PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: KAGHAN AND ALLAI VALLEYS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 016850

SIPDIS

DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO USAID
KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS MOPS ECON PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: KAGHAN AND ALLAI VALLEYS


1. Summary: A team from the Embassy's Forward Operating Base
in Mansehra (Officer-in-Charge (OIC),USAID/DART Field
Officer, U.S. Military Liaison Officer) and representatives
of five USAID-funded NGOs visited the Northern Kaghan and
Allai Valleys on November 9. In both areas, Pakistan
military commanders are strongly encouraging villagers to
relocate for the winter to facilitate assistance efforts. In
northern Kaghan, where most families migrate south to Balakot
annually, this advice is being followed. In Allai, however,
most people appear reluctant to leave and will continue to
require significant assistance. Alternative shelter programs
will be critical to survival in Allai during the winter
months. Geological activity in Allai remains a significant
concern and rumors of volcanic activity continue to persist.
Villagers appear grateful for USG assistance and have a
generally positive view of Pakistan army efforts. They are,
however, resentful at the provincial government and many
political parties for their perceived lack of response. End
Summary.

Kaghan Valley
--------------


2. The northern end of the Kaghan Valley centered around the
town of Narang was completely isolated by landslides that
destroyed the area's one access road. Resupply of this area
of Kaghan has been limited to helicopter support flights from
the Pakistan militar. The road opened for the first time to
light vehicle traffic on the morning of the delegation's
arrival. According to local villagers, the area around
Narang has traditionally been seen as having too harsh a
climate for winter settlement. Most villagers spend 8 months
of the year in Narang engaged in both agriculture and the
tourist industry and then move down the valley to Balakot for
the winter after the final potato harvest. Prior to the
earthquake most families had temporary shelter for themselves
and their livestock in Balakot. This is now destroyed.


3. Villagers told us that, as in previous years, only about
25 people will remain in the Narang area during the winter.
Most will stay in the tourist hotels, which did not appear to
sustain significant damage during the earthquake. Foodstocks
in the village are sufficient for these remaining
individuals. Those intending to leave the village will do so
in about 12 days, after the harvest is in. There is a
serious concern among villagers that the tent camp being
established in Jaba Farms (where the army is encouraging
villagers to go) lacks sufficient tents, facilities for
livestock, and education for children. The private schools
in Balakot in which parents usually enrolled their children
are now piles of rubble. This migratory pattern contrasts
with the southern Kaghan Valley, where at least half the
population has told NGOs that they intend to remain in place
for the winter. Based on this information, U.S.-funded NGOs
intend to continue to focus their supply efforts in southern
Kaghan operating out of
Paras.

Allai Valley
--------------


4. FOB Team visited two sites in the Allai Valley: the
Rashang Union Council and the town of Bana, the center of
relief operations. Military officials present in both
locations were adamant that villagers had to leave the valley
to survive. They were strongly encouraging villagers to
migrate south to the tent city being established in Marai,
Shangla District. For a variety of reasons, villagers seemed
reluctant to make this transition. Those we spoke with cited
concern for their property, safety of their domestic animals,
historical ties to their villages, and suspicion about
conditions in the camps. Military officials, in cooperation
with NGOs, faced an uphill battle addressing these concerns.
Even the most optimistic officials that we spoke with
estimated that only half the area's population of 60,000
would move south. Based on movement to date (the harvest in
Allai is essentially finished),the final numbers departing
may be far lower.


5. The major need in the Allai Valley appears to be shelter.
Insufficient numbers of winterized tents have arrived,
although shipments by helicopter (essential due to blocked
roads in many areas) continue to arrive. Military and NGO
representatives were skeptical that even properly winterized
tents would be sufficient to allow individuals to survive in
the harsh winter climate of the area. In addition, transport
of such tents before the weather shifts appears a near
impossible task. As an alternative, NGOs strongly pushed for
funding of alternative shelter programs. These would provide
construction kits and advice to enable villagers to rebuild
appropriate accommodation using materials from their
collapsed houses. Villagers seemed open to the idea and were
already recovering stones, timber, and corrugated sheeting
from their collapsed properties, most of which could easily
be reused. Foodstocks in Allai appear in relatively good
shape, despite some damage from the earthquake, although no
comprehensive study is available. Prepositioning of food is
still a welcome activity, although some of it may go unused.
Villagers continued to report smoke and fire coming from some
mountains in Allai. Military commander in Rashang reported
that Battela Mountain was a particular concern.

Political Perceptions
--------------


6. Villagers were uniformly positive about the USG role.
Many had received supplies from U.S. military and INL
helicopters and clearly believed that we were going to assist
long-term. The active presence of U.S.-funded NGOs in the
Allai Valley further enhances this positive view. Similarly,
villagers were grateful to the Pakistan Army for its role in
facilitating assistance. Soldiers were often the first
relief personnel on the ground and had delivered a great deal
to the local populace. The only tinge of resentment was
towards the consistent messages requesting villagers to leave
their homes. The provincial government was routinely
criticized for its virtually invisibility. Villagers
claimed that, although provincial ministers and officials had
visited, they had done nothing to provide needed relief.
Asked about the political parties, there was great resentment
towards the Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan People's Party,
Awami National Party, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman.
Village elders
claimed none of them had done anything to help and were only
interested in votes. Frequent contrasts were made with
Jamaat-i-Islami, whose on-the-ground relief camps appear to
have done a great deal to improve its image.

Comment
--------------


7. The northern Kaghan Valley appears unique in the area, as
it already has a long history of winter migration to the
south. We do not believe that other areas will follow this
pattern. Particularly in the Allai Valley, in-place
assistance will be critical through the winter months and
must include an immediate emphasis on alternative shelter
that can be developed in relatively short order. Food
supplies in these areas will need to be monitored by
on-the-ground personnel and logistical plans will need to be
developed to distribute on an as-needed basis.


8. Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on behalf of
FOB Mansehra.
CROCKER