DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCERNED ABOUT MAOISTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002668 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS NP SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCERNED ABOUT MAOISTS, PARTIES REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2547 ¶C. KATHMANDU 2572 Classified By: CDA Elisabeth I. Millard, reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate discussions with the ambassadors of Israel, Norway, Bangladesh, and Germany, the Ambassador discussed our concerns that the recent 12-point understanding between the political parties and Maoists contained no Maoist commitment to give up violence (ref A). He remarked that the Parties ran a great risk by signing such an understanding: if the Maoists returned to violence, the King could take action against the Parties for treason. The Ambassador raised the suggestion that the King could call for an internationally monitored cease-fire, which would show him as a proponent of peace (ref B). The other ambassadors shared this concern; the Bangladeshi Ambassador was the only one who expressed optimism that the Maoists might join the political mainstream. End Summary. DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNDERSTANDING -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 25, the Ambassador briefed his colleagues (Israeli Ambassador Dan Stav, Norwegian Ambassador Tore Toreng accompanied by Jon Lomoy from Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladeshi Ambassador Humayun Kabir, and German Ambassador Franz Ring) on our concerns regarding the Maoist-Parties 12-point understanding. The Ambassador noted that the understanding contained no Maoist commitment to give up violence; if the Maoists returned to violence, the King could act against the Parties as abetting terrorists and committing treason. Ambassador Stav agreed that the current situation looked grim. He added that, if the Maoists resumed violence, the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) would need more arms, and suggested that this would be an opportunity to put international pressure on the King by withholding military assistance to Nepal (ref C). Ambassador Toreng suggested that the international community explain to His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) what the good and bad points of the understanding were. Ambassador Ring shared U.S. concerns and was extremely skeptical of the understanding. BANGLADESHI OPTIMISTIC MAOISTS MIGHT JOIN MAINSTREAM -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Bangladeshi Ambassador Kabir speculated that, if the Maoists could gain politically, they might abandon violence and rejoin the mainstream political process. The Ambassador explained that, if the Maoists joined the mainstream they would most likely fare poorly in elections and have little or no political clout. Kabir noted that political parties in South Asia that had been around a long time tended to do better in subsequent elections. The Ambassador countered that the Maoists never had ten percent support even in the best of times and had alienated most Nepalis by their violent behavior. There were no indications that many people would vote for them in an election. The Bangladeshi Ambassador added that perhaps the Maoists were realizing the lack of success of Mao's ideology and were rethinking the need to go mainstream. He commented that it would require six months to two years to prepare for constituent assembly elections with Maoist participation, and it would be interesting to observe the political discourse during that period. MAOIST IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador explained to Ambassadors Stav and Kabir that the Maoist central committee membership had decreased from 90 to 30 members, perhaps as a result of those affiliated with Baburam Bhattarai leaving (or being forced out) after Prachanda had come out on top of the recent Bhattarai-Prachanda ideology rift. Prachanda was clearly in charge now and there had been a bit of an ideological shift. Stav noted that he understood that there were a growing number of Maoist desertions and that some Maoists were going abroad for work. The Ambassador agreed, explaining that the cease-fire had allowed some cadre to go back to their villages and some had then quit the movement. Kabir mentioned that he had talked with the King at the SAARC summit in Dhaka, who had said the calling of municipal elections was dividing the Maoists. The Ambassador remarked that forced recruits were using the cease-fire as an opportunity to desert. WELCOME SUGGESTION THAT KING CALL CEASE-FIRE -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised the suggestion that the King call for an internationally monitored cease-fire, which would show him as a proponent for peace. Mr. Lomoy was curious whether the Parties would lose power under such a cease-fire agreement; the Ambassador replied that stopping violence with a cease-fire would have the opposite effect, allowing the Parties to get back out in the countryside. It would also expand the reach of HMGN, which could resume delivery of government services. MILLARD