Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LIMA5391
2005-12-21 20:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,

Tags:  SNAR PREL PE 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LIMA 005391 

SIPDIS

JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS, AND NDDS
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
STATE FOR INL/LP, WHA
USAID FOR LAC/SAM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PREL PE
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
PERU, 2005-2006

REF: SECSTATE 209560

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LIMA 005391 SIPDIS JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS, AND NDDS TREASURY FOR FINCEN STATE FOR INL/LP, WHA USAID FOR LAC/SAM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR PREL PE SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, PERU, 2005-2006 REF: SECSTATE 209560 ¶1. The following is Post's submission as Part I of the 2005- 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),Drugs and Chemical Controls ¶2. Summary - In 2004-2005, the Peruvian government (GOP) surpassed its coca eradication goals and conducted operations on land and sea to disrupt the production and transshipment of cocaine. Despite these efforts, the Peruvian Government will not be able to fulfill the assurance given by President Toledo in 2000 that illegal coca would be eliminated during his administration. Since that commitment was made, the price of coca leaf has risen steadily and the number of hectares under cultivation has grown in areas not under the GOP's control. Cocaleros have become more violent and better organized within valleys. Terrorist groups claiming to be affiliated with Sendero Luminoso (SL) have also openly identified with coca growers and drug traffickers and engaged in increasingly violent ambushes of police and intimidation of alternative development teams in coca growing areas. Traffickers are adapting to counter-drug strategies to increase narcotics production. There has been a significant shift in the Peruvian public's views on widespread myths surrounding coca. There is a much greater public understanding of the close linkage between illegal coca cultivation and the hugely negative impact of narco-trafficking on Peru and its people. ¶3. The GOP surpassed its goal for coca eradication in 2005 but this effort may not have kept pace with expanding coca cultivation. The Peruvian Government has made progress in strengthening police capacity East of the Andes. Four hundred police graduates dedicated to counter-narcotics graduated from NAS-supported police academies in 2005. Their entry on duty has allowed the Peruvian National Police (PNP) to effect sustained interdiction in source zones and to carry out eradication in valleys where coca farmers have violently resisted forced eradication in the past. The Government of Peru's Office of Drug Control (DEVIDA) has adopted the United Nation's estimate released in June 2005 that there are 50,000 hectares of coca under cultivation in Peru that produce a potential annual harvest of 110,000 metric tons of coca leaf. An estimated 9,0
00 tons of leaf are consumed licitly. The UN estimates that the balance of approximately 100,000 metric tons of coca leaf is available to make up to an estimated 190 metric tons of cocaine annually. A relatively small percent of Peruvians, 250,000 people (45,000 families) out of a population of 27 million, are involved in growing, processing and trafficking coca. ¶4. The GOP showed steadfast resolution in carrying out eradication in the Huallaga valley despite violent opposition by coca growers and elements of the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group. Eradicators returned to San Gaban in 2005, an area of new and expanding coca cultivation, to complete efforts begun last year. The GOP eradicated almost 9,000 hectares of coca in key producing zones of the Huallaga Valley and San Gaban in Puno Department, and over 3,000 hectares more in voluntary eradication linked to alternative development. Port programs directed at interdicting maritime shipments of drugs have also begun to pay-off. Over 11 metric tons of Peruvian cocaine was seized in Peru or in transit to consumer destinations in CY 2005. ¶5. In October, the Constitutional Tribunal supported the GOP's exclusive control over national drug policy, overturning two regional ordinances that aimed to liberalize coca cultivation. In Congress, over 20 legislative coca law proposals have been put forward; however, with elections in 2006, passage of any coca law is uncertain. The proposed laws run the gamut but generally favor liberalization with the exception of the GOP proposal that establishes a ceiling on licit coca. In November, Peruvian National police arrested Fernando Zevallos, a U.S. Government designated drug kingpin. One cause for concern is the growing evidence of increasing links between the Sendero Luminoso and cocaleros in the Upper Huallaga and Apurimac and Ene River Valleys (Spanish acronym is VRAE). End Summary. II. Status of Country ¶6. Illicit Cultivation - In 2005, the GOP planned and mounted aggressive interdiction and eradication campaigns in two key coca-growing