for the new missions.
They understood our point that caveats sometimes limited the
local commander's flexibility in dealing with expected and
unexpected contingencies. Torrente noted that some of the
Spanish caveats are required for domestic political reasons
and others, such as those relating to the type missions for
which the troops have been trained and equipped, are not
really caveats, but rather clarifications of their troops,
training and capabilities.
4. (C) Laclaustra assured us that in any event, Spain "is
fully committed to its missions in Afghanistan," and "will do
what is needed to lead the PRT and FSB successfully."
Torrente emphasized that Spain will ensure that no caveats
interfere with Spain's ability to work effectively with other
nations' forces or otherwise to lead the PRT or FSB.
5. (C) Torrente also noted that he thought it was unusual
that ISAF command had never expressed concern about caveats
to the Spanish, and that the U.S. was instead raising the
issue. He thought it more appropriate for the matter to be
dealt with via NATO channels.
6. (C) Comment: We think it unlikely that Spain will deploy
to western Afghanistan with no caveats. The current
political landscape in Spain will probably require the
Spanish government to insert its national military
authorities somewhere in the wiring diagram, at least for
some of the troops' activities.
MANZANARES