INDIAN FS SARAN: KING NEEDS TO RECONCILE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002793

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN FS SARAN: KING NEEDS TO RECONCILE WITH
PARTIES

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) On December 12, Indian Foreign Secretary Saran told
the Ambassador that he was visiting Nepal to follow-up on the
Dhaka meeting between PM Singh and King Gyanendra and to keep
open lines of communication with the government in Nepal.
Saran's message to the King in his December 13 audience would
be the same as Singh's had been: the King needed to move fast
to reconcile with the political parties. Saran termed the
Maoist-Parties' 12-point understanding "an historic
opportunity worth exploring." The Ambassador cautioned that
the U.S. would take a dim view of the Parties continuing a
working relationship with the Maoists if the latter resumed
using violence to overthrow the government. Saran agreed
with the Ambassador that, in the meantime and with the King's
lack of action, the Maoists and the political parties had
gained the upper hand by capturing the people's concern for
peace. End Summary.

Message to the King: Act Fast to Reconcile
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2. (C) In a December 12 meeting with UK Ambassador Keith
Bloomfield, Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee and the
Ambassador, Foreign Secretary Syam Saran stressed that the
Government of India (GOI) viewed his trip to Nepal as a
follow-up to the meeting between PM Manmohan Singh and the
King in Dhaka on the margins of the SAARC Summit, where the
PM had assured the King that the GOI would stay in regular
contact. Saran said that he was carrying the same message
the PM had given the King in Dhaka: the King had to move, and
fast, to reconcile with the political parties. Saran noted
that the GOI was doing this out of friendship. It did not
oppose the monarchy, but did not believe the monarchy would
survive unless the King acted.

Maoist-Parties Understanding: "Historic Opportunity"
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3. (C) Observing that the Nepali people wanted peace, Saran
termed the Maoist-Parties' 12-point understanding an
"historic opportunity that needs to be explored." He noted
that it had rearranged Nepal's political landscape and the
King should NOW respond. The Foreign Secretary opined that
there was a real possibility that the Maoists had realized
that they lacked the military wherewithal to take over the
state and that they were deeply unpopular in the countryside
and might be looking for a soft landing. The Ambassador
agreed on the need for the King to compromise, and
acknowledged that we had not seen any indication he was
willing to do so just yet. The King might be hoping the
February municipal elections could shift the political
landscape in his favor.


4. (C) While the Indian Foreign Secretary indicated that
there was a chance that the understanding could pressure the
King and lead to dramatic change, the Ambassador questioned
how to provide Nepal with a safe landing if the King
continued to be stubborn and did not change. Ambassador
Bloomfield echoed that concern, asking whether we could be
sure that the King would accept a ceremonial role, cautioning
that, if not, "this could all be for naught." Saran
acknowledged that even though the King was obviously an
obstacle right now, the international community had to be
careful not to do anything that ended up allowing the Maoists
to make huge advances.

Ambassador: Worry if Maoists Return to Violence
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5. (C) The Ambassador warned that Washington would look
askance at a working relationship between the Parties and the
Maoists if the latter engaged in violence to overthrow the
regime. Saran first responded by noting that India, like the
U.S., had said all along that a military victory was
impossible, and that a combination of factors was needed:
military pressure and political means might be needed to

convince the Maoists to come in out of the cold. Saran
appeared to be implying that perhaps a combination of
military pressure from the Maoists and political means by the
Parties might be necessary to make the King see reason.
Switching course abruptly, however, he said that the
political parties needed to make clear to the Maoists that
breaking the cease-fire (due to expire January 3, 2006) would
be unacceptable.

Maoists and Parties Have High Ground As Advocates For Peace
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6. (C) Saran stressed that right NOW the people's number one
demand was peace. The political parties and the Maoists had
found a way to capture that concern and were NOW focused on
peace, while putting other issues, like regression and
reinstatement of parliament, on the back burner. The Foreign
Secretary added that it appeared as if the King was thinking

SIPDIS
that getting Narayan Singh Pun and Kamal Thapa, both of whom
had been involved in prior negotiations with the Maoists,
into the Cabinet would enable him to start a dialogue with
the Maoists. Saran commented that, if so, the King was
probably mistaken. The Maoists and political parties had
gone too far with each other to break apart easily. Saran
added that the Maoists did not trust Pun or Thapa and blamed
them for the Doramba massacre in August 2003, which
effectively ended the last round of peace talks.

Comment
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7. (C) The GOI appears happy that it has helped start a
Maoist-Parties combine that could force change. Like us,
they are hoping that the King will respond by taking the
right steps. Saran's comments and tone indicated that the
GOI, like the political parties, might be analyzing the
situation through slightly rose-colored glasses. Both the
Parties and the GOI appear to be trying to convince
themselves that the Maoists have genuinely changed. We
remain more skeptical and are waiting to see proof.
MORIARTY