SYNOPSIS OF KUWAIT'S ACTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000806 SIPDIS NEA/ARP FOR REECE SMYTH NSC FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015 TAGS: EFIN PTER ETTC KU TERRORISM SUBJECT: SYNOPSIS OF KUWAIT'S ACTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORIST FINANCE REF: A. KUWAIT 669 ¶B. KUWAIT 638 ¶C. KUWAIT 594 ¶D. KUWAIT 417 ¶E. KUWAIT 76 ¶F. 03 KUWAIT 4840 Classified By: CDA Matthew H. Tueller, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Summary. In the wake of January's violent confrontations between extremists and Kuwaiti security forces, the Government of Kuwait has begun to view terrorist finance as an issue of real concern. Although Kuwait is not a major financial center and has not been a primary entrepot for terrorist financing, there are gaps in the GOK's ability to prevent terrorist finance. At present, Kuwait has no law specifically criminalizing terrorist finance, but the Council of Ministers recently agreed that Kuwait should become a party to the UN Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. Kuwait's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is not permitted to share information without prior approval from the Public Prosecutor's Office, making it ineligible for membership in the Egmont Group. ¶2. (C) With regard to banking, Islamic financial institutions now fall under the Central Bank's regulatory authority and most GOK and banking interlocutors believe that current anti-money laundering laws are adequate to monitor financial transactions carried out through regulated institutions (Islamic and traditional). The GOK is tightening up its supervision of charitable organizations, following revelations that four of the five charities licensed to do charity work outside of Kuwait have violated the GOK's rules governing fundraising. In other news, local papers reported that a Kuwaiti appeals court upheld a lower court ruling absolving Muhsin Al-Fadhli of financing terrorism in Iraq. This ruling is separate from another charge against Fadhli concerning his alleged connection with the 2000 attack on the USS Cole; that case is still pending. End Summary. Terrorist Finance Legislation Needed -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In the wake of January's violent confrontations between extremists and Kuwaiti security forces, the Government of Kuwait has begun to view terrorist finance as an issue of real concern. Although Kuwait is not a major financial center and has not been a primary entrepot for terrorist financing, there are gaps in the GOK's ability to prevent terrorist finance. ¶4. (U) At present, Kuwait has no law specifically criminalizing terrorist finance. Some GOK officials have contended that such a law is not necessary since Kuwait's 2002 anti-money laundering statute ostensibly covers terrorist finance (although it should be noted that Financial Action Task Force guidelines, to which Kuwait is a party, call for criminalization of terrorist finance). To raise U.S. concerns about this deficiency, the Ambassador has pressed a wide range of GOK officials to pass anti-terrorist finance legislation. On February 7, the Council of Ministers agreed that Kuwait should become a party to the UN Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, and referred its decision to the National Assembly for ratification (Ref C). Financial Intelligence Unit -------------- ¶5. (U) Kuwait's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),which is housed within the Central Bank, was established in 2003. However, its efficacy is limited by an inability to share information without prior approval from the Public Prosecutor's Office; this approval must be granted on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the U.S. has been unable to move ahead with its plan to sponsor Kuwait for membership in the Egmont Group, an international network designed to facilitate information-sharing among FIUs. Post is urging the GOK to revise its legislation governing the FIU so that the unit can function independently and effectively. Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions and Banks -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Beginning January 1, 2004, the Central Bank of Kuwait assumed licensing and supervisory responsibility for Kuwait's Islamic financial institutions, Kuwait Finance House (KFH) and Bubiyan Bank, making them subject to the same regulatory guidelines as all other banks in Kuwait. KFH executives report that although the amount of client information required by "Know Your Customer" rules makes some clients uncomfortable, KFH continues to comply (Ref E). ¶7. (C) Most GOK and banking interlocutors believe that current anti-money laundering laws are adequate to monitor financial transactions carried out through regulated institutions (Ref B). For example, Minister of Finance Mahmoud Al-Nouri told Ambassador and Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor that he was more concerned about the small amounts of cash needed to purchase weapons and explosives, rather than larger transactions that can easily be traced (Ref A). The National Bank of Kuwait's CEO, however, disagrees that existing legislation is adequate, as does Gulf Bank's CEO, who lamented the absence of criminal penalties for terrorist finance during his meeting with the Ambassador. Monitoring of Charitable Institutions -------------- ¶8. (C) After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Kuwait established an Office of Charitable Oversight and Supervision within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, to ensure that funds raised by Kuwaiti charities would not be used to finance terror abroad. To regulate fundraising, all charities were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor before transferring money abroad, and only certain individuals from each charity were authorized to make the transactions (the Office of Oversight provided the Central Bank of Kuwait with a list of all licensed charities and the names of individuals authorized to carry out transfers, which was then provided to all Kuwaiti banks). In the weeks before Ramadan began in fall 2003 -- typically a time of heavy charitable giving -- the Ministry launched a crackdown against unlicensed charity kiosks and sent inspectors into the field to ensure that charities were acting within the law. The government also outlawed the taking of collections in mosques (Ref F). ¶9. (SBU) However, the Charitable Oversight Office made headlines recently when it revealed that of the five Kuwaiti charities licensed to conduct charity work outside of Kuwait, four had violated the Ministry's rules governing fundraising. Specifically, the Ministry alleged, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS),the Social Reform Society (SRS),the Abdullah Al-Nouri Charity, and the Al-Najat Society used unlicensed kiosks and then attempted to evade government supervision of these funds. In response, the GOK has begun shutting down unlicensed kiosks this month, much as they did in 2003 (Ref D). According to local media, the Ministry has warned the charities that should they fail to comply with regulations, the Ministry will take "all necessary legal measures" against them (athough these measures were not specified). ¶10. (C) Several bankers told the Ambassador of their discomfort with the relative lack of supervision over charitable kiosks (Ref B). According to one, "conflict within the ruling family has allowed the rise of religious parties and their influence," and has made the GOK disinclined to regulate charitable giving more consistently. They hoped, nevertheless, that the recent terrorist confrontations would provide the government with the excuse it needed to impose more stringent controls. Lower Court's Dismissal of Charges Against Al-Fadhli Upheld -------------- -------------- ¶11. (U) Local newspapers reported that on February 16, a Kuwaiti appeals court upheld a lower court ruling absolving Muhsin Al-Fadhli of financing terrorism in Iraq. The ruling came one day after Fadhli was designated by the U.S. as a supporter of terrorism. The appeals court's verdict, however, is not final and the government has the option of referring the case of the Court of Cassation. This ruling is also separate from another charge against Fadhli concerning his alleged connection with the 2000 attack on the USS Cole; that case is still pending. TUELLER