regions - the Huallaga Valley and in San Gaban in Puno Department. The primary reasons for the continuing success in eradication campaigns are the resolve of the police to hold their ground against cocalero threats and the close coordination between different GOP institutions (police and eradication corps, drug prosecutors, among others). The Ministry of Interior's coca eradication group eradicated almost 9,000 hectares of coca by year's end in Peru, plus an additional 3,200 hectares through voluntary eradication. This Ministry of Interior office is known in Spanish as el Proyecto Especial de Control y Reduccion de los Cultivos the Coca en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH). ¶7. The GOP conducted eradication operations in the Huallaga Valley in entrenched coca cultivation zones around the town of Pizana that, previously, had been off limits because of violent resistance by farmers. The PNP mounted extensive interdiction campaigns to establish the illegality of the coca production by destroying cocaine base laboratories prior to initiating eradication. Attacks against PNP helicopters carrying security forces and eradicators delayed the start of eradication until police began inserting larger numbers of troops to protect eradicators. The GOP was remarkably steadfast in carrying out eradication in the Huallaga valley despite violent opposition by coca growers and elements of the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group. With strong backing by senior GOP officials, these new tactics have proven successful in this cocalero stronghold. Eradicators pulled up a total of 5,429 hectares of coca in the Huallaga Valley as well as 35,600 square meters of seedbeds that could have planted an additional 2,373 hectares of coca. ¶8. Eradicators returned to San Gaban in Puno Department in October 2005, an area of new and expanding coca cultivation, to complete efforts begun in 2004 when it eradicated 1,500 hectares of coca. Eradication proceeded peacefully after the PNP deployed a sizeable force of drug police. Eradicators pulled up 1,475 hectares of densely planted coca in San Gaban between October and December. ¶9. CORAH also eradicated small amounts of coca in areas where coca growers were interfering with communities that wished to participate in voluntary eradication as well as others that failed to fulfill a commitment to voluntary eradication under the PDAP (Participative Alternative Development Program). This effort has helped clear the way for the program's1 implementation in some new areas and, in general, publicly reinforced the government of Peru's commitment to enforcing coca eradication agreements. ¶10. As evidenced by attacks on NAS helicopters in April and kidnapping of and threats to alternative development workers in November, and two deadly ambushes of police in the Upper Huallaga and VRAE in December, there are growing links between the Sendero Luminoso and cocaleros. Generally, cocalero organizations remain aggressively active but divided. Some fifteen hundred cocaleros met in September at the Fourth Congress of the National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys of Peru. Though some new alliances were made, representatives from the Monzon and Cuzco did not attend, effectively thwarting attempts to create a national cocalero movement. The cocalero congress did elect new leadership that is advocating more radical, confrontational tactics. ¶11. Trafficking organizations continue to use all available methods to move coca products out of Peru via air, river, land and maritime routes to Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Chile. Opium latex and morphine move overland north into Ecuador and/or Colombia, where they are collected and converted to heroin for subsequent export to the U.S. and Europe. Maritime smuggling of larger cocaine shipments is becoming increasingly dominant as a primary method of transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine base and HCl. ¶12. Cocaine base (locally referred to as PBC) was once considered the traditional principal form of coca product produced and trafficked in Peru. However, in 2005, as evidenced by multi-ton and multi-kilogram seizures, cocaine HCl rapidly became the principal product in Peruvian drug trafficking. It is also evident from seizures that large- production laboratories in Peru are being utilized to prepare this product in coca growing regions as well as in the coastal regions of Peru. ¶13. The presence of opium poppy cultivation in Peru is an increasing international concern. Intelligence indicates that opiate trafficking in Peru, to include opium poppy cultivation, the production of opium latex, and suspected morphine, is primarily concentrated in the northern and central parts of the country, with poppy cultivation also sited in the Huallaga and Apurimac Valleys although there are no reliable estimates as to the number of hectares under cultivation in remote areas. In April 2005, a PNP investigation resulted in the seizure of 412 kilograms of opium latex in Chiclayo Province, Peru. However, it is unknown if these sizeable seizures are related to increased opium poppy cultivation in Peru. Intelligence