THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS TERRORISM BACK ON THE RISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 005335 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015 TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC SNAR PE SUBJECT: THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS TERRORISM BACK ON THE RISE IN PERU? REF: A. LIMA 5203 ¶B. LIMA 4985 ¶C. LIMA 4784 ¶D. LIMA 1471 Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Remarks by Prime Minister Kuczynski alleging a growing terrorism problem in Peru have rekindled public interest in this issue, but have generated little consensus on how grave the problem really is. In private, Embassy contacts point to an increasing involvement of Sendero Luminoso in narcotics trafficking, including a vertically integrated, FARC-like approach to coca paste production by at least one SL group. Our contacts were also concerned about possible subversive activity by the almost 1,000 terrorists who have been released from jail over the past three years; however, there is general consensus that these individuals are not/not attempting to return to armed insurrection, and do not have strong links to SL combatants in the field. Our principle conclusions regarding the direction of SL and of GOP counterterrorism efforts at present are that: -- Especially in the VRAE, SL has increased its involvement in the drug trade, and the resulting income has allowed SL to extend its influence and increase offensive operations within its geographical base. PNP field officers believe the number of SL operatives in this area has increased slightly. -- SL, by defending coca production/marketing, has established a base of support within local communities dependent on coca; this is a significant change from past rejection by local communities. As a result, SL feels more secure, confident, and in control within its home territory. -- The drift in SL's basic orientation -- away from insurrection and toward consolidation of the economic benefits of criminal enterprises -- may make the group more viable in the long run. -- Outrage over the 12/5 killing of five police in an SL ambush should keep pressure on the GOP to sustain efforts to keep SL in check during the remaining months of the Toledo Administration. END SUMMARY. -------------- Everyone Has an Opinion -------------- ¶2. (U) Public focus on the issue of terrorism in Peru, which had diminished over time as violent attacks by terrorist groups became increasingly infrequent, has come back into prominence. In mid-September, Prime Minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) remarked on CPN Radio's "Viewpoints" interview program that Peru suffered from "a terrorism problem that is more intense today than it was four years ago." PPK went on to say that his statement was based on GOP statistics detailing terrorist activities throughout Peru. ¶3. (U) What PPK undoubtedly intended to be a simple statement of fact, and a mild remonstration not to become complacent, set off a series of denunciations of his message, seemingly by any public figure who happened to be close to a microphone. Former President Alan Garcia said PPK's statement constituted a grave accusation against the current government, being made by one of its own leaders. Vice President David Waisman, never shy about adding fuel to a blazing controversy, said it was unfortunate that someone had made PPK slip up by giving him incorrect information, and that as far as the VP was concerned (and the Ministers of Defense and Interior, for good measure),there was no resurgence of terrorism. ¶4. (U) President Toledo finally weighed into the fray, telling reporters that they had simply misunderstood the PM, and that there was clearly "no resurgence of terrorism going on around here." After the President's pronouncement, a chastened PPK made a terse statement that he was certainly not going to contradict the President. ¶5. (U) Given the intensity of the dispute, Congressional Defense Committee Chairman Luis Iberico held a hearing on the matter on 9/27. After listening to PPK's presentation, Iberico said he had concluded that there was no new outbreak of insurgency in the country, but that there was evidence the Sendero Luminoso (SL) was reorganizing, especially in coca-producing areas. Iberico later announced that SL members, "are present in coca growing valleys and they are even growing coca. They have obviously infiltrated movements of coca growers, which are legitimate, but which have been infiltrated." ¶6. (U) Editorial pages have also picked up the terrorism theme in their commentary. "La Republica" noted on 10/13 that it is a matter of concern to Peruvians that even though SL was not as intimidating as in the 90s, it had still managed to keep on operating after all these years. The commentary questioned whether the SL's ideology had been totally defeated, and urged Peruvians not to discount the threat posed by Sendero and like organizations. In the daily "Expreso" of 10/18, editor Carlos Espa contended that SL was regrouping and resurging in areas where there was a lack of state presence. Espa also said that through lack of action against