Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
05KUWAIT1159 | 2005-03-21 14:13:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Kuwait |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001159 |
1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador chaired on March 14 the monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group (CWG). Participants reviewed pending anti-terror legislation, developments in stemming terror financing, and identified criteria by which to assess GOK counterterrorism measures. The group noted intensified GOK efforts to improve technology used to track wanted individuals, enhance training for security service personnel, and identify possible militants within the military and public sector. (Post's CWG is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads from RSO, POL, ECON, CONS, RMAS, OMC-K, and DIALO.) End Summary. 2. (C) Pol Chief provided an update on counterterrorism legislation currently being discussed by the Council of Ministers or before the National Assembly. The GOK wants to strengthen existing laws, especially those addressing "jihad" and arms possession. Experts are seeking to define jihad in a way so that those who extol it cannot claim freedom of expression if charged with a crime. Likewise, legislators want to legally distinguish between those who seek/offer weapons training for sport in contrast to training in order to perpetrate terror acts. The GOK is also taking steps in support of international efforts to combat terrorism. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is expected to be ratified this legislative session and the GOK recently confirmed it submitted the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to the UN in April 2004 (ref B). Although the GOK often refers to its obligations under the GCC anti-terror pact, post has not yet located a copy of the agreement. 3. (C) Econ Chief reported on an FBI/IRS team in Kuwait from 12-16 March to present a training course for personnel from Kuwait State Security (KSS), the Central Bank, and Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The seminar, entitled "Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering Program," was funded by the Department of State to provide training to countries most vulnerable to terrorist financing. It reinforced Kuwaiti institutions' ability to detect, disrupt and dismantle terrorist financing networks. He also noted that current money laundering legislation addressed the source of the funds, not their use, making it difficult for the GOK to take action against terror financiers. The Ambassador mentioned that he raised the need for the GOK to begin tracking cash exported from Kuwait funds with Shaykh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah, President of the National Security Bureau, who did not fully appreciate the extent of the problem (ref A). Econ Chief further suggested that Kuwait would benefit from consultations with the IMF on the fund's efforts to combat international terror financing. 4. (S/NF) RMAS reported that security forces had located most members of known terror cells. Financier Mohsen Al-Fadhli remains at large and is believed to be in Kuwait. There is no information on the whereabouts of Khaled Al-Dosari. The GOK is also investigating reports that detained Imam and Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs employee Hamid Al-Ali recruits and sends Kuwait youth for jihad. 5. (S/NF) OMC-K Chief said that the Kuwaiti military leadership asked the British Military Mission (BMM) to recommend options on how to better organize in order to support the MOI in internal security operations. To that end, BG Jim Baxter, the BMM Chief, has delivered a recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Staff, MG Ahmed Al-Khaled Al-Sabah that builds upon the Commando Brigade as a response force. Additionally, the Commandos are sending 20-30 Commandos to Jordan for training (NFI). Separately, and on its own initiative, the BMM is seeking to develop a training and advisory niche or position within the Kuwaiti governmental structure that would allow it to train and advise the three primary Kuwaiti security forces: MOI, Ministry of Defense, and the Kuwaiti National Guard with a focus on internal security. The GOK is also taking a closer look at the make-up of the military, locating AWOL personnel, identifying non-Kuwaitis with the intent of moving them out of the security forces (there are and estimated 4,000 Saudis, for example, within the larger security forces of Kuwait), and screening out those with extremist ideologies. He further informed OMC-K Chief that MG Khaled Al-Jarrah Al-Sabah, the Kuwait Armed Forces (KAF) J2, said he had been tasked by the Minister of Defense to screen the KAF and also given authority to remove those found to have extremist positions or allegiances. The MG added that the Army Chief of Staff lost his veto on personnel decisions regarding possible extremists in the ranks. RSO echoed a revived Kuwaiti interest in training opportunities offered by the U.S. or private sector sources. The GOK also has long-term plans to establish a training center. 6. (S) The Working Group also discussed benchmarks by which to measure Kuwaiti progress on CT activities. Among the areas to be monitored are: Law Enforcement and Judicial Action -- monitoring the GOK's ability to locate and detain wanted insurgents, adoption of CT laws and international conventions, and sentencing of convicted terrorists and their supporters. Financial Controls -- monitoring GOK oversight of charitable organizations, implementation of money-laundering laws, and prosecution of those accused of terror financing. Coordination and Sharing of Intelligence -- monitoring the speed and accuracy of information shared with the U.S. and others, as well as coordination among GOK entities. Public Awareness -- tracking GOK efforts to educate the public on domestic threats and reforming educational and information material that espouse violence. LEBARON |