SOME LUBERIZI INTEGRATION CENTER PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001229

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CG
SUBJECT: SOME LUBERIZI INTEGRATION CENTER PROGRESS


Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).


1. (U) Ambassadors/Charges composing the International
Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) stopped at the
Luberizi military integration camp while on a visit to South
Kivu Province July 22. The Luberizi camp is located very
near the Burundi border, at the site of a prior, now largely
destroyed, military training center. It was established as
an integration center in recent months associated with the
various "emergency plans" established to further DRC,s
military integration, but lacked even the most basic
facilities to conduct training or other operations.


2. (SBU) The July 22 visit was encouraging, with visible
progress at the camp. The European Union (EU) has committed
funds in support of Luberizi camp improvements, but that
money has not yet arrived through the delivery pipeline.
Nonetheless, construction was underway of simple wooden
barracks and other facilities, following a master plan for
camp development that had already been defined. More
significantly, CIAT members found over 3,000 troops assembled
at the center, the majority of whom had opted for
integration, and a smaller number choosing to be demobilized.
MONUC Pakistani officials as well as GDRC officers at the
camp affirmed to the CIAT that all the troops at the camp
were receiving regular food rations and pay, albeit at the
meager $10/month level in effect for FARDC troops. All of
this was coming out of the government budget. All troops
destined for integration were equipped with fairly
recently-issued uniforms and boots; most still retained
weapons. Soldiers opting for demobilization wore civilian
clothes.


3. (C) The ranking FARDC officer, a Colonel, briefed CIAT
members that the assembled troops included nearly 1,000
"ex-government" forces, about the same number of ex-RCD-Goma
troops, slightly more than 1,000 ex-MLC troops, about 410
ex-Mai Mai combatants, and roughly 40 "Ex-Masunzu" soldiers.
(Note: The latter refers to South Kivu Banyamulenge soldiers
who served under the command of General Masunzu. End Note).
The camp had originally received 123 "ex-Masunzu" troops, but
83 of these had deserted, presumably returning to the
Banyamulenge home area in South Kivu. Roughly 125 of the
original Mai Mai contingent had also deserted. Of all
remaining troops, however, only 2 had deserted, both of these
ex-RCD-Goma soldiers. Most of the soldiers at the center
were accompanied by their families. None of the training
had been started for the troops to be integrated, and would
not pending completion of some further facilities.


4. (C) The FARDC Colonel also reported the specific arms
inventory of the camp, which included over 2,200 AK-47,s,
four 60 mm mortars, and 7 RPG,s, the latter weapons having
only a few rounds each of ammunition. Upon questioning by
CIAT members, MONUC officers present confirmed that MONUC
will soon be taking possession of all weapons and ammunition
as a part of the agreed-upon integration procedures.
Officials from CONADER, the GDRC agency in charge of DDR
programs, affirmed that a DDR center has been established,
about 14 kms. away, and that those soldiers to be demobilized
would be transferred there after being disarmed. The German
NGO, GTZ, has already been designated to oversee operations
at the DDR camp.


5. (C) Comment: The Luberizi camp illustrated both
difficulties and progress characteristic of the current
integration and DDR programs. The camp had been established
in haste with no adequate facilities. In theory, separation
of the soldiers to be demobilized is to be done before troops
arrive at the integration center, the opposite of what is
occurring at Luberizi. Nonetheless, GDRC-supplied uniforms,
food, and pay are arriving at the camp, construction is
(belatedly) underway of facilities, and the mix of troops in
the camp is a good representation of former belligerent
armies. All are living in close proximity with no evident
tension nor reported incidents. The relatively high
desertion rate of former Mai Mai and Banyamulenge troops is
not surprising, and can be expected as the integration and
DDR processes move forward. In general, however, pending the
start of training, the Luberizi camp is showing signs of how
the larger integration program should develop. End comment.
MEECE