SENDERO IS CHANGING STRATEGY: WHAT IT MEANS FOR

S E C R E T LIMA 005440

SIPDIS

FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND INL A/S PATTERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC SNAR PGOV PE
SUBJECT: SENDERO IS CHANGING STRATEGY: WHAT IT MEANS FOR
PERU AND FOR US

REF: A. LIMA 5397

B. LIMA 5335

C. LIMA 5203

Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble for Reason 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) I believe that the armed Sendero Luminoso factions in
the Monzon and VRAE valleys have changed both their strategic
objectives and tactics in a way that has implications for our
counter narcotics work and anti-terrorism interests. The
Toledo Government fully doesn,t realize this yet. We will
help them get to that realization. When they do, both of us
are going to have to make some adjustments.


2. (S/NF) The separate Sendero columns under Artemio (Monzon
valley) and Alipio (VRAE) never went away when SL was beaten
elsewhere in the country. We do not have evidence that the
two groups are directly coordinating with one another nor
that they have significantly expanded the number of
combatants. We do know that they have built a formidable
network of auxiliaries*locals in these cocalero zones, who
provide layers of security for the full time combatants and
who gather intelligence on what the police, military, and
alternative development workers are up to.


3. (S/NF) When they were less certain of local support,
these two columns would mount one or two ambush raids per
year and quickly run to ground. The change in tactics we see
is that they are mounting ambitious and well-planned ambushes
or attacks on isolated fixed detachments, melting away for a
few days, then doing it again somewhere else. This
heightened ops tempo reflects confidence that their backs are
covered by the local population. Recent reports indicate
that the Alipio faction is digging up arms caches, and their
communication links are more active. We don,t yet know
whether the cached arms are needed for special operations or
whether Alipio has decided to recruit auxiliaries into his
standing base. The change in tactics points to a new
strategy *- to push GOP authorities out of the area by
making it too hot for them to wander in, let alone stay.


4. ( C) Toledo does not want to be known as the President
who let terrorism get back on its feet. At present, this has
produced a dysfunctional response: public denials that
anything has changed coupled with orders to the police to
catch the terrorists ASAP. The police leadership can,t
bring itself to admit that it doesn,t yet have the
intelligence nor capability to do that, so is reduced to
looking busy; it,s throwing men into the zone who stumble
about under the leadership of generals who are not
communicating with one another. We need to help the GOP
remember what it painfully learned in the early 1990s:
You,ll beat the bad guys if you harden your defenses,
patiently build your intelligence network, integrate a civic
humanitarian component into your security policy and make
decisions about who to put in charge of the troops based on
ability rather than institutional politics.


5. (C) Though we just developed our eradication plan for
2006, we are going to have to look at it again in light of
the security situation. I,m also going to insist that
Toledo and Prime Minister Kuczynski give well-informed
approval of it. I believe they will agree to push back at
this effort to expel the state from the Monzon and VRAE, but
they need to reassure their security forces that resolve
won,t vanish if the latter get their nose bloodied during
the election campaign.
STRUBLE