HOW THE WEST ISN'T DONE: AMBASSADOR VISITS HERAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005245 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN COMMERCE FOR AADLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2010 TAGS: EAGR EAID ECON EFIN ETRD AF SUBJECT: HOW THE WEST ISN'T DONE: AMBASSADOR VISITS HERAT REF: KABUL 5185 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN. REASONS 1.4 (B,D) -------------- Summary and Introduction -------------- ¶1. (C) During a December 11-12 visit to Herat, Ambassador observed many of the problems which threaten commercial investment, provincial stability, and rule of law. Although rightly proud of their accomplishments, Herati industrialists face an almost insurmountable task if they are to survive. Proactive GOA engagement is needed to reverse the poor investment climate. Governor Anwari made a pitch for more assistance projects for Heart, although the USG, and particularly USAID, have already assisted Herat Province significantly. Meanwhile, the Governor expressed his belief that DIAG cannot work in Herat unless Herat,s largest warlords are dealt with by Kabul. While ISAF is committed to its Mission, ISAF assets currently are not robust enough to keep Herat pacified. The Border Police are doing good work but need Kabul help. Herat customs, on the other hand, are doing terrible work and require a housecleaning. The bottom line: the West isn,t done, just yet. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) During December 11-12 visit to Herat, Ambassador received local feedback on the commercial, political, and security situation in this important city and province. A city of approximately one million inhabitants, Herat is essentially the capital of western Afghanistan, the country,s most commercially buoyant location, the gateway for most imports and smuggled goods (and an important transit for illicit opium,) and a key Phase One DIAG (Disarming Illegally Armed Groups) site. Interlocutors with the Ambassador included Herati businessmen; Provincial Governor Anwari and senior local GOA officials; ANA 207 Corps Commander and U.S. embedded ANA trainers; PRT, RAC and FSB commanders; members of the assistance and development community, and USG officials stationed in Herat. -------------- Plight of Herati Manufacturers -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On the surface, business in Herat is booming, led by a flood of (often poppy-financed) imported goods from Iran. Budding Herati industrialists however ) and almost 100 manufacturing firms operate in Herat,s Industrial Zone 
alone ) fear they could face extinction as they are undercut by predatory Iranian trade policies, pervasive smuggling from Iran, excessively high domestic costs of production, and misguided GOA policies. Official GOA efforts to control, or at least collect duty on, the flood of goods entering western Afghanistan, the industrialists told the Ambassador, are both inept and corrupt. A visit to the Herat customs house showed that most potential revenue collections for the GOA escape appropriate customs gleaning. ¶4. (SBU) Businessmen explained there are immediate steps the GOA can take to ameliorate the uneven, unfair playing field on which they are forced to compete. First and foremost, they urged, is for the GOA to take control over cross border trade and reinvigorate Afghan customs rules and tariffs. Factory owners spoke strongly against corrupt Afghan customs officials who, for bribes, freely allow competing, and often allegedly inferior, Iranian products to flood Herat,s markets. Iranian companies with the overt support of the GOI, the manufacturers alleged, are seeking the eradication of Afghan competition. They argued that the GOA must be firm in its dealings with the GOI, not only in targeting GOI subsidies and dumping practices, but also in forcing Iran to open its market to Afghan products that might, conceivably, be exported once the playing field was level. ¶5. (SBU) Herat manufacturers highlighted high electricity costs as a major cost to operations. (Unlike most of Afghanistan, Herat enjoys a power grid. Electricity is imported from Iran at $.01-$.02 KWH while the Herat municipality turns around and charges a flat $0.11 KWH to residential and industrial users alike ) the profit margin, supposedly, reinvested in power infrastructure.) Manufacturers with whom the Ambassador spoke wholeheartedly favored the idea of a multi-tier tariff structure that would offer lower rates to industrial users, perhaps at low peak hours. (Note: Even at one-half the current tariff, Herat municipality would still generate much revenue.) Factory owners also pointed to security concerns in the Herat Industrial Zone and at nascent factories throughout the metropolitan area. Many claimed police protection is not being provided by provincial authorities; instead, it is purchased through payments to the police. Access to capital, or any banking services, is non-existent. Finally, a number of manufacturers admitted their lack of business expertise, particularly