INDIAN FS SARAN: KING NEEDS TO RECONCILE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002793 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NP SUBJECT: INDIAN FS SARAN: KING NEEDS TO RECONCILE WITH PARTIES Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On December 12, Indian Foreign Secretary Saran told the Ambassador that he was visiting Nepal to follow-up on the Dhaka meeting between PM Singh and King Gyanendra and to keep open lines of communication with the government in Nepal. Saran's message to the King in his December 13 audience would be the same as Singh's had been: the King needed to move fast to reconcile with the political parties. Saran termed the Maoist-Parties' 12-point understanding "an historic opportunity worth exploring." The Ambassador cautioned that the U.S. would take a dim view of the Parties continuing a working relationship with the Maoists if the latter resumed using violence to overthrow the government. Saran agreed with the Ambassador that, in the meantime and with the King's lack of action, the Maoists and the political parties had gained the upper hand by capturing the people's concern for peace. End Summary. Message to the King: Act Fast to Reconcile -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 12 meeting with UK Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee and the Ambassador, Foreign Secretary Syam Saran stressed that the Government of India (GOI) viewed his trip to Nepal as a follow-up to the meeting between PM Manmohan Singh and the King in Dhaka on the margins of the SAARC Summit, where the PM had assured the King that the GOI would stay in regular contact. Saran said that he was carrying the same message the PM had given the King in Dhaka: the King had to move, and fast, to reconcile with the political parties. Saran noted that the GOI was doing this out of friendship. It did not oppose the monarchy, but did not believe the monarchy would survive unless the King acted. Maoist-Parties Understanding: "Historic Opportunity" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Observing that the Nepali people wanted peace, Saran termed the Maoist-Parties' 12-point understanding an "historic opportunity that needs to be explored." He noted that it had rearranged Nepal's political landscape and the King should now respond. The Foreign Secretary opined that there was a real possibility that the Maoists had realized that they lacked the military wherewithal to take over the state and that they were deeply unpopular in the countryside and might be looking for a soft landing. The Ambassador agreed on the need for the King to compromise, and acknowledged that we had not seen any indication he was willing to do so just yet. The King might be hoping the February municipal elections could shift the political landscape in his favor. ¶4. (C) While the Indian Foreign Secretary indicated that there was a chance that the understanding could pressure the King and lead to dramatic change, the Ambassador questioned how to provide Nepal with a safe landing if the King continued to be stubborn and did not change. Ambassador Bloomfield echoed that concern, asking whether we could be sure that the King would accept a ceremonial role, cautioning that, if not, "this could all be for naught." Saran acknowledged that even though the King was obviously an obstacle right now, the international community had to be careful not to do anything that ended up allowing the Maoists to make huge advances. Ambassador: Worry if Maoists Return to Violence -------------- -- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador warned that Washington would look askance at a working relationship between the Parties and the Maoists if the latter engaged in violence to overthrow the regime. Saran first responded by noting that India, like the U.S., had said all along that a military victory was impossible, and that a combination of factors was needed: military pressure and political means might be needed to convince the Maoists to come in out of the cold. Saran appeared to be implying that perhaps a combination of military pressure from the Maoists and political means by the Parties might be necessary to make the King see reason. Switching course abruptly, however, he said that the political parties needed to make clear to the Maoists that breaking the cease-fire (due to expire January 3, 2006) would be unacceptable. Maoists and Parties Have High Ground As Advocates For Peace -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Saran stressed that right now the people's number one demand was peace. The political parties and the Maoists had found a way to capture that concern and were now focused on peace, while putting other issues, like regression and reinstatement of parliament, on the back burner. The Foreign Secretary added that it appeared as if the King was thinking SIPDIS that getting Narayan Singh Pun and Kamal Thapa, both of whom had been involved in prior negotiations with the Maoists, into the Cabinet would enable him to start a dialogue with the Maoists. Saran commented that, if so, the King was probably mistaken. The Maoists and political parties had gone too far with each other to break apart easily. Saran added that the Maoists did not trust Pun or Thapa and blamed them for the Doramba massacre in August 2003, which effectively ended the last round of peace talks. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOI appears happy that it has helped start a Maoist-Parties combine that could force change. Like us, they are hoping that the King will respond by taking the right steps. Saran's comments and tone indicated that the GOI, like the political parties, might be analyzing the situation through slightly rose-colored glasses. Both the Parties and the GOI appear to be trying to convince themselves that the Maoists have genuinely changed. We remain more skeptical and are waiting to see proof. MORIARTY