UML LEADER CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002635 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: UML LEADER CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UNDERSTANDING WITH MAOISTS REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2605 Classified By: CDA Elisabeth I. Millard, Reason 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) CPN-UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal told the Charge November 28 that the political parties would shun violence, even if the Maoists broke the cease-fire, due to expire December 3. He speculated that the insurgents might pose conditions for extending the cease-fire. He emphasized his continued suspicion of the Maoists and said that he had requested the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor the Maoists' commitments. The UML leader believed that the Parties still had room to negotiate with the King, but distrusted the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). He hoped that the King would respond positively to the Maoist-Parties understanding and act to return power to the political parties, who would continue their successful protest program for democracy. End Summary. Maoists Might Extend Cease-Fire -------------- ¶2. (C) In a November 28 meeting, the Charge cautioned MK Nepal of the possible consequences if the political parties were associated with a group using violent means to attempt to overthrow the government. MK Nepal asserted that the Maoists might extend the cease-fire, speculating that the Maoists might stipulate to the King some conditions, such as withdrawing his call for the municipal elections scheduled for February 8. If the King met the conditions, the Maoists would be prepared to prolong the cease-fire indefinitely; however, if the King reacted negatively, the Maoists would break their cease-fire. MK Nepal claimed that the Parties had tried to convince the Maoists to extend the cease-fire, but he acknowledged the Maoist cadre were "restless" because of the losses they had suffered during the cease-fire. He indicated that the Parties had not agreed on how to react if the Maoists did not extend their cease-fire. But UML Remains Suspicious Of Maoists -------------- ¶3. (C) MK Nepal admitted that he was of two minds about the Maoists. Part of him wanted to take the Maoists into his confidence and trust them, but he also feared that the Maoists intended to use the political parties. He wanted to have the opportunity to observe their actions. Recalling the Maoist refusal to negotiate with the political parties when former PM Deuba's government had extended an offer to do so, MK Nepal also worried that the Maoists might have a secret understanding with the King. However, he concluded that the political parties had achieved a great deal by persuading the Maoists to agree to the 12 point understanding (ref A). Saying that they had turned a new page, he argued that the Parties should gauge their actions and call them to account if they violated their commitments. And Asks OHCHR's Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) The UML head relayed that he had just met with UN OHCHR head Ian Martin to request OHCHR involvement to monitor Maoist commitments to multiparty democracy, rule of law, and human rights. MK Nepal said that the Maoists had not agreed to abide by or recognize Nepali law. The definition of rule of law was debatable, but the Maoists and Parties might be able to agree on and establish certain norms. He suggested that the seven-party alliance could arrange among themselves to gather information on Maoist behavior, which they could transmit to OHCHR. Martin had said he would consider Nepal's request. ¶5. (C) MK Nepal admitted that the Parties could not assure the displaced people that they could return to their homes. Explaining that some of the IDPS were believed to have been involved in retaliatory action against the Maoists, he said that there was so much bitterness on both sides that a human rights organization would need to monitor the return and bring both sides together. MK Nepal noted his surprise at seeing the large number of abductions had continued and that the Maoists needed to be criticized on this score. He acknowledged that the seven-party alliance had not yet concentrated on these issues. Parties Still Have Room To Negotiate With The King -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal stated that the seven-party alliance would meet after hearing the King's response to the Parties-Maoist understanding -- a response that was expected after the King's scheduled December 2 return to Nepal. The Charge stressed that it was important that the King reach out to the political parties, and if he did so, that the Parties respond. The UML leader set forth the steps he believed necessary for the King to take. First, he should postpone municipal elections; second, retreat from the moves taken February 1 and since; and third, indicate a "willingness to hand over complete power to the political parties." The King should dissolve the current government, appoint a prime minister and either reinstate parliament or form an all-party government. He explained that the 1990 Constitution would need to be changed to curtail the King's power. He emphasized that the King could reach a private understanding with the political parties before constituent assembly elections to ensure the retention of a ceremonial monarchy, if the King undertook not to usurp power in the future. But Distrust the RNA -------------- ¶7. (C) MK Nepal insisted that the Parties would not accept keeping the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) under the King's control. He charged the RNA with interfering with Party activities and expressed his belief that free and fair elections would be impossible if the RNA were free to move around. Nepal emphasized that the army should be "a national, not royal, army." UML Central Committee member Jhalanath Khanal, who had recently been in Pyuthan District in mid-western Nepal and sat in on the meeting, alleged that while lower-ranking officers had allowed the UML's activities to occur without any disturbances, senior officers had instructed the RNA to conduct checks and other activities that interfered with the Party's work. UML Demonstrations a Success -------------- ¶8. (C) MK Nepal claimed that his Party's recent demonstrations (in Butwal, Pokhara, and Jhanakpur) had been a success, despite the government's attempts to create obstacles (ref B). The government had funded the publishing and distribution of pamphlets denouncing the mass meetings, cancelled bus permits to prevent travel to the meeting sites; threatened some bus owners if they carried demonstrators; enforced strict limits on the number of passengers busses could carry (disallowing standing passengers on anybody riding on the roof); and set up temporary security checkpoints along the roads leading to the meeting sites. MK Nepal asserted that the Party could have doubled its estimated attendance to 200,000 had the government not acted. He added that all seven-parties were cooperating and participating in the UML-organized meetings. ¶9. (C) He stated that the UML would watch to see whether the government disturbed a UML demonstration scheduled for December 2 in Kathmandu. He commented that the Party would not be able to prevent the people from reacting violently if the security forces provoked them, adding that the UML suspected the security services might do so. The UML head said that his Party had clearly told the Maoists that they should not do anything that would lead to violence. He indicated that if violence occurred, it would be at the instigation of the government. After the current round of party-organized meetings the alliance planned to hold an all-party demonstration in Jhanakpur, where they hoped to draw 400,000 participants. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite MK Nepal's deep suspicion of the Maoists and his realization that they could destroy the political parties, his current plan seems to be to continue trusting them while waiting to see how the King responds. He was not able to detail a plan of how the parties would react if the King rejected the understanding or if the Maoists broke the cease-fire, beyond calling on the international community to pressure both the Maoists and the King. The possibilities of a trainwreck December 2-3 in light of the current lack of a plan by the Parties seems to be growing. MILLARD