marketing skills, and sought guidance as to where to turn. -------------- Governor Focused on Stabilization -------------- ¶6. (C) In various face-to-face events with the Ambassador, Governor Sayed Hossein Anwari pointed to Herat,s unique dynamics, strengths, and challenges. Most Heratis, including the province,s religious leaders, the Governor noted, respect and support Afghanistan,s central government. Anwari attributed occasional violence in the province to personal and &traditional8 conflicts. Yet, the Governor acknowledged there are security problems that defy easy solution. While he stated his commitment to DIAG and other GOA-supported measures aimed at stabilizing his province, he is frustrated by the grip still held in Herat by armed supporters of Ismael Khan (IK - current GOA Minister of Energy) and other Herat warlords, most specifically IK rival and counterweight, Amanullah Khan. Without Kabul engagement in bring these two warlords to book, Anwari explained, the DIAG process in Herat was doomed to failure. ¶7. (SBU) The Governor expressed his appreciation for the lage mount of USG assistance to date to his province and participated with the Ambassador in a CFC-A and a USAID dedication. As might be expected, the Governor presented the Ambassador with a wish list of additional projects for USG support, including a new campus for Herat University (a project many Heratis believe was &promised8 by the previous US Ambassador to then Governor Ismael Khan.) The request also included more secondary district roads and an additional 250 school buildings in the province due to a &desperate8 shortage of educational infrastructure, expansion of Herat,s airport (note: the most immediate need is a new runway,) and water projects in Herat,s outlying districts. ¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador presented the Governor with a list of all U.S.-sponsored projects and programs recently completed or currently being programmed in Herat. Additional U.S. funding, if approved by Congress, will focus on basic infrastructure (roads, electricity and rural agricultural development) that are key building blocks and enablers of self-sustaining economic growth. U.S. support for Afghan education will continue to target primary education and teacher training programs below the university level. Finally, the Ambassador noted specific joint GOA and international donor community development targets being negotiated in the post-Bonn Afghanistan Compact that will address many of the Governor,s development priorities. ¶9. (SBU) The Governor admitted &failings8 in Herat,s judicial system, but claimed one of his administration,s priorities was to address and correct systemic flaws. A part of the problem, he explained, can be traced to inadequate staffing of Herat,s police force due to inadequate salary levels. Only 600 of 2,600 authorized police officer positions have been filled due to a salary cap of Af 800/month (US$ 16/month). &People simply won,t work for such wages,8 he said. While PRT/ISAF support for the chief of police has been strong, Anwari continued, additional U.S. and international community assistance is needed to bolster Herat,s law enforcement capabilities. ¶10. (SBU) Herat supports the GOA,s counter-narcotics drive, Anwari continued, but local farmers need additional help to adjust to a poppy-free culture. He noted that Afghan farmers in other provinces receive USAID (Alternative Livelihoods Program) support and Herat,s farmers need and deserve more. Finally, the Governor asked the Ambassador to &tell8 US companies to follow the lead of Iranian and Pakistani firms and to invest in Herat. ¶11. (SBU) Ambassador described his visits earlier to struggling Afghan industrialists. He explained that American investors seek a welcoming investment climate and suggested there is much that Governor Anwari could do to make Herat a more attractive destination for foreign and domestic investment, such as lowering electricity tariffs for industrial wholesale users, educating the local business community on investment incentives incorporated into Afghanistan,s new tax code (including provisions allowing accelerated depreciation on investment in new capital equipment),ensuring that competitive products imported from Iran are properly valued and pay customs duties, and enhancing security in Herat,s industrial zone. -------------- Italy ) Focus on &Hearts and Minds8 -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The western region of Afghanistan is under ISAF control, although there are some U.S. military assets in Herat. The Ambassador met with the Herat Italian PRT commander, the Regional Area Coordinator, and the Spanish commander of the Herat Forward Supply Base (FSB),as well as U.S. National Guard ANA embedded trainers stationed at nearby Camp Victory. General Rossi, the Regional Area Coordinator ) West (RAC ) West),described Italian development efforts in the province which focus on school construction, medical equipment for hospitals, and water well drilling. Italy, Rossi