indicates that opium products are shipped via land routes to Ecuador and Colombia for conversion to morphine base and heroin. III. Country Actions against Drugs in 2005 ¶14. Law Enforcement Efforts - In 2005, the GOP made significant strides in investigating and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations and attacking drug-processing sites in key source zone valleys of the Monzon and Apurimac/Ene River Valleys (VRAE). The Peruvian National Police Narcotics Directorate (DIRANDRO) mounted several successful operations in the Monzon destroying over 621 metric tons of coca leaf and 522 cocaine base laboratories. No eradication took place in the Monzon in 2005 where there are approximately 11,000 hectares of coca. ¶15. The VRAE has approximately 14,000 hectares of coca under cultivation. In recent times, it has become increasingly dangerous for legitimate economic activity, including alternative development, as narcotraffickers linked to subversive groups rule in the absence of state security. As they have done in the Monzon Valley, the PNP are engaged in an interdiction campaign in the VRAE from the newly constructed police base in Palmapampa. The GOP is using Palmapampa to reestablish police presence and end a climate of impunity in the VRAE. This year the PNP drug police destroyed over 767 rustic cocaine base laboratories and 1,200 metric tons of coca leaf in the VRAE. In May 2005, the PNP located a large, well-equipped cocaine HCl laboratory in the region, seizing over 1 ton of cocaine and seven tons of precursor chemicals. The PNP reports it was the largest cocaine HCl laboratory ever found in Peru. As part of this effort to disrupt drug trafficking in the Ayacucho region adjacent to the VRAE, the PNP deployed a mobile road interdiction group trained to detect contraband from precursor chemicals to drugs using x-ray technology. This team has been effective in deterring truckers from transporting chemicals into the area. ¶16. The PNP established two new basic training academies in 2004 at the Santa Lucia and Mazamari police bases, located in two coca-growing regions. The first two hundred students graduated in May 2005. They are working in Peruvian drug police units operating in the coca growing valleys. Their availability was a key factor in enabling the drug police to support simultaneous eradication and interdiction operations in different coca valleys this year. A third academy was established in October 2005. Another 200 students will graduate in December 2005. The new graduates will all be assigned to Dirandro for counter-drug operations. ¶17. Mexican drug cartels are appearing more frequently as key players in directing the shipment of multi-kilogram and multi-ton loads to Mexico and the Caribbean. Colombian drug trafficking organizations are present to a lesser degree. Continued aggressive investigation by the PNP is slowly beginning to make headway against these Peru-based organizations. DIRANDRO successfully identified and disrupted major international cocaine trafficking organizations responsible for maritime and air shipment of metric tons of cocaine to U.S., South American and European markets. Fernando Zevallos-Gonzales, an OFAC-designated Kingpin and a Department of Justice OCDETF-designated priority target, was taken into custody on November 19. Zevallos was sentenced by a Peruvian court to 20 years in jail in December. Two of his key lieutenants, Jorge CHAVEZ- Montoya and Jesus Manuel FRANCIA-Pesaque were arrested separately on charges including drug trafficking and witness intimidation. ¶18. The USG and GOP have cooperated to improve port security and to address increased maritime smuggling at Peruvian ports. In 2005, U.S. and Peruvian law enforcement efforts led to the seizure of over 11 tons of cocaine HCl. See Para 23 for details. ¶19. Opium poppy - The PNP eradicated 92 hectares of opium fields in CY2005. The GOP has estimated there are about 1,500 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation based on the amount of hectares eradicated and opium latex seized in ¶2004. These figures cannot be corroborated. The GOP and USG conducted a short-term aerial survey of suspected opium poppy growing areas in northern Peru but found little cultivation. Additional efforts to quantify the opium poppy crop are underway. Although efforts to locate opium poppy fields from the air have been unsuccessful, the PNP continues to report multiple seizures and arrests related to opium latex trafficking. Although most opium latex and morphine base is transported overland from Peru to Ecuador and Colombia, "mules" carrying opium latex have been intercepted at the Jorge Chavez International Airport and in packages sent through the Peruvian postal system to destinations in Europe. DIRANDRO seized 573 kgs of opium latex in the first five months of CY2005, up from 383 kgs in all of CY 2004. Based on the poor quality of latex seized to date, however, Peruvian producers seem unable to deliver a product suitable for heroin production. ¶20. Judiciary, Congress and Legislation - The GOP challenged the constitutionality of two regional ordinances that sought to liberalize coca production. The Constitutional Tribunal