KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP: GOK TO USE

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador chaired on March 14 the
monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group
(CWG). Participants reviewed pending anti-terror
legislation, developments in stemming terror financing, and
identified criteria by which to assess GOK counterterrorism
measures. The group noted intensified GOK efforts to improve
technology used to track wanted individuals, enhance training
for security service personnel, and identify possible
militants within the military and public sector. (Post's CWG
is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads from
RSO, POL, ECON, CONS, RMAS, OMC-K, and DIALO.) End Summary.



2. (C) Pol Chief provided an update on counterterrorism
legislation currently being discussed by the Council of
Ministers or before the National Assembly. The GOK wants to
strengthen existing laws, especially those addressing "jihad"
and arms possession. Experts are seeking to define jihad in
a way so that those who extol it cannot claim freedom of
expression if charged with a crime. Likewise, legislators
want to legally distinguish between those who seek/offer
weapons training for sport in contrast to training in order
to perpetrate terror acts. The GOK is also taking steps in
support of international efforts to combat terrorism. The
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism is expected to be ratified this legislative
session and the GOK recently confirmed it submitted the
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to the
UN in April 2004 (ref B). Although the GOK often refers to
its obligations under the GCC anti-terror pact, post has not
yet located a copy of the agreement.



3. (C) Econ Chief reported on an FBI/IRS team in Kuwait
from 12-16 March to present a training course for personnel
from Kuwait State Security (KSS), the Central Bank, and
Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The seminar, entitled
"Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering Program," was
funded by the Department of State to provide training to
countries most vulnerable to terrorist financing. It
reinforced Kuwaiti institutions' ability to detect, disrupt
and dismantle terrorist financing networks. He also noted
that current money laundering legislation addressed the
source of the funds, not their use, making it difficult for
the GOK to take action against terror financiers. The
Ambassador mentioned that he raised the need for the GOK to
begin tracking cash exported from Kuwait funds with Shaykh
Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah, President of the National Security
Bureau, who did not fully appreciate the extent of the
problem (ref A). Econ Chief further suggested that Kuwait
would benefit from consultations with the IMF on the fund's
efforts to combat international terror financing.



4. (S/NF) RMAS reported that security forces had located
most members of known terror cells. Financier Mohsen
Al-Fadhli remains at large and is believed to be in Kuwait.
There is no information on the whereabouts of Khaled
Al-Dosari. The GOK is also investigating reports that
detained Imam and Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs
employee Hamid Al-Ali recruits and sends Kuwait youth for
jihad.



5. (S/NF) OMC-K Chief said that the Kuwaiti military
leadership asked the British Military Mission (BMM) to
recommend options on how to better organize in order to
support the MOI in internal security operations. To that
end, BG Jim Baxter, the BMM Chief, has delivered a
recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Staff, MG Ahmed
Al-Khaled Al-Sabah that builds upon the Commando Brigade as a
response force. Additionally, the Commandos are sending
20-30 Commandos to Jordan for training (NFI). Separately,
and on its own initiative, the BMM is seeking to develop a
training and advisory niche or position within the Kuwaiti
governmental structure that would allow it to train and
advise the three primary Kuwaiti security forces: MOI,
Ministry of Defense, and the Kuwaiti National Guard with a
focus on internal security. The GOK is also taking a closer
look at the make-up of the military, locating AWOL personnel,
identifying non-Kuwaitis with the intent of moving them out
of the security forces (there are and estimated 4,000 Saudis,
for example, within the larger security forces of Kuwait),
and screening out those with extremist ideologies. He
further informed OMC-K Chief that MG Khaled Al-Jarrah
Al-Sabah, the Kuwait Armed Forces (KAF) J2, said he had been
tasked by the Minister of Defense to screen the KAF and also
given authority to remove those found to have extremist
positions or allegiances. The MG added that the Army Chief
of Staff lost his veto on personnel decisions regarding
possible extremists in the ranks. RSO echoed a revived
Kuwaiti interest in training opportunities offered by the
U.S. or private sector sources. The GOK also has long-term
plans to establish a training center.



6. (S) The Working Group also discussed benchmarks by which
to measure Kuwaiti progress on CT activities. Among the
areas to be monitored are:

Law Enforcement and Judicial Action -- monitoring the GOK's
ability to locate and detain wanted insurgents, adoption of
CT laws and international conventions, and sentencing of
convicted terrorists and their supporters.

Financial Controls -- monitoring GOK oversight of charitable
organizations, implementation of money-laundering laws, and
prosecution of those accused of terror financing.

Coordination and Sharing of Intelligence -- monitoring the
speed and accuracy of information shared with the U.S. and
others, as well as coordination among GOK entities.

Public Awareness -- tracking GOK efforts to educate the
public on domestic threats and reforming educational and
information material that espouse violence.
LEBARON