MEDIA, DISSIDENTS AND THE PARTY: DILEMAS AND POLITICAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001155 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV PINR VM HUMANR DPOL SUBJECT: MEDIA, DISSIDENTS AND THE PARTY: DILEMAS AND POLITICAL TENSIONS IN VIETNAM REF: A) Hanoi 2068; B) HCMC 1151 ¶1. (U) This is a joint Hanoi-HCMC cable. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Vastly differing media treatment of dissident Hoang Minh Chinh in Hanoi and HCMC newspapers underscores the differences between conservatives and reformers within the Party in advance of the 10th Party Congress. Soon after Chinh made critical remarks in the United States of Vietnam's human rights record and Communist ideology, Hanoi media launched a scathing series of attacks against the dissident. In contrast, HCMC media avoided the story completely until the Party demanded that they follow suit. While a senior HCMC media contact believes that Chinh can return home safely, Ministry of Public Security contacts in Hanoi are neither optimistic about Chinh's future in Vietnam, nor about other dissidents that follow suit. End Summary. Contrasting Media Treatment of Hoang Minh Chinh -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) Soon after dissident Hoang Minh Chinh made a series of public appearances in the United States in October criticizing Vietnam's human rights record and Communist ideology, the HCMC editions of Hanoi-based newspapers launched a campaign attacking Chinh and defending orthodox Communist Party dogma. Calling Chinh a "rambling old man," one typical editorial in Nhan Dan -- the Party mouthpiece -- vigorously defended "the vitality of Marxism, with its noble, humane ideals, and with dialectical materialism at its core, [which] has survived the challenge of time." Another November 4 article in Nhan Dan entitled "Traitor Unmasked," attacked Chinh for his support during the Cold War of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, for supporting the "enemies of Marxism-Leninism," and for "embracing the feet of the invaders." By our count, since mid-October, there have been at least 17 anti-Chinh articles and editorials appearing in HCMC emanating from Hanoi-based media outlets. (Per ref A, Chinh, the former Director of the Marxist-Leninist Institute until 1967, traveled to the U.S. in early October for medical treatment.) ¶4. (SBU) There were no articles in leading HCMC dailies for at least the first week of the anti-Chinh campaign. Two media contacts told us that HCMC's leading dailies made a calculated decision to remain silent. One press contact added that, although he did not agree with everything Chinh said, there were elements of his discourse that were reasonable. In any case, the contact did not think it "unreasonable" that Chinh be allowed to say whatever he wished to say, so long as he did not encourage violence. A long-time Embassy contact, Senior Colonel Tran Nhung (protect) of the Quan Doi Nhan Dan ("People's Army"),said that, "One has to respect Chinh for maintaining his views in spite of everything he has been through." ¶5. (SBU) Another HCMC media contact reported that on or about October 27, the Party's Central Department for Ideology and Culture ordered the formation of a special group of columnists to prepare articles discrediting Chinh and defending Marxism- Leninism. Immediately thereafter, HCMC's leading dailies Thanh Nien and Tuoi Tre began running a number articles critical of Chinh. A Deputy Managing Editor told us that HCMC newspapers were told that it was "their political duty" to run the Chinh stories. ¶6. (SBU) In contrast to their Hanoi-based colleagues, HCMC's major dailies ran only five articles on Chinh. They also were milder in tone and, in some cases, less prominently placed. Tuoi Tre, perhaps HCMC's most reform-oriented newspaper, ran only one article, placed on the penultimate page to the October 30 edition. Can Chinh Return to Vietnam? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During a recent meeting, a senior editor of one of HCMC's newspapers said that tensions and jockeying for position within the Party ahead of the 10th Party Congress helped explain the intense campaign against the dissident. Chinh was a target that conservatives could exploit. Nonetheless, our contact was optimistic that the Party would not order arrest Chinh should he return. While this undoubtedly would not have been the case even a few years ago, today most Party leaders seem to understand that arresting Chinh would only raise the dissident's profile. They also appreciate that his arrest would cause unnecessary tension with the United States. Other Embassy contacts have not been as optimistic about Chinh's future in Vietnam. "Chinh has broken a lot of laws over there," one Ministry of Public Security (MPS) told a Hanoi PolOff at an informal dinner. "It would be better if he doesn't come back to Vietnam." One of the other MPS officials at the dinner, after a few glasses of wine, noted that Chinh's comments (and those of CPV dissident novelist Duong Thu Huong, whose criticism of the Vietnamese regime while visiting France made the New York Times' front page) were so public that "if they return, the GVN will be in a very bad position." The MPS officials, who are from the office that would likely order such an arrest if it occurred, said that MPS would be under a great deal of pressure from conservatives to arrest both dissidents upon their return to Vietnam. They stopped short, however, of stating categorically that they would be arrested. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER DISSIDENTS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The MPS officials stressed that they had anticipated Chinh's high-profile attacks before granting him permission to travel, but had let him go anyway. "We told the Embassy explicitly that this would happen," a Senior Colonel told PolOff. "But we let him go anyway. This should be considered when evaluating Vietnam's human rights record." After a long and dramatic pause to light a cigarette, he added, "this is probably what we should expect if we allow Nguyen Dan Que (another high profile, dissident) to travel to the United States, isn't it?" PolOff shrugged. "In that case," the MPS official continued, "if he goes, he had better not come back." For his part, Que told Embassy and ConGenOffs in mid-October that he is watching the outcome of the Chinh case carefully before he decides whether to pursue his travel plans to the United States. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: Hoang Minh Chinh and Duong Thu Huong present a dilemma for the GVN in general and the MPS General Department of Security (charged with keeping dissidents under control) in particular: getting them out of Vietnam eliminates a local headache, but the dissidents' public denunciations of the regime make it very difficult to allow them back into Vietnam. As the MPS officials pointed out, Vietnamese law outlaws the international public criticism these dissidents have engaged in. To let them return to Vietnam, and not arrest them, would be a very public decision not to apply these laws. If it were possible to shield them from arrest and prosecution (in defiance of the hard-line voices who have been so prolific in recent weeks),it would then set a precedent that would be hard to overturn. We would certainly welcome such a development as an enormous improvement in the climate for freedom of expression in Vietnam, but we would be surprised to see such a radical change in a society that is so dedicated to incremental political reform. For our part, we will continue to urge our GVN interlocutors to exercise restraint, underlining that the GVN will do itself no favors internationally by arresting Chinh or forcing him into exile. End Comment. WINNICK