declared the ordinances unconstitutional, but also criticized the GOP's coca policies and their implementation. The decision effectively ended pro-coca regional ordinance efforts, but spurred public and Congressional discourse on the need for a new coca law. Over 20 different coca law proposals were introduced in Congress most of which argued for expansion of coca cultivation and liberalization of GOP controls. The GOP submitted its own draft law that seeks to limit coca production to the 9,000 metric tons needed to supply the legitimate domestic demand for coca leaf. At the end of 2005, Congress had passed no new coca law. To implement last year's law to control precursor chemicals used in cocaine processing, the GOP issued its regulations; however putting the regulations into practice remains an ongoing challenge. ¶21. A recent public opinion poll conducted in Lima and five cities in coca-growing regions indicates that the Peruvian public is greatly concerned about the extent of influence of narco-traffickers over public institutions and authorities believes that both the Peruvian government and Congress must do more to defeat narco-trafficking. The poll surveyed randomly selected persons in different socio-economic classes between 18-65 years in Lima, Pucallpa, Aguaytia, Huanuco, Ayacucho and Cusco. One major change from previous surveys is the growing recognition of the role of coca farmers in drug trafficking and the influence of narco- traffickers over coca grower organizations. Over 77 percent recognized that most coca leaf is destined for narco- trafficking and 61 percent acknowledged that coca growers are part of the drug supply chain. More surprisingly, over 71 percent of those surveyed opined that coca growers who sell coca leaf to drug traffickers should be punished. Peruvians surveyed also recognize that drug trafficking is not a problem only for foreigners. Over 90 percent of respondents thought that drug trafficking is a problem that affects both Peru and other countries. Less than 8 percent thought that it was only a problem for the United States. IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs. ¶22. The change in Peruvian perceptions about coca growing and the complicity of coca farmers in narco-trafficking is to a great extent due to multiple U.S. and GOP efforts to inform the public debate in the press, via television and radio and among Peruvian government officials. ¶23. Bilateral Cooperation - The USG continues to encourage the GOP to focus its counter-drug operations in the major drug source zones in the Upper Huallaga Valley and Apurimac/Ene Valley. The Peruvian National Police have been able to increase police presence and their operational productivity in these areas by using USG assistance to fortify existing police bases, increase the number of drug police working in the coca valleys, and enhance police training and mobility. The USG is also providing assistance to expand the GOP's anti-drug canine programs. ¶24. Peru's law enforcement organizations have participated in joint operations and shared drug intelligence with neighboring countries. In Operation Amazonas, the PNP conducted a joint operation with Ecuadorian National Police. Operation Northern Border began with a conference to address drug trafficking along Peru's borders with Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. A Mini IDEC conference brought together law enforcement representatives from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela as well as Brazil, Panama and the U.S. The group reported on money laundering initiatives as well as growing problems with narco-terrorism. Finally, Peru is actively participating in a counter-narcotics officer exchange program with Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador to enhance cross- border drug enforcement efforts. ¶25. Maritime/Airport Interdiction Programs - It is estimated that 70 percent of all illicit drugs exported from Peru are hidden in legitimate maritime cargo. DIRANDRO and Peruvian Customs have established a joint interdiction group at the Port of Callao to review all export documents of containerized-freight and identify suspect cargo for further inspection. The USG and GOP are increasing investigative and intelligence resources targeted at the transportation of cocaine products to the coastal regions for maritime smuggling and to enhance the GOP's capability to identify and inspect suspect cargo shipments passing through Peruvian maritime ports and its international airports. The GOP has made many arrests and multi-ton/multi-kilogram seizures totaling over 11 metric tons of cocaine HCl in 2005. As an example, in February 2005, a PNP investigation resulted in the discovery of 1.2 metric tons of cocaine HCl hidden in false compartments in a chemicals tanker at the Port of Callao. In another case, the PNP identified and surveilled a suspicious cargo vehicle destined for a fish export company. Cocaine was found packed in frozen squid. Subsequent investigations identified containers of frozen squid from the fish export company that had been sent to locations in the U.S. and Europe. The PNP alerted police in destination countries of suspect drug