PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005198 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/CT AND SA/A NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF SUBJECT: PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG PROCESS Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Herat Governor Anwari is angered by reported MOI criticism of DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) in his province. It is Kabul, he affirmed at the December 14 weekly DIAG Committee meeting, which is underperforming. The GOA, moreover, has failed, so far, to force Herat's two major warlords, Ismael Khan and Amanullah Khan, to comply with DIAG. Neither, Anwari said, can be brought to heel from Herat, and the success of DIAG depends on such compliance. Even more fundamental, the provincial entities tasked with enforcing DIAG, especially police, lack the necessary tools, such as boots, coats, food, and fuel, for even basic operations. While inter-agency bickering in Herat can probably be overcome with a committed Governor Anwari, such basics as proper equipment, fuel, and timely pay, are just as critical for DIAG success. End Summary. ¶2. (C) There was tension in the air at Herat Governor Anwari's December 14 DIAG meeting, attended by most of Herat's senior security leadership, the PRT and RCAG-West commanders, UNAMA, lead Italian PRT civilian Ambassador Carlo Ungaro, and PRToff, among others. Herat is one of the DIAG to four, Phase I provinces, and the Governor has affirmed he is committed to a successful DIAG in his province during his tenure. -------------- Disconnect with Kabul... -------------- ¶3. (C) The Governor stated he felt the DIAGprocess in Herat had moved forward with weapons collection as well as could be expected, given the constraints. He then noted a recent MOI evaluation which criticized DIAG in Herat for its tardiness. The key issue, Anwari said, and one Kabul apparently has chosen to ignore, is the confiscation of weapons held by Herat's two most prominent warlords, Energy Minister Ismael Khan (IK) and his rival Amanullah Khan (AK). Only the central government, Anwari argued, and not the provincial one, can address the weaponry held by these two "troublemakers." ¶4. (C) Anwari angrily rejected the MOI criticism. IK, Anwari said, had been granted political and social privileges in Kabul. He should thus be forced by the GOA to make his commanders comply with DIAG. AK, on the other hand, was a criminal and should be removed by the GOA from Shindand District, his personal fiefdom. Moreover, provincial authorities had no authorization from Kabul to order IK and AK personnel to comply with DIAG. Unless Kabul takes action regarding the two warlords, the Governor warned that additional DIAG meeting would be a waste of time. -------------- ...and within Herat -------------- ¶5. (C) Governor Anwari fixated on the lack of coordination within the D&R Commission in Kabul and the mixed signals being sent to him. Herat, he affirmed, had been selected for DIAG Phase I because of its strong leadership. Now, others were saying his leadership was unsatisfactory. Still, Anwari asked his security team if Herat could do better. How, he asked, could the process be accelerated? This resulted in provincial interagency bickering about information sharing and alleged hoarding of weapons by various police entities. ANBP accused the police of hoarding a large amount of "unauthorized" munitions and ordnance (e.g., mortars, RPG's, artillery shells). Herat Chief of Police Salangi retorted that the police had never been requested to turn in such munitions. Regarding already identified weapons caches the police were to have confiscated, ANBP alleged that the police had not delivered these weapons under DIAG as it should have. The Governor did not seem pleased with the quarreling among his security cabinet in front of the non-Afghan attendees. (Note: ANBP later affirmed to PRToff that Herat PC coordination is very good and the Governor, very motivated and committed. End Note.) -------------- Lack of Enabling Tools -------------- ¶6. (C) According to provincial Chief of Information and Culture Bahara, Kabul DIAG leadership is critical of the apparent lack of a public information campaign in Herat. However, Bahara explained, no budget had been allocated for television, radio, and print media -- which in any case would have scant impact in much of rural Herat. Still, he felt the message was getting through as well as anywhere else in the country despite the dearth of information flow from Kabul. DIAG West General Aziz pointed out that Imams were being asked to deliver the DIAG message, a potentially very effective tool for small weapons holders. (Note: ANBP again affirmed to PRToff that it enjoys good ties with Herat Culture and Information officials. Also, there is resistance among some mullahs to preaching the DIAG message, according to ANBP. End Note.) ¶7. (C) Police shortcomings are even more severe. After the DIAG meeting, Salangi told PRToff that the policemen being asked to enforce DIAG lack uniforms, coats, boots, and food -- a similar situation exists with the Border Police as well. The average police station receives about five liters of fuel daily total for all vehicles, he maintained. Despite a German-financed maintenance depot in Herat City, vehicle maintenance in outlying areas remains a severe problem. Embedded Regional Training Center (RTC) U.S. mentors confirmed that their trainees lack even the most basic equipment. -------------- Oil on the Waters -------------- ¶8. (C) PRToff intervened to soften the Governor's threat that MOI take back its words or else. All recognized, PRToff said, that there were leadership and coordination problems in Kabul. In addition, he noted, there is consensus that unless the IK/AK issue is resolved, DIAG in Herat would have little impact. Finally, police participation in DIAG was critical to its success; the police are either part of the problem or part of the solution. Thus, we should identify their needs and urge the police receive the tools to do the job. The Governor seemed placated with the pledge for our continued support for DIAG in Herat. ¶9. (C) Herat Comment: A number of the key Herat players in the DIAG process are alleged to have ties with IK, and this could well complicate DIAG's forward movement. A more aggressive approach to the two warlords from Kabul, we feel, would help negate this. However, Kabul criticism of DIAG in Herat, without providing the most basic tools for success, will doom DIAG from the start. Efforts must be made to get the tools to the enablers, and to sustain them over time. Despite reported assurances to the contrary, the MOI has failed, so far, in delivering adequate tools to any of the police services here. ¶10. (C) Embassy Comment: The international community (Japan, UNAMA, ANBP) approached President Karzai last week about reining in IK; Karzai was non-committal, but offered no objections to the international community's pressuring IK. In the absence of a strong central governmental leadership and backing for this program, starting with the President, it will be difficult to make significant progress with the politically sensitive program. End Comment. NEUMANN