SL, President Toledo was knowingly leaving "a time bomb" for the next administration. -------------- Emulating the FARC, But on a Smaller Scale -------------- ¶7. (C) Sociologist Jaime Antesana has written frequently about drug trafficking and terrorism trends. In an 11/4 meeting, Antesana told D/Polcouns that the SL remnant in the VRAE had gone beyond its previously reported practice of receiving payment for protecting the transit of cocaine, and had now adopted the same strategy employed by the FARC in Colombia: involvement in all aspects of the coca paste industry, including planting and harvesting of coca plants, management of maceration pits, and sale and transport of coca paste. Antesana said this new SL strategy had been reported to him by contacts in the VRAE, and had existed at least since July, but possibly for much longer. The obvious difference from the FARC, he said, was one of scale -- the area of coca controlled by the SL was at present minimal, and there were probably no more than 60 SL members involved in this activity. (NOTE: Other Embassy sources believe more SL may be involved, possibly as many as 150. END NOTE.) ¶8. (C) Antesana contended that the VRAE SL had been able to implement this "vertically integrated" approach to coca paste production because the group was not being actively pursued by the GOP. He noted, however, that he did not see indications that SL was involved in recruiting of new members, either in the hinterlands or in their previous stronghold in Peru's universities. Antesana also felt that there was little or no coordination going on between the Senderistas still operating in remote areas and SL members (many of whom have been released from prison after serving jail sentences) located in Peru's urban centers. -------------- Army Is Concerned, Lacks Capabilities -------------- ¶9. (C) Emboffs met on 11/18 with the Army's Director of Intelligence, General Pedro Beingolea Although he did not perceive SL as actively seeking to increase its combatants in the field, Beingolea said that Sendero was certainly attempting to expand its influence in the most remote areas of Peru. He said that military intelligence had verified the existence of groups of 10 to 15 SL members acting like circuit riders within their respective areas of operations. These groups will periodically visit local villages to carry out proselytizing activities and make their presence known. Beingolea emphasized that SL no longer had the adversarial relationship with the local populace that had existed at the height of the internal conflict in Peru, but rather portrayed themselves as the defenders of peasant interests, and specifically of the cocaleros. ¶10. (C) Beingolea was especially concerned at the paltry resources the Peruvian military had available for dealing with the defiant activities being carried out by the Senderistas. Asked to compare current GOP capabilities with what had existed during the peak years of terrorist violence in the late 80s and early 90s, Beingolea said the difference was "abysmal." He lamented that "we've lost our eyes and ears," since almost all the equipment and most of the advanced bases used for monitoring and counteracting Sendero had ceased to exist. Considering the growing involvement of SL in the narcotics trade, and the money this would make available to the terrorists to expand their operations, Beingolea felt it essential that the GOP reassess its policies and retake the initiative in order to eliminate SL once and for all. He was convinced, however, that this was a task that would fall upon the new presidential administration that will take office in July of 2006 -- given the current lack of political will, the best anyone could hope for until then was a holding action. -------------- Interior Ministry Views and Initiatives -------------- ¶11. (C) Interior Ministry Intelligence Director Jorge Cardenas told D/Polcouns on 11/29 that MinInt and the Counterterrorism Police (DIRCOTE) also feel strapped for resources compared to their situation ten years ago, but that he was beginning to see signs of PM Kuczynski concerns about a resurgence of terrorism being translated into additional funding support for MinInt. Operationally, Cardenas outlined some positive trends in the GOP efforts to deal with the remnants of Sendero Luminoso. He referred to information his office had about the activities of two female companions of SL leader "Artemio," and said he was hopeful of undertaking an operation in the near term against Artemio and members of his group. He also noted that MinInt had detected the movement of a large group of Senderistas, perhaps as many as a hundred, in the general vicinity of the Doe Run mining facility in Cobriza, Huancavelica, and said the Ministry was taking security countermeasures. ¶12. (C) Cardenas agreed with the thesis that, at least in the VRAE, SL members are moving toward a fully integrated approach to coca paste production, even to the extent of abandoning other methods of fund-raising, such as extortion and protection of commodity smuggling. Even though Sendero did not appear to be enlisting new recruits, its improved economic situation was giving SL improved