NIGERIA TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CONTINGENCY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001943 SIPDIS USDA FAS WASHDC FOR CMP/DL&P DIVISION FAA/AREA DIRECTOR/RANDY HAGER ITP/THOMAS POMEROY ICD/DRD USDA/APHIS FROM OFFICE OF AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, LAGOS TOFAS 015 E.O. 12958, N/A TAGS: EAGR PGOV NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR HPAI PANDEMIC REF: STATE 00206588, STATE 00216147, SECSTATE 001770774, ABUJA 00002234 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: National technical committee of experts on the prevention and control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) concluded deliberations in Abuja December 12-14, 2005 and proposed contingency plans for a pandemic in Nigeria. Federal Ministries of Agriculture and Health technical committees proposed national contingency plans for both human and animal health. Both technical committees (one from Health, the other from Agriculture) will seek substantial financial support from international donors to implement these plans. National contingency plans will be presented to the National Inter-ministerial Committee on Avian Influenza chaired by the Minister of Health, before going to the president for approval and GON budgetary support. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) National technical committee of experts on the prevention and control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) concluded deliberations in Abuja December 12-14, 2005 and proposed contingency plans for Influenza Pandemic in Nigeria. Federal Ministries of Agriculture and Health technical committees proposed national contingency plans for both human and animal health. Both contingency plans will be presented to the National Inter-ministerial Committee on Avian Influenza chaired by the Minister of Health, before going the Federal Executive Council and the president for final approval. ¶3. (SBU) The Ministry of Agriculture's strategy for the prevention and control of HPAI is based on the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) format for preparing National Emergency Preparedness and Contingency plans for Trans-boundary Animal Diseases (TADs) and the Australian Veterinary Plan. ¶4. (SBU) The committee noted the threat to human health would persist as long as the problem persists in poultry flocks. Therefore, the primary focus of attention in the prevention and control of HPAI in the country should be from the animal health perspective. The committee recommended that prevention and control measures should focus on clinically affected poultry with full safe disposal of carcasses, adequate disinfection and decontamination and appropriate surveillance to determine the origin and extent of the disease. The plan also calls for full compensation to affected poultry farmers. (Comment: The provision of full compensation appears relatively enlightened until one realizes that several powerful Nigerians are involved in poultry farming and would stand to benefit by this provision. End comment). ¶5. (SBU) The report details resources that would be required to contain and eradicate the virus. The Ministry of Agriculture's contingency plan calls for the immediate allocation of 555.5 million Naira (approximately 4 million dollars) by the Federal Government and $400,000 from international donors in order to implement its plan. The Ministry of Health will require the government to spend 109.2 million Naira (slightly over $800,000) in addition to $1.1 million it hopes to collect from international donors. ¶6. (SBU) The committee acknowledged Nigeria's deteriorating animal health delivery services due to lack of adequate resources. In order to strengthen the national surveillance network, the committee recommended establishing a diagnostic laboratory network involving NVRI and designated laboratories in the veterinary teaching hospitals in Zairia, Ibadan, Nsuka, Maiduguri and Sokoto as well as the OIE/FAO/WHO regional and world reference laboratories for HPAI. Comment: currently, the National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI) in Jos is the only laboratory in the country capable of animal disease diagnostics. End Comment.) ¶7. (SBU) The committee further identified smuggling or importation of infected poultry and poultry products and migratory birds as the possible sources of the introduction of the disease into the country. Following are specific recommendations by the committee that will be presented to the Executive Council (Presidency) for approval and financial backing. ¶8. (SBU) --Ban the importation of poultry and poultry products from countries where the disease is know to exist. At present, there is a complete import ban on live birds, poultry products including fertile eggs. ¶9. (SBU) --Immediate rehabilitation and revitalization of existing veterinary quarantine infrastructure, control posts and enhanced manpower capabilities. ¶10. (SBU) --Training of veterinarians, auxiliaries and other categories of poultry operators on HPAI prevention and control strategies, including all aspects of biosecurity. ¶11. (SBU) --Ensure effective animal surveillance involving high-risk areas such as poultry markets, wetlands and migratory bird routes. ¶12. (SBU) --GON planning for Avian Influenza is welcome news and a commendable development. Apparently, the GON planning, right now, is more weighted towards the agricultural side of the equilibrium and secondarily toward human health implications. This is perhaps a prudent strategy as long as the assumption holds that Avian Influenza is still limited to animal-to-animal transmission. However, if the disease mutates to human-to-human form, Nigeria's planning might not be optimal. The GON will have to play catch-up with very little time to spare. Compounding this problem is that, on the human health side, the GON appears to be relying more on the international community for funding than its own coffers. Browne