THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000646 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2015 TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREF PREL KPKO KAWC CG SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION REF: A. (A) STATE 66187 ¶B. (B) KIGALI 405 Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Embassy Kinshasa shares view expressed ref a that it would be a tragedy to miss the opportunity provided by the Sant' Egidio process to energize the voluntary return of a large number of non-genocidaire FDLR elements and their dependents. This initiative offers the best chance in over ten years to begin to address a neuralgic problem which has contributed significantly to regional instability and particularly to continuing mistrust and conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. We appreciate being given the opportunity to share our thoughts. ¶2. (C) As requested, Embassy will explore with GDRC (Antoine Ghonda is the point person on the issue but has been traveling virtually constantly since the conclusion of the Rome talks and the Pope's funeral) their thinking on the proposed "comite de suivi." What we know at the moment is that Ghonda's initial explanation was that this international commission would serve as a confidence-building measure to encourage the FDLR to proceed with disarmament, and specifically would address FDLR concerns that they would return to Rwanda, unarmed, and either be imprisoned or harmed in some manner. When PolCouns asked whether the commission would also somehow be responsible for developing (or forcing) "political space" in Rwanda for the returnees, Ghonda said that the Congolese had categorically rejected any such role. (Comment: This commission potentially could be a useful way to defuse a potential roadblock to progress. We and the U.K. -- which has informally been asked to chair the group -- will be well-positioned to help shape its mission and structure in our talks with the Congolese. Assuming that we can reach a satisfactory conclusion on these issues, we should be prepared to support and take part in the commission. End Comment.) ¶3. (C) Ref b recounting of the Monuc briefing provided to Embassy Kigali generally captures well Monuc's preparations to expeditiously facilitate the process. We spoke to Peter Swarbrick, head of DDR/DDRRR for Monuc in Kinshasa, who was in Rome for the logistical negotiations, and to Monuc's DDR/DDRRR chief in Bukavu, Tim Reed. Swarbrick said that in his opinion, Rwandan Foreign Minister Murigande's public statement on March 31 had substantially altered the dynamic of the Rome negotiations and had had the effect of causing the FDLR to pull back from their initial readiness to commit to a logistical process and timetable (elements which were to have been announced on April 2). As originally envisioned, the process should have officially begun April 15 and would have run for 90 days. Instead, the program launch is now on hold, pending further discussions to "reassure" the FDLR that they can safely return. Swarbrick hopes that the process now could begin on/about the first week of May and end in the first week of August. He emphasized that Monuc's education campaign, working through Radio Okapi broadcasts and leaflets dropped near known FDLR sites by Monuc helicopters, is on-track and, beginning April 15, will be augmented by FDLR "sensitizers" who have arrived in both Kivus and are coordinating with Monuc liaison offices there. ¶4. (C) In South Kivu, the Bukavu Monuc office is planning to build three major disarmament camps -- in Hombo, Kaziba/Burhinyi, and Kamanyola, all three of which can be completed in about one week once work begins. In addition, smaller "collection points" will be established in Sange (Ruzizi plain),Uvira and Adikivu (near the Bukavu airport). Responding to a GDRC request for assistance, some NGOs, as well as UNHCR, are also preparing support sites for the Rwandan refugee repatriation program, which will be located in the same areas as the Monuc sites. In addition to the actual camps, NGOs will also establish "food and water stations" along the routes which the FDLR will travel to reach the processing zones, to ensure that all arrive in adequate health. ¶5. (C) Neither we, Monuc nor the Congolese, however, have any illusions. Even if the Sant' Egidio process is one hundred percent successful, there still will be a need for action of some sort to address the problem of the remaining hard-core elements in eastern Congo. The real genocidaires, together with the Rastas (a savage criminalized element of the FDLR) have no intention of going anywhere voluntarily. Rather, they prefer to remain and prey on the Congolese and disrupt regional stability. This group, which Monuc estimates could comprise 3,000-5,000 combatants, will need to be confronted. The Congolese, with Angolan assistance, are working to train a small group of Congolese military who could cooperate with Monuc in attacking this problem, with or without accompanying AU forces. What More Can We Do? -------------- ¶6. (C) The above is what we know about what already is underway, but that begs the key question of ref a, what more can we propose (creatively) doing? -- we can and should pass a clear message to the GOR that now is the time to honor the pledge it has repeatedly made for the last ten years that it will welcome the return of non-genocidaire FDLR members. Unfortunately, Foreign Minister Murigande's statement -- and other, more recent statements, such as the one in which Rwanda deplores the UN and the international community for "sitting at the same table with" the FDLR (to negotiate their return to Rwanda) -- strongly suggest that confronted with the real possibility of such a return, Rwanda has mixed feelings. -- likewise, working through the GDRC and our European Embassies and our EU confreres, we need to keep reiterating a clear and simple message to the FDLR, it is time to go home or face the consequences. -- we should encourage the AU and the EU to continue to explore the possibility of AU military assistance to the Monuc-Congolese effort, while keeping in mind that given the significant military obligations already undertaken by the AU it may not be able to compose a force quickly enough to be of assistance. -- we have an opportunity, through the Tripartite Agreement, to ensure that Rwanda and the DRC continue to talk directly to each other about the FDLR process. (Ghonda and Kaputo visited Kigali at least twice during the negotiations to speak directly to President Kagame.) We should adhere to the Tripartite meeting schedule which we ourselves outlined, to keep open these channels of communication. We should ensure that the FDLR question is the central issue on the agenda of the April 21-22 Tripartite meeting in Lubumbashi. -- likewise, we should move ahead as expeditiously as possible in establishing the fusion cell. If functional within the next three months it could provide a useful tool for any post-August military operation against remaining genocidaire elements. -- we are considering a Congolese request to provide brigade-level command training to the element which would combat the FDLR. We should move expeditiously on that request, and also look seriously for any communications equipment which might be available for this discrete element, possibly through the excess defense articles program. Seizing the Moment -------------- ¶7. (C) In short, we have an unprecedented opportunity to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, one of the largest and thorniest of the regional security flashpoints. Doing so will be a major step as well in our efforts to encourage Rwanda and the DRC to resume diplomatic relations at the proper moment. Finally, but far from insignificantly, the return of the FDLR to Rwanda could greatly diminish the degree of human suffering which currently characterizes the life of average Congolese in the two Kivus, who are victimized daily by the FDLR elements. We need to do everything we can to ensure that this process is not stalled, but rather moves quickly ahead. MEECE