THE UDF SPLIT: SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000017 SIPDIS SENSITIVE AF/S FOR GALANEK; INR/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MI SUBJECT: THE UDF SPLIT: SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS REF: A. A) LILONGWE 0016 ¶B. B) LILONGWE 0015 ¶C. C) 04 LILONGWE 1110 ¶D. D) 04 LILONGWE 1086 1.(SBU) Summary and Introduction: After a week of high political drama, including an alleged assassination attempt, the dissolution of Malawi's pro-Muluzi intelligence service, and the arrest on treason charges and subsequent pardon of three Muluzi loyalists, Malawians now seem to believe that the rift between President Mutharika and his predecessor, UDF Party Chairman Bakili Muluzi, is now insurmountable (Ref. B). While the public internecine wrangling may have damaged Mutharika's presidential image, it has also cleared the air: Mutharika is in charge and clearly in control of the machinery of state. Without making predictions, this cable describes some of the challenges Mutharika faces as he moves forward to consolidate his presidency and advance his pro-growth, good-government agenda, as well as outlining possible scenarios that could play out over the coming months. 2.(SBU) A permanent rift in the UDF now seems inevitable, as Mutharika has declared that he can and will govern independently of Muluzi and his political machine. Muluzi's UDF may form a marriage of convenience with John Tembo's MCP to support the latter's court case seeking to nullify last year's presidential election on grounds of voter fraud. Tembo could prevail, especially if those who perpetrated the fraud provide evidence in court, resulting in a call for new elections. At that point, Mutharika would have to create a party, possibly resurrecting his defunct United Party (UP). Muluzi would be free to run as the UDF candidate, since Mutharika's interregnum would permit Muluzi to obviate the constitutional prohibition against serving more than two consecutive terms. Muluzi still enjoys strong support in the rural areas, especially the south, and could return as president. Mutharika's options: continue to govern without the support of Muluzi's UDF, delay the court case as long as possible, rebuild his own party after eventually splitting with the UDF, and weaken the UDF machine by starving it of its government sources of revenue. End Summary and Introduction. -------------- The Rift -------------- ¶3. (U) Following President Mutharika's announcement last week of an alleged assassination plot, editorials Friday and over the weekend have largely praised the President for standing up to Muluzi and the UDF. The Daily Times praised the President's willingness to acknowledge in public the widely-held truth that Muluzi does not want to relinquish power; it was less than sanguine, however, about his "pardons" of three UDF treason defendants before they were tried and convicted. The Nation: "Malawians thought Bingu was a coward. He is not." ¶4. (SBU) Muluzi denied any involvement in the alleged assassination plot, and struck back by threatening to "discipline" eight senior UDF officials loyal to Mutharika. Mutharika claimed he now would only reenter reconciliation talks with Muluzi if the UDF were to remove four of his closest political confidantes and UDF co-founders: John Chikakwiya (Mayor of Blantyre),Dumbo Lemani (ex-minister of mines),Humphrey Mvula (ex-president of parastatal Shire bus lines) and Friday Jumbe (ex-minister of finance). All four have been accused of corruption and three are currently under indictment, but few here believe that Muluzi will remove them from the party (Ref. C). Meanwhile, National Police and Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) officials began seizing UDF vehicles for non-payment of duty on December 7. While the UDF was granted a preliminary injunction over the weekend, the MRA will likely move to lift the stay and continue the seizures in the coming week (Ref. A). (Note: Muluzi personally holds title to over one hundred bright-yellow UDF four-by-four and luxury vehicles he imported duty-free while president and never registered. They have been passed out as political perks to UDF/Muluzi loyalists, and several have been violently seized recently by the militant, pro-Muluzi Young Democrats from politicians seen as too close to Mutharika. End Note.) -------------- What Next? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The events of the past week have clearly shown that President Mutharika is in charge, and government institutions are following his orders. While the political situation here is extremely fluid, significant challenges lie ahead for President Mutharika. Most here now consider the Muluzi/Mutharika rift in the UDF to be insurmountable. While many in the UDF are pro-Mutharika, none here believes that Muluzi will give up his position as party chairman voluntarily, and few think Mutharika will be able to wrest control of the UDF from him. Muluzi personally owns all UDF vehicles, all of its real property and the business interests that provide it funding--including the KEZA building which he built and leased to the Malawi Revenue Authority while still President. (Note: The MRA was ordered to vacate the KEZA building in November and its director was removed. End Note). The UDF still functions as a machine for the distribution of wealth and political influence--even if both have waned considerably since Mutharika's inauguration--and Muluzi still controls it. 6.