COUNTERING CHAVEZ IN PERU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004983

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ENRG PE VE
SUBJECT: COUNTERING CHAVEZ IN PERU

REF: A. LIMA 4569

B. LIMA 4521

C. LIMA 4420

D. LIMA 4271
...

id: 45879
date: 11/22/2005 22:00
refid: 05LIMA4983
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04LIMA5757|05LIMA2304|05LIMA2551|05LIMA3175|05LIMA359|05LIMA4132|05LIMA4271|05LIMA4420|05LIMA4521|05LIMA4569
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



-------------- header ends --------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004983

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ENRG PE VE
SUBJECT: COUNTERING CHAVEZ IN PERU

REF: A. LIMA 4569

B. LIMA 4521

C. LIMA 4420

D. LIMA 4271

E. LIMA 4132

F. MONSERRATE-MARGULIES EMAIL 9/17/05

G. LIMA 3175

H. LIMA 2551

I. LIMA 2304

J. LIMA 359

K. 04 LIMA 5757

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(c
,d).

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SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) SUMMARY: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is actively
seeking to project his "Bolivarian Revolution" to Peru
politically, institutionally (via Venezuela's membership in
the Andean Community and South American Community of
Nations),commercially (energy integration and offers of
development funding),and covertly (support for far-left
parties and to the fascistic Ollanta Humala). Peru should be
fertile ground for Chavez, populist and anti-systemic
message; the poverty rate is 52 percent, and INR,s recent
region-wide poll shows that distrust of government
institutions and dissatisfaction with the fruits of democracy
is the highest in the Andean region. This cable analyzes the
&wedge issues8 that have prevented Chavez from broadening
his support here, and notes some areas where he could gain
ground. It also lists groups that we view as our potential
allies in blocking the spread of &Bolivarianismo8 in this
country. END SUMMARY.

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WHO ARE CHAVEZ'S "ALLIES" IN PERU?

--------------


2. (C) Embassy sources, GOP officials and media reportage
indicate that the Venezuelan Embassy has been very active in
organizing "Bolivarian" events, attempting to engender
support for "Bolivarianism" among leftist parties and
organizations, sponsoring the travel of students and youth
leaders to Venezuela, and providing funding (perhaps through
the Cuban Embassy) to far-left parties and Ollanta Humala's
fascistic Nationalist Peruvian Party (Refs D-E). The
Venezuelan Embassy may become smoother and more effective at
these influence operations with the recent arrival of new
Ambassador Cruz Manuel Martinez Ramirez, reportedly a Chavez
confidante. Martinez replaces a Charge d'Affaires whose
effectiveness was blunted by her stridency. Despite its
efforts, the GOV has not/not had noticeable success in
fostering "Bolivarianism" here, with disappointing attendance
at rallies and minimal pro-Chavez activism on the part of its
erstwhile allies.


3. (C) One reason is that the overwhelming majority of
Peruvians reject the local partners cultivated by Chavez. By
alternately offering and withholding financial support,
Chavez is aiming to build a brown-red coalition to contest
Peru,s 2006 elections. The country's unreconstructed
Stalinists and Maoists, who represent the red integer in the
equation, enjoy minimal popular support, are led by veteran
political has-beens, and are tarred in the court of public
opinion by their historic linkages to the Sendero Luminoso
and MRTA terrorist organizations. Brown shirt Ollanta
Humala, according to recent polls, is doing much better. He
may have as much as a 10-12 percent nationwide following,
centered in the long-neglected southern and highland
departments. Like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Humala is trying
to moderate his image in order to broaden his appeal. The
Humala threat should not be dismissed; he has a good prospect
of winning enough seats (up to 10 percent) to be a disruptive
force in the next Congress, but a minuscule chance of winning
the Presidency or imposing his policy agenda.

--------------
GOP OPPOSITION TO CHAVEZ
--------------


4. (C) President Alejandro Toledo, in private comments to
USG officials, has made it clear that he, along with
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, are the South American
leaders most opposed to Chavez's ideology, initiatives and
methods. Publicly, Toledo has not hesitated to stand up to
Chavez's antics in international fora, such as the South
American Community of Nations Summit (Ref C). The GOP
promotes free markets, foreign direct investment, a free
trade agreement with the U.S., and private-sector-led growth.
Consequently, it rejects Chavez's statist prescriptions for
national and regional development, as evidenced by Peru's
dismissive response towards the Petroandina initiative (Ref
B).

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A HOSTILE POLITICAL CLASS
--------------


5. (C) Peru's political class largely shares the Toledo
Government's hostility towards Chavez and his "Bolivarian"
revolution. The center-right rejects his left-wing politics
and statist economics, which they equate with the disastrous
policies implemented by the 1968-75 leftist military Velasco
regime. The center-left rejects Chavez's authoritarianism and
militarism, his human rights violations, and his undermining
of democratic institutions. APRA, the populist major
opposition party, rejects his pretensions to regional
leadership and "Bolivarianism," which conflicts with
Aprismo's own pretensions to be a regional political
ideology.


