Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KABUL5092
2005-12-15 13:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM - AFGHANISTAN
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005092
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PTER KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO AF
SUBJECT: COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM - AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005092
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PTER KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO AF
SUBJECT: COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM - AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
1. (SBU) In 2005, Afghanistan continued its progress
toward building a democratic government. The 2004
Presidential elections were followed by national
assembly and provincial council elections in September
2005. In spite of Taliban threats to disrupt the
democratic process, only minor incidents occurred and
the results were accepted as legitimate by the Afghan
people. The National Assembly will be inaugurated on
December 19, marking the final milestone of the Bonn
Process.
2. (SBU) Programs designed to combat terrorism and
lawlessness have continued. The Program for
Strengthening Peace (PTS),which reconciles former
Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) members,
founded six regional offices and reported that over
800 former fighters had joined the program, as of
December 2005. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) program has processed over 63,000
former combatants. The Disarmament of Illegal Armed
Groups (DIAG) process began work in June, focusing on
vetting parliamentary candidates to ensure they had no
ties to illegal armed groups (IAGs). The DIAG
disqualified a number of candidates, but the process
fell short of winnowing out every candidate with such
ties. The GOA likely wanted to use the process to
push compliance rather than punishing individuals for
their past (and present) actions. The programs next
phase will be a province-by-province effort to disband
the most notorious IAGs, but progress has been slowed
by the search for a successor to the Afghan head of
the program, who left his post in October, and to an
apparent lack of political will to seriously confront
the commanders.
3. (SBU) Increasingly, the Afghan National Army
(ANA),with over 26,000 personnel in its ranks, and
the Afghan National Police (ANP),with 54,500, have
taken the lead in anti-terrorism operations. Proactive
arrests of terrorists have also continued, thwarting
bombings in Kabul and the rest of the country.
4. (SBU) In spite of this progress, Afghanistan saw an
increasing number of violent incidents in 2005,
compared with 2004. Over 1500 people were killed in
violent attacks this year, many of them a result of
tribal, criminal, an especially narcotics-related
activity rather than of terrorism. Al Qaida and the
Taliban frequently claim responsibility for attacks
but their claims are unverifiable and sometimes
contradictory.
5. (SBU) There has been a clear increase in the number
of suicide bombings in Afghanistan over the last year.
There were an estimated 15 suicide attacks, compared
to only four in 2004. It is unclear if these bombers
were Afghans or foreigners. What is clear is the
increase in sophistication of these attacks when
compared with previous suicide operations conducted in
Afghanistan. While there are no indications Anti-
Government Elements (AGE) are directly using lessons
learned in Iraq, there does appear to be a desire to
replicate some of those operations. A similar pattern
is seen in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs),which have increased dramatically in frequency
and sophistication in 2005. This may reflect the
desire of AGEs to move away from direct fire attacks
against Coalition forces, thus avoiding high
casualties.
6. (SBU) In addition to their attacks on ISAF and
Coalition forces, suspected terrorists and anti-
coalition forces targeted candidates and election
workers in the run up to the parliamentary elections.
International NGO and U.N. workers have also been a
focus of violence, as well as, in some areas,
recipients of NGO assistance, in an attempt to hamper
reconstruction efforts and drive the international
assistance community out of Afghanistan. Thirty-three
NGO staff members were killed in 2005, up from 23 in
2004 and 12 in 2003. This is in contrast to overall
attacks against noncombatants, which appear to have
significantly decreased since 2004.
NEUMANN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PTER KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO AF
SUBJECT: COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM - AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
1. (SBU) In 2005, Afghanistan continued its progress
toward building a democratic government. The 2004
Presidential elections were followed by national
assembly and provincial council elections in September
2005. In spite of Taliban threats to disrupt the
democratic process, only minor incidents occurred and
the results were accepted as legitimate by the Afghan
people. The National Assembly will be inaugurated on
December 19, marking the final milestone of the Bonn
Process.
2. (SBU) Programs designed to combat terrorism and
lawlessness have continued. The Program for
Strengthening Peace (PTS),which reconciles former
Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) members,
founded six regional offices and reported that over
800 former fighters had joined the program, as of
December 2005. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) program has processed over 63,000
former combatants. The Disarmament of Illegal Armed
Groups (DIAG) process began work in June, focusing on
vetting parliamentary candidates to ensure they had no
ties to illegal armed groups (IAGs). The DIAG
disqualified a number of candidates, but the process
fell short of winnowing out every candidate with such
ties. The GOA likely wanted to use the process to
push compliance rather than punishing individuals for
their past (and present) actions. The programs next
phase will be a province-by-province effort to disband
the most notorious IAGs, but progress has been slowed
by the search for a successor to the Afghan head of
the program, who left his post in October, and to an
apparent lack of political will to seriously confront
the commanders.
3. (SBU) Increasingly, the Afghan National Army
(ANA),with over 26,000 personnel in its ranks, and
the Afghan National Police (ANP),with 54,500, have
taken the lead in anti-terrorism operations. Proactive
arrests of terrorists have also continued, thwarting
bombings in Kabul and the rest of the country.
4. (SBU) In spite of this progress, Afghanistan saw an
increasing number of violent incidents in 2005,
compared with 2004. Over 1500 people were killed in
violent attacks this year, many of them a result of
tribal, criminal, an especially narcotics-related
activity rather than of terrorism. Al Qaida and the
Taliban frequently claim responsibility for attacks
but their claims are unverifiable and sometimes
contradictory.
5. (SBU) There has been a clear increase in the number
of suicide bombings in Afghanistan over the last year.
There were an estimated 15 suicide attacks, compared
to only four in 2004. It is unclear if these bombers
were Afghans or foreigners. What is clear is the
increase in sophistication of these attacks when
compared with previous suicide operations conducted in
Afghanistan. While there are no indications Anti-
Government Elements (AGE) are directly using lessons
learned in Iraq, there does appear to be a desire to
replicate some of those operations. A similar pattern
is seen in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs),which have increased dramatically in frequency
and sophistication in 2005. This may reflect the
desire of AGEs to move away from direct fire attacks
against Coalition forces, thus avoiding high
casualties.
6. (SBU) In addition to their attacks on ISAF and
Coalition forces, suspected terrorists and anti-
coalition forces targeted candidates and election
workers in the run up to the parliamentary elections.
International NGO and U.N. workers have also been a
focus of violence, as well as, in some areas,
recipients of NGO assistance, in an attempt to hamper
reconstruction efforts and drive the international
assistance community out of Afghanistan. Thirty-three
NGO staff members were killed in 2005, up from 23 in
2004 and 12 in 2003. This is in contrast to overall
attacks against noncombatants, which appear to have
significantly decreased since 2004.
NEUMANN