(SBU) While Mutharika has concentrated on sidelining Muluzi's inner circle through corruption prosecutions, he has not investigated Muluzi himself. This may become an increasingly appealing option for Mutharika once he has abandoned any hope for reconciling the split in the UDF, although it is not without risk: any arrest or indictment of Muluzi would significantly raise the ante for political violence by Young Democrats, who in the current climate have already begun beating and harassing pro-Mutharika politicians, including one sitting cabinet minister (Ref. A). Mutharika may have deferred pursuing Muluzi on corruption charges because of the UDF complaints that his anti-corruption efforts constitute de facto political persecution. Short of indicting Muluzi, the President will be able to weaken Muluzi and the UDF by cutting off their various sources of funding. The seizing of Muluzi's UDF vehicles is an indication that the President has already begun that process: Muluzi will not likely be able pay the 100 percent duty and registration fees to recover the vehicles, given their number and value. The nullification of the lease contract between MRA and Muluzi for the KEZA building terminated a major source of funding to the Party. Given that Muluzi is already liquidating assets to pay outstanding personal judgments, it is doubtful that he will be able to continue to fund the UDF without direct inflows from the government. Even with these measures it will not be easy for Mutharika to sideline Muluzi from the UDF and take over. The Party exists to promote the political and personal fortunes of Muluzi and his cohort, and Mutharika is viewed as an outside technocrat imposed by Muluzi on the party. -------------- Crossing the Floor Over You -------------- 7.(SBU) Mutharika could simply abandon the UDF. Under Malawi's mixed presidential/parliamentary constitution, Malawian presidents are directly elected, and theoretically should remain president regardless of party affiliation. The UDF would certainly contest Mutharika's ability to remain President if he leaves the Party, since its current rhetoric is that the Party (read Muluzi) is superior to any president elected with its support. While this position would not prevail legally, it would be a nuisance and another battle for public opinion that Mutharika will need to handle carefully. Under this scenario, Mutharika will likely form another party, possibly reviving his United Party (UP) and taking loyalists with him. All current UDF Ministers would likely go with the President--if only to hold on to their jobs--including some percentage of UDF MPs. It is impossible to say how many would depart UDF: much will depend on the perception of who is ascendant in the Muluzi-Mutharika struggle. Some UDF MPs clearly support Mutharika's good-governance and economic growth platform, while most are watching the political winds. 8.(SBU) In a ploy to prevent parliamentary defections, Muluzi's UDF successfully amended the Malawi Constitution to include Section 65, which penalizes MPs with the loss of their seats for switching parties. This rule has been finessed to permit MPs to switch from a declared party affiliation to independent status, or vice versa (they may run as independents and later declare a party affiliation). This would create for more high political drama, but would not necessarily prevent Mutharika from cobbling together a coalition of ex-UDF independents and existing parties sufficient to be able to govern effectively. Malawi's system of government is heavily weighted towards the executive, and Mutharika can rule without legislative approval for many of his initiatives if necessary, but he will need a block of legislative support in order to effectively govern. -------------- Muluzi Back in the Saddle? -------------- 9.(SBU) Once the split with Mutharika is permanent, as many believe it is, Muluzi would have every incentive to encourage UDF members such as Lemani, Mvula and Jumbe to testify or otherwise provide evidence in MCP Presidential candidate John Tembo's legal case to nullify last year's election results (Ref. D). They have already made claims in the media that they were personally involved in widespread election fraud to ensure a Mutharika victory. Tembo was Banda's heir in the MCP, and he and Muluzi are bitter political enemies dating back to the 1994 elections. Still, they may cooperate in the lawsuit for the purposes of removing Mutharika and staging new elections, which both believe they would win. There would be a risk of prosecution for Lemani and others who incriminate themselves, but the payoff would be worth the risk: in a new election, Muluzi could run as the UDF candidate and return to the presidency. Muluzi still enjoys a broad base of support among rural Malawians, especially in the south, and others who remember the Muluzi years of profligate government spending with some nostalgia. Legally, the Constitution only bars presidents from seeking more than two consecutive terms, and Mutharika's interregnum would effectively permit a third Muluzi term, although this would certainly be contested. Mutharika's best defense will be the same of any sitting Malawian President confronted by an election-fraud case: use dilatory tactics, gentle suasion and any other means possible to prevent the case from coming to trial for as long as possible. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: Muluzi may have chosen unwisely in selecting Mutharika as his successor. Mutharika, a technocrat and former IMF official, has diligently set about the work of returning fiscal discipline to government, combating corruption and promoting economic growth in Malawi. Mutharika's anticorruption efforts have targeted the most powerful figures in his own party, except Muluzi, who are also widely recognized to have been the most corrupt members of the last government. The effort is laudable, but the Muluzi machine will not go without a fight in the courts, the media, and as is being proven by the return of the Young Democrats to active thuggery--in the streets. Malawi's neopaternalistic political structure favors the executive, and it is difficult for either the legislative or judicial branches to pose an effective counterweight to executive power, as when Muluzi's bid to amend the Constitution to permit a third term was defeated. Barring the unlikely event of a coup or a successful assassination attempt, the balance of power clearly rests with Mutharika, a situation that will only become more pronounced with time. Most here now believe the President's account that Muluzi plotted to have him assassinated last week. Mutharika successfully outmanouvered him, probably with the help of officials within the disbanded National Intelligence Bureau, and this may signal the beginning of the end of Muluzi's political influence. The irony is that Mutharika may have to resort to less than democratic means to consolidate his power, hold on to the presidency and advance his agenda in the face of continued opposition from the still-powerful UDF machine that sponsored him, which clearly will not go without a fight. End Comment. GILMOUR