6. (C) For all of that, there is a risk that both APRA and
the Fujimoristas may try to improve the electoral prospects
of Humala. Alan Garcia and Alberto Fujimori enjoy a solid
base of passionate supporters (15 to 25 percent range) but
face even larger and equally passionate negatives among the
electorate. The support gives them good prospects of making
it to the second round of presidential elections (Fujimori by
means of a stand-in candidate) but the negatives set them up
to lose in a two candidate race against less disliked
opponents like Valentine Paniagua or Lourdes Flores. Humala,
who generates even higher negatives than Garcia or Fujimori,
would be the perfect opponent in a second round contest.


--------------
ISSUES THAT COST CHAVEZ SUPPORT
--------------


7. (C) Anti-Americanism: Recent INR polling show that Peru
and Colombia, where 70 percent of the population has a
favorable view of the United States, are the most
pro-American countries in all of South America. Chavez,
attacks on President Bush resonate with many Peruvians, who
are critical of perceived U.S. unilateralism. His attacks on
the United States, however, do not. Most elements of U.S.
policy in Peru (anti-terrorism, democracy, human rights,
honesty in government, job creation through trade) touch a
deep and sympathetic chord with Peruvians except those on the
farthest right and left. Even many Peruvians who are
critical of our anti-narcotics policies (the most
controversial element of our bilateral relationship) fear the
narco-terrorist link and value the U.S. assistance
commitment.


8. (C) Free Trade: Support for a U.S.-Peruvian FTA has
declined from nearly 70 percent to the mid 50s as GOP
negotiators have complained about US inflexibility while free
trade opponents mobilized. Still, hard-core opponents of a
trade agreement number less than a quarter of the population.
Chavez, anti-FTA and anti-FTAA message has not caught on
well in a country where even most free trade critics
acknowledge that preferential access to the U.S. market has
driven Peru,s export-led economy. Acknowledging the
popularity of trade with the United States, Peru,s motley
coalition of FTA opponents changed their slogan a few months
ago from &No to the FTA8 to a more nuanced, &FTA: Not
Like This8 (TLC: Asi No).


9. (C) The Economic Model: Chavez, attacks on
neo-liberalism play well to his narrow red-brown base, but
meets with indifference or antipathy from the broader public.
Peruvians have fairly fresh memories of hyper-inflation and
a sclerotic statist economy. Orthodox policies have brought
Peru record low levels of inflation, steadily declining
interest rates, and the best economic growth record in
decades. Venezuelan purchases of government debt evoke no
interest in a country with record reserves and which is close
to winning investment grade status. The Venezuelan proposal
for Andean energy integration met with similar Peruvian
opposition because it was predicated upon increasing the role
of state companies in the sector. Prime Minister Kuczynski
recently remarked privately that the Toledo government has
succeeded in de-politicizing the economic model. In fact,
parties from the right to center-left have embraced the
present macroeconomic approach. In the same way, however,
that many Peruvians complain that economic growth is not
trickling down to the general populace, so Chavez has won
points for his programs to fight illiteracy and provide
broader medical care.


10. (C) Democracy: Chavez, traction with the left is hurt
by the fact that he reminds Peruvians of Fujimori's
authoritarianism. The owner of leading leftist newspaper La
Republica (which is leading the charge against the FTA) has
told the Ambassador that Chavez, efforts to control the
press are a defining issue for him. The local and very
influential Inter-American Press Society (SIP) chapter is
actively critical of Chavez. Many of Peru,s leading
journalists are left of center, but their recent struggle
against Montesinos, control of the press has colored their
attitude toward Chavez. The anti-democratic tint of Chavez,
allies in this country offend even regular critics of the
U.S. among the democratic left. Despite a lack of sympathy
for Chavez among media owners and editors, he does make good
copy. Most papers have a quarter to half a page every Monday
quoting his colorful attacks during "Alo Presidente" of the
day before against regional leaders or their policies.

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ISSUES AND MEASURES TO COUNTER CHAVEZ
--------------


11. (C) In sum, we have a positive basis in Peru that we
can build on to effectively counter Chavez's influence here
and in regional organizations. We propose to:

-- encourage President Toledo, Prime Minister Kuczynski and
other GOP officials to maintain their general policy of
engagement, containment and damage control, while being
prepared to ratchet-up protests should evidence be uncovered
tying Chavez to political subversion or terrorism.

-- urge Peruvian officials, business leaders and media
opinion-makers to speak out in favor of the GOP's
economic/trade policies and against the economic/trade
policies advocated by Chavez.

-- emphasize to Peruvian officials that they need to address
the dichotomy between their desire for Free Trade Agreements
with the U.S. and the EU on the one hand, and Venezuela's
approach to regional development in the CAN and CASA; sooner
or later the GOP will have to make a choice between the two.

-- work with media contacts to publicize any evidence of
Chavez's interference in internal political affairs (such as
by funding extremist parties or promoting subversive
activities),anti-democratic actions taken by Chavez in
Venezuela (particularly against the press),and any evidence
of Chavez's support for terrorist organizations in Colombia
and elsewhere.

-- encourage our pro-democracy NGO, human rights and labor
contacts to publicly criticize the GOV's anti-democratic
actions, human rights violations, and anti-labor policies by
providing them with information on Chavez's activities, as
well as by promoting their engagement with Venezuelan
counterparts suffering from GOV persecution.
STRUBLE

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