shipments. These warning alerts have resulted in multiple seizures in the United States and Europe. We expect seizures to escalate as the GOP expands its canine and technology (X-ray and Gamma- ray) programs at several key sea and airports. ¶26. Precursor Chemicals - Peru produces some precursor chemicals and imports large volumes of all essential chemicals for cocaine production. In 2005, the PNP Chemical Investigations Unit successfully executed operations against Peruvian companies suspected of diverting tons of these precursor chemicals from legitimate use. Targets included companies in coca growing valleys that diverted sulfuric acid, legitimately used in automobile battery maintenance, to the illicit market. Police also seized 6.6 tons of acetone and significant amounts of hydrochloric acid, potassium permanganate and sulfuric acid at a major cocaine HCl production laboratory. The Peruvian National Police participated with neighboring countries and the U.S. in a regional chemical control program known as Operation Six Frontiers during which the PNP seized a record amount of 122 metric tons. ¶27. Regional aerial interdiction programs - Progress was made in 2005 towards establishing a more detailed picture of aerial trafficking in Peru. In September, the GOP signed a Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System agreement (CNIES) that will enable the USG and other cooperating nations to share intelligence about trafficking of drugs by air. The Peruvian Air Force formed an anti-drug squadron and accepted two aircraft, one specially equipped, donated to the Peruvian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea del Peru - FAP) by the USG. These aircraft will be dedicated to counter-narcotics missions. The US Department of Defense is working with the FAP to study the feasibility of establishing radar coverage over areas of Peru suspected to be over-flown by narco- traffickers. ¶28. Operation Breakthrough - The GOP blocked the execution of this DEA-financed scientific study to estimate cocaine production through a cocaine base laboratory efficiency study. The action came despite previous coordination between U.S. and Peruvian law enforcement agencies. Efforts are underway to reschedule Operation Breakthrough in 2006. ¶29. Money Laundering - The U.S. Treasury's Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) continues to maintain Fernando Zevallos Gonzales and Aero Continente Airlines on its OFAC Kingpin list. Several former government officials continued to be under investigation for money laundering, however the Public Ministry has presented no case in court. Over 30 money-laundering cases researched by the GOP's Financial Intelligence Unit have been forwarded to the national prosecutor's office. The Public Prosecutor won two money- laundering convictions in 2005. One case was related to public corruption. The other involved money laundering of drug proceeds. There are three cases currently underway in the Peruvian court system. ¶30. Corruption - As a matter of policy, the GOP does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of the proceeds from illegal drug transactions. No senior official of the GOP is known to engage in, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Alleged connections (including free airline tickets and campaign contributions) between Fernando Zevallos and GOP officials and other political leaders are under investigation. ¶31. Extradition - In May 2005, Peruvian authorities approved a request to extradite one narcotrafficker, Ernesto Corral Sanchez, from Peru to the United States. He is detained in a Peruvian prison, being tried on separate drug trafficking charges. Jorge "Polaco" Chavez Montoya, a priority narco-trafficker with an approved extradition request who was enjoying parole, was detained in 2005 and is now in jail under separate trafficking charges. The GOP has assured the USG that both drug traffickers will be extradited upon completion of their Peruvian judicial and penal processes. A Department of Justice team visited Peru in 2005 to discuss ongoing extradition requests and improve the efficiency of the process. ¶32. Demand Reduction - Evidence continues to mount showing that illegal drug use is increasing at all levels of society. Marihuana is the most commonly used drug in Peru. The most recent national survey (2003) found that among people of ages 12-64, four percent have used cocaine HCL at least once in their lives, up from two percent in 2002. In an August 2004 survey of university students in Lima, marihuana was considered the easiest drug to buy, followed by ecstasy, cocaine-base and cocaine HCl. The data shows that availability is contributing to the abuse of illegal drugs among the future professionals and leaders of Peru. ¶33. With technical assistance from the U.S.