Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KINSHASA1731
2005-10-17 12:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO CG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171257Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001731 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC
STILL WORRIED OVER FDLR

REF: A. KINSHASA 1711


B. KINSHASA 1690

Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001731 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG SUBJECT: RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC STILL WORRIED OVER FDLR REF: A. KINSHASA 1711 ¶B. KINSHASA 1690 Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) During his October 13 meeting with the Ambassador regarding the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention (reftel A),Minister of Foreign Affairs Raymond Ramazani spoke about the upcoming Tripartite meeting and the security situation in the eastern part of the country, particularly in South Kivu province with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). -------------- TRIPARTITE MEETING -------------- ¶2. (C) Ramazani said he was not planning on attending the upcoming Tripartite meeting scheduled for October 20-21 in Kampala. He added that he also gathered from Rwanda's Foreign Minister, Charles Murigande, that he would not be attending the meeting, either. The DRC delegation likely will be headed by Minister for Regional Cooperation Mbusa Nyamwisi. -------------- ACTING AGAINST THE FDLR -------------- ¶3. (C) Ramazani said he worried about the recent massacre of civilians in South Kivu by RASTA/FDLR forces (reftel B), indicating that such events reflect the continuing obstacles to establishing peace and security posed by FDLR elements. Ramazani also said that the presence and activities of the FDLR are the biggest difficulties in establishing normal relations with Rwanda. ¶4. (C) Ramazani told Ambassador he was disappointed that the US and European Union proposed package of sanctions against the FDLR had not been enacted following the September 30 deadline. ¶5. (C) Ramazani further said the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) were unable to fight the FDLR alone. He complained that MONUC, which has troops in the province, is not in a hurry to resolve the situation and disarm the FDLR soldiers. He said that MONUC should have the capacity to stop FDLR activities, but as of yet has not done so. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador concurred that a package of measures or sanctions targeting FDLR leaders outside of Africa is needed following the September 30 deadline, and noted that efforts are in progress to put such measures in place. He also noted that MONUC's mandate and capability have limits, but that MONUC has been actively conducting for some time cordon and search operations to establish arms-free zones in South Kivu province. Indeed, 2,500 FARDC troops have essentially been trained by the MONUC brigade there to assist in these operations, although there is no explicit MONUC mandate for such training. What is missing is a capable FARDC force, such as the Angolan-trained Kitona Second Integrated Brigade to provide the needed Congolese military capacity and authority to go after FDLR and other destabilizing forces in the area. Likewise, when equipped, the Kamina Belgian/South African trained brigade needs to be deployed as soon as possible to North Kivu to provide a similar capability there. Ramazani acknowledged the point that the FARDC deployments are needed. ¶7. (C) Comment: While even the integrated FARDC brigades' capabilities are open to question, deployment of the newly trained integrated brigades is essential to provide a national component to operations against the FDLR and other disruptive forces in eastern Congo. Such a component is needed not only for additional military capability, but as well for the sovereign authority that the FARDC represents. While various factors, including arrival and distribution of equipment promised by various donors, has slowed the process, deployments are lagging far behind schedule, we suspect to a significant degree due to foot-dragging or outright opposition within the senior FARDC officer corps. With proposals on the table for far-reaching reforms regarding FARDC pay, support and general administration, vested interests of these officers are being threatened. Deployments to active operational areas of the integrated brigades focuses even more attention on these issues. These deployments are high on the agenda for the next meetings of the CIAT with the Espace Presidentiel, and the Security Sector Mixed Commission, and we will continue to press the issue bilaterally as well. End Comment. MEECE

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