said, will shortly send a dedicated justice sector reform export to be based at the PRT. The PRT Commander noted that the Herat PRT currently had just one platoon for force protection, severely limiting PRT stability projection capabilities. It was hoped that this force would be augmented in the future. The Colonel also noted that USG staff at the PRT (DOS, USAID) were &very active8 and thus placed a high level of demand on PRT force protection assets. ¶13. (C) A visit to the ANA 207 Corps training center (Camp Victory) demonstrated that much progress had been made in preparing an effective Afghan army. However, senior U.S. officers warned that training the Afghan soldiers, including running joint missions, is not a fast process, and there are many skill sets particularly above the company level that have not yet been inculcated. There also remains much room for cooperation with Border Police who control the frontier with Iran (Note: the ANA is proscribed from operating within 50 kilometers of the Iranian border. End Note). According to the U.S. Commander, all Highway Police encountered in their patrols are extorting money from travelers. -------------- Border Police Left Hanging -------------- ¶14. (CU) The Afghan Border Police's (ABP's) embedded CFC-A trainer explained that under the leadership of Colonel Ayub, the ABP 6 Brigade was becoming a professional force. However, unless financial and logistical support was continued beyond this month, the ABP could easily and rapidly backslide. Simple actions must be pressed such as delivery of sufficient boots, coats, and uniforms still warehoused by MOI in Kabul. Adequate fuel and food to maintain operations must be delivered. And most importantly, promised pay and stipends (USD 2/day per soldier) had to be provided (MOI had delivered proper salary payments on only two of the last eight months.) For more on Border Management Initiative, see reftel.) -------------- While Customs Is a Disaster -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Gleaning customs revenue for the GOA commensurate with the rising flood of imports depends largely on moving GOA customs collection to the Islam Qalah border crossing point and eliminating opportunities for &baksheesh.8 (Note: Herat, where most customs activities are conducted, is 120 kilometers from the Iranian border.) Herat Provincial Customs Director Abdul Azim Rahimi told Ambassador that although he desired to move some operations to the border, infrastructure there was inadequate (new USG-constructed buildings for customs at Islam Qalah remain unoccupied) and the &corrupt8 Border Police at Islam Qala prevented customs from doing their job (ABP and customs officials at IQ maintain consistently to USG officials that ties between the two agencies there are cordial.) ¶16. (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized the need for the GOA to generate substantial additional customs revenues in order to cover a greater share of its operating budget. Unthinkingly, Rahimi commented that Herat customs was close to meeting the Af 4 billion (USD 80 million) current year customs collection target set by the Finance Ministry in Kabul. (Note: Various projections suggest that substantial additional revenues could/should be collected in Herat customs.) The Ambassador asked Rahimi why Bearing Point-trained female customs data input clerks had not been paid in many months and challenged the Customs Director to explain the lethargy in moving operations to Islam Qalah when all evidence indicates only lack of will, and corruption, prevent the move. (FYI: In subsequent conversation between Finance Minister Ahadi and the Ambassador, Ahadi promised to see that the data entry clerks are paid. End FYI). ¶17. (C) Rahimi deflected the Ambassador,s sharp questions with an ill-advised request for additional USG support to provide the Herat customs facility with a fire station, a vehicle weight scale, a material testing laboratory, and new office facilities at Torugundi on the Turkmenistan border. The Ambassador suggested the first requirement was an honest customs director. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) The issues in the West speak for themselves. As noted, some industrial investment has already taken place. But if industry is allowed to wither in Herat, prospects for similar investment anywhere in Afghanistan are bleak. The Governor admits he is walking a tightrope on DIAG and other issues. If Kabul ignores his plea for decisive Kabul action with Herat,s warlords, the DIAG process could fail in Herat, a bad omen for the program nationally. Obviously, DIAG is something we will be focused on intensely in the new year. As backfill for the Coalition, ISAF admittedly is unable to project security throughout Herat as well as it would like. And a dysfunctional, corrupt customs in Herat is preventing the GOA from collecting needed tariff revenues, thus, the Embassy,s urgent request for the Border Management Initiative (reftel) The West is not done, and is certainly not yet won. NEUMANN