GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY HELSINKI RESPONSE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000406

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/PGI, AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL FI
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY HELSINKI RESPONSE

REF: STATE 60796

Classified By: Ambassador Earle I. Mack, for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D)


1. (S) Embassy Helsinki has found that our primary challenge
in dealing with the GoF on counterterrorism issues has been
to overcome the ingrained Finnish belief that "it can't
happen here." This mind-set, on the part of senior officials
and public opinion alike, has slowed Finnish progress in
meeting some international counterterrorism standards, and in
some cases has kept GoF agencies from devoting resources to
counterterrorism that are commensurate with the worldwide
threat. Thus, while Finnish leaders are quick to acknowledge
the need for a global response to terrorism, behind this lies
an unspoken assumption that Finland has given terrorists no
reason to strike here. (An example might be an April 2004
speech by PM Matti Vanhanen to loyalists from his
predominantly-rural Center Party. Vanhanen sought to
persuade his fellow Finns that their country is not isolated
from scourges like terrorism. He referred to the Madrid
train bombings -- but instead of arguing that the bombers
could have struck as easily in Helsinki, he argued that
vacationing Finns could easily have been aboard the Madrid
trains.)


2. (S) Working in partnership with Finland in the Global War
on Terrorism has been a high-priority performance goal in
Embassy Helsinki's Mission Performance Plan for several years
running. Our overall objective has been to encourage Finland
to fight terrorism at home and abroad, while countering the
misperception that this threat applies only to other nations.
Among our supporting tactics:

-- Here in Helsinki, the Embassy has lobbied the Finns to
strengthen the effectiveness of domestic counterterrorism
legislation, and maintained regular interchanges with
officials responsible for implementing the various phases of
that legislation. Together with visiting U.S. officials, we
have sought to help Finnish authorities to comply with
international standards on aviation and maritime security,
and to understand the importance of aggressive action to
control terrorist finance. Separately, we have also
instituted an active outreach to Finland's small and moderate
Muslim community.

-- We have worked to support and facilitate Finland's ongoing
participation in stabilization and reconstruction in
Afghanistan, and have encouraged GoF law enforcement outreach
to the Baltic nations, Russia, and Central and South Asia.

-- We have sought to raise the profile of the terrorism issue
through speaker programs and International Visitor programs
aimed at dispelling the idea that terrorism does not threaten
Finnish soil.


3. (S) In carrying out these tactics, we have consulted
closely with the UK embassy, which has similar objectives.
The Ambassador meets with the British Ambassador on a monthly
basis to compare notes, and there are regular contacts at the
working level as well.


4. (S) Looking to the future, we believe that the most
effective approach will be, as it is today, to concentrate on
three areas simultaneously: working-level U.S.-Finnish
cooperation on concrete measures to strengthen Finland's
response to terrorism; advocacy at the policy level to change
the mind-set that can shortchange counterterrorism budgets;
and public diplomacy efforts to overcome popular
misconceptions about the nature of the threat to Finland.


5. (S) The extent to which we are able to do this depends in
part on the resources available to us. One specifically
resource-linked recommendation has been the Embassy's
request, in the last two Mission Performance Plans, for a new
Political/Economic officer position to cover counterterrorism
and regional security issues. Other recommendations:

-- We have found -- and GoF interlocutors who deal with
terrorism issues strongly agree -- that travel by Finnish
officials to the United States to learn from U.S. experience
and expertise in counterterrorism issues is highly valuable
for the GoF. An expansion of International Visitor and
Voluntary Visitor programs -- perhaps regional (Nordic/Baltic
or pan-European in focus) -- would expand our ability to
influence Finnish policymakers and help the working level
acquire the tools needed to confront the drastically-changed
post 9/11 world.

-- Conversely, visits to Finland by U.S. officials and
academic experts are of enormous value. We are grateful to
the Department for facilitating visits by the Transportation
Security Agency (which conducts regular reviews of airport
security),the Coast Guard (which has coordinated with the
Finns in improving port security) and individual experts like
Dr. Paul Jabber (whose December lecture on the sources of
Muslim fundamentalism was judged by MFA's counterterrorism
section as particularly useful to GoF officials with little
or no background on the strategic context for terrorism). We
(and the GoF) would welcome more such opportunities. In
particular, visits by senior officials from the Department of
Homeland Security would enable us to program conversations
that would help sensitize Finnish policymakers, as well as
press outreach and contacts with opinion-makers to address
the public awareness problem.


6. (S) In our Country Team discussions three subjects have
emerged as being of particular concern:

-- First, while the Finns have made progress in addressing
conventional channels of terrorist finance, they exercise
little or no oversight over hawalas. As small as Finland's
Muslim population is, it is large enough to include these
informal mechanisms for money transfer. The Finnish
authorities could learn from U.S. best practices in dealing
with this potential avenue of terrorist financing.

-- Second, although the Finns appear to meet IMO maritime
security requirements, they do little or no screening of
ferry passengers. Given the large number of ferry vessels
plying the waters from Finland to Sweden, Estonia, Russia,
Latvia, and Germany, this gap needs to be closed, and the USG
may be able to help. Moreover, although cargo is subject to
check, in practice very little inspection is done. (On the
other hand, Finland has upgraded its screening of air
passengers and meets all applicable international standards
in this area.)

-- Third, containers transit Russia on a "land bridge" from
the Far East to the Baltic. These enter Finland and are
trans-shipped, thus are treated by the U.S. as of Finnish
origin while, in fact, they are from Russia or other points.
We recommend coordination with Finnish authorities to ensure
that they screen more adequately the contents of containers
leaving Finnish ports.


7. (S) One strategic consideration: While the Finns value
highly their bilateral cooperation with the United States,
they have an instinctive preference for multilateral
approaches and multilateral fora when possible. Thus, for
example, it may be most useful to address the issue of
hawalas in an EU regional context. And in more general
terms, Finland as an active member of NATO's Partnership for
Peace might be receptive to expanded counterterrorist
cooperation in the PfP context. Finally, we suggest that
e-PINE (which the Finns see as linked to the EU's Northern
Dimension initiative, pioneer