mobility, leading to growing reports of intimidation of the local populace. (NOTE: PNP sources operating in the VRAE reported to Embassy NAS on 12/15 their belief that SL had added 30 combatants to their contingent operating in the area of Vizcatan, Ayacucho, thereby increasing the number of platoons deployed in the area from four to six. END NOTE.) ¶13. (C) Cardenas also said there were some indications that the various groups operating in the VRAE and the Huallaga were communicating more readily, and might be putting aside some of their past philosophical differences. Cardenas did not, however, detect any strong level of integration of SL elements in urban settings (such as members who have completed their jail terms and are now increasingly active in universities) with the group's combatants in the field. -------------- Recent Signs of Intensified Hostility -------------- ¶14. (C) The nature of the most recent SL attacks is a cause for concern. Outside of a handful of high-profile kidnappings and killings, SL deployments in the past few years have typically been limited to small groups involved in indoctrination and intimidation activities in local communities. Lately the group has mobilized larger contingents and has taken the offensive against GOP and USG interests. The most egregious recent example was the ambush by 15 to 20 SL members of a PNP convoy on 12/5 near the city of San Francisco, Ayacucho, resulting in the death of five officers (Ref A). A few days after this ambush, a PNP helicopter searching for the attackers received ground fire, wounding a PNP officer. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) The trends regarding Sendero Luminoso that were highlighted in Ref D have persisted in the ensuing nine months. The terrorist group appears to have increased its involvement in the drug trade, and the resulting financial well-being has allowed SL to extend its influence and to increase harassing-type and even offensive operations within its geographical base. SL has become much better integrated with local community members, especially narcotics traffickers and cocaleros, than was the case in the past. Threatened local communities, through their rondero patrols, were key to defeating SL in the 80s and 90s. The current trend toward Sendero receiving local support and collaboration is a significant change and creates a new paradigm for the social dynamic of these areas. ¶16. (C) We also understand that SL leaders such as Artemio maintain an elaborate security cordon, and have extensive intelligence networks, drawing on the goodwill they have cultivated with rural community members. In the case of the AID contractors temporarily kidnapped by SL this November (Ref C),we believe community members aided the Senderistas in luring the contractors into a trap. The conclusion we would reach is that rather than being marginalized, SL feels more secure, confident, and in control within its home territory. ¶17. (C) Concerns remain about the possibility of subversive activity by terrorists who are no longer incarcerated -- Congressman Iberico announced on 11/30 that in the past three years, 981 persons accused or convicted of terrorism have been released from prison. Even so, almost all analysts agree that these individuals are engaging in political activity, albeit radical, rather than attempting to return to armed insurrection, and do not have direct links to the SL combatants in Peru's interior. ¶18. (C) What we may be witnessing with SL is its gradual transmogrification from a revolutionary political group into a criminal gang with a thin philosophical veneer, similar to what has taken place with the FARC in Colombia. Former SL Central Committee member Oscar Ramirez ("Feliciano"),who has testified against Sendero founder Abimael Guzman in the ongoing "megatrial" of SL leaders, said during a 10/12 court appearance that, "Sendero Luminoso is finished, it doesn't exist any more." The drift of SL members in the field away from insurrection and toward consolidation of criminal enterprises, would tend to support Feliciano's reading of the tea leaves. The problem for the GOP is that the new, economically-motivated SL may prove to be more viable than the old, revolutionary model. ¶19. (C) Even though he was widely accused of being Chicken Little, the fact that PPK raised the issue of a possible resurgence of terrorist activity has reinforced the hand of responsible individuals in the GOP who understand the potential danger that Sendero Luminoso represents, and want to keep this group in check. Although it is unlikely with the election season heating up and the Toledo Government winding down that the current GOP will mount a concerted campaign against SL, the public notoriety that PPK has generated about the group, coupled with outrage over the 12/5 death of five police in the Ayacucho ambush, should ensure that this matter doesn't simply get swept under the rug until the new administration is up and running next August. Embassy will continue to stress this issue with contacts here, and reiterates its appreciation to Washington agencies for their ongoing support of counterterrorism training and assistance in Peru. STRUBLE