-based NGO Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA),the U.S. Embassy is funding the development of community anti-drug coalitions (CAC) in lower-class communities in Lima. The CAC, a highly successful program in the U.S., is being adapted to the realities of Peruvian society (e.g., higher levels of poverty, weaker institutions, corruption). The CACs will involve people from all sectors of the community in long-term, community financed, and sustainable activities to reduce drug use and abuse. ¶34. Alternative Development Program (ADP)- The ADP portfolio is a multi-sector approach to making coca reduction sustainable through improving local governance, strengthening rule of law and increasing the economic competitiveness of coca-growing areas. At the close of its third year, the voluntary eradication (VE) program has over 26,600 families living in compliant communities, marking an important milestone to showing the potential for sustainable coca eradication based on popular commitments to live coca- free. In addition, over 9,000 more families have joined the program in the past year, which will result in approximately 3,000 hectares of voluntary coca eradication during 2005, and over 11,000 hectares since it began in October 2002. ¶35. The program rapidly accelerated the implementation of infrastructure and productive activities in VE communities throughout 2005, resulting in the completion of 231 infrastructure projects and the delivery of technical assistance to 26,469 family farmers on over 31,000 hectares of licit crops in this year alone. Assistance in increasing licit business activity in alternative development areas resulted in $ 4.4M of additional sales in districts where voluntary eradication is taking place and $18.6M in the seven regions where the ADP is active. In addition, USAID completed the $30M rehabilitation of the Fernando Belaunde Terry highway, reducing travel time and corresponding costs from twelve to four hours, which is expected to improve legal productivity in the former cocalero stronghold of the Central Huallaga Valley. ¶36. The implementation of community agreements continues to be challenged by organized, well-funded and often violent opposition from politically active cocalero groups as well as by increasingly active insurgent groups. Strikes and threats of violence substantially slowed program implementation this year, forcing the program implementer to close regional offices on 21 different occasions for a combined period of 119 days. ¶37. Synergies between the development and law enforcement components of the coca reduction strategy helped to consolidate coca-free areas throughout the coca growing valleys of San Martin and Ucayali. Joint strategic planning continued throughout the year and has resulted in plans for a first-ever sustainable eradication activity that will combine regular eradication efforts with alternative development activities and increased government presence to maintain cocalero strongholds in the Huallaga Valley coca- free. The GOP carried out eradication in non-compliant communities for the first time in FY2005, reaching six communities that had maintained coca despite commitments to eradicate. ¶38. Efforts to help the GOP establish more effective precursor chemical and coca control systems yielded positive results in an often negative and, at best, ambivalent program environment. FONAFE, the GOP institution responsible for managing parastatal enterprises, took the lead in reforming the coca control system in the face of a corrupt and inept state enterprise charged with coca commercialization in Peru. Through FONAFE, the GOP established the volume of coca going to narco-trafficking and an empirical basis for differentiating between legal and illegal coca production. Policy assistance to DEVIDA also produced a plan for the use of the state tax agency's information technology platform to manage a precursor chemical database that will serve the institutions responsible for chemical control. USAID and the Embassy have concluded that the adoption of this proposal by the GOP is so critical to the success of the control system that, without the use of this platform, the impact of the new precursor control law will be lost. The institutions responsible for this system have recently agreed to adopt this recommendation and appear to be starting on the path towards an effective implementation of the control system. Peru Statistics (2003-2005) 2005 2004 2003 Coca Net Cultivation (ha) * TBD 31,150 * 2005 numbers not yet final Eradication (ha) 12,166 12,525 15,604 Forced 8,966 9,983 11,313 Voluntary 3,200 2,542 4,291 Cultivation (ha) TBD 31,150 42,466 Leaf (Potential Harvest) (ha) N/A HCl (Potential) (mt) Seizures 2005 2004 2003 Coca Leaf (mt) 1,424 845 134 Coca Paste (mt) N/A N/A N/A Cocaine HCl (mt) 11.27 7.11 3.25 Cocaine Base (mt) 4.40 5.70 3.76 Total Cocaine (mt) 15.67 12.81 7.0 Opium latex (kgs) 500.7 285 182 Heroin (kg) 6.2 1.0 0 Aircraft (items) 0 0 0 NOTE: Statistics from Peruvian National Police, Anti-Drug Office. 2005 figures cover period from Jan 1 - Nov 25. STRUBLE _______________________________ 1It's too much of a stretch to say that the eradication in VE communities caused others to reconsider the option since we didn't really sign up with new communities in Huanuco where this took place. In Ucayali, the Campo Verde eradiaction in early 2005 helped clear the way for implementation in communities that wanted to join but where Los Angeles and Tunuya were causing security and social problems.

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