PLAYING FIELD HEAVILY TILTED, BUT OUTCOME STILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000467 SIPDIS AF/S FOR B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI SUBJECT: PLAYING FIELD HEAVILY TILTED, BUT OUTCOME STILL UNCERTAIN AS ZIMBABWE BRACES FOR ELECTIONS REF: (A) HARARE 459 (B) HARARE 428 (C) HARARE 418 (D) HARARE 345 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) With less than a week to go before Zimbabwe,s electorate goes to the polls the result is uncertain. The election playing field is heavily tilted in the ruling party's favor. However, the MDC has proven stronger than expected and ZANU-PF weaker. Mugabe,s gamble to reduce violence in order to legitimize the election may backfire. The MDC believes it is poised to win 70-80 seats, perhaps enough for a majority in the 150 seat unicameral parliament despite the 30 seats Mugabe appoints. There are too many unknown factors, principally the extent to which the ruling party will cheat on election day, to embrace the MDC,s optimism. Still, we find it increasingly likely that the MDC will win at least 51 seats, preventing a two-thirds majority for ZANU-PF and likely setting the stage for resumed intra-party negotiations following the election. -------------- Election Framework Heavily Favors Ruling Party -------------- ¶2. (C) As we reported earlier (Ref D),Zimbabwe,s election falls far short of the South African Development Community,s (SADC) guidelines and is heavily tilted in favor of the ruling ZANU-PF party. Zimbabwe's repressive laws and biased institutions remain fundamental flaws in the election environment. Start with the fact that only 120 out of 150 seats are directly elected. Under the constitution, President Mugabe chooses the other 30. As a result, the opposition needs to win a super-majority of 76 seats to take control of parliament. In addition, five years of GOZ repression and harassment of the opposition and its supporters have likely cowed the populace, conditioning them to accept yet another fraudulent outcome. The regime's legal toolbox of repression is also fuller now than ever. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) were both strengthened during the last session of Parliament and the infamous NGO bill, though unsigned, has also loomed in the background and limited civil society activism. ¶3. (C) A host of other GOZ policies and decisions have served to undermine the integrity of the election. New legal constraints have reduced the level of voter education nationally and brought more of it under state control, although key NGOs, such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, have been conducting voter education despite the constraints. Furthermore, a recent adverse court decision effectively squelched political and legal campaigns to extend the vote to the three million-strong Zimbabwean diaspora. The so-called Delimitation Commission also gerrymandered three constituencies from MDC-controlled areas to ZANU-PF areas, ostensibly justified by voter registration numbers, and safe MDC majorities in urban constituencies have been diluted by the inclusion of additional voters from nearby rural traditional ZANU-PF areas. However, the lack of transparency and apparent poor state of the voter rolls is itself potentially the most problematic aspect of the election. ¶4. (C) Finally, although the recently passed Zimbabwe Electoral Act incorporated some of the opposition's technical demands (i.e., translucent ballot boxes, one-day voting, ballot counting at the polling station) for election administration, it did so on the government,s terms. The ruling party has cynically misused aspects of the technical reforms to manipulate and intimidate some of the electorate, especially in rural areas where voters are told that reforms will help the ruling party know how individuals and communities voted. -------------- Pre-Election Environment: Less Violent but Still Distorted -------------- ¶5. (C) We reported recently (Ref A) on the significantly reduced levels of election violence, which does mark a significant improvement, regardless of the GOZ,s motivation. However, as we also reported fear remains a significant factor in many constituencies, particularly in rural areas. Forms of intimidation vary, but typically revolve around threatened withholding of government benefits to individuals or communities or physical violence targeting opposition supporters after the election. ¶6. (C) Campaign space and freedom of assembly still fall far short of SADC guidelines and international norms but have improved significantly compared to the 2000 and 2002 elections. Authorities have permitted the opposition to campaign widely, frequently, and without physical disruption in most areas over the past month. However, that the MDC (and civil society) must receive permission at all distinguishes the opposition it sharply from the ruling party, for which permission is perfunctorily given, if sought at all. ¶7. (C) The GOZ is also continuing to use State assets to support ZANU-PF,s campaign. The most cynical example is its manipulation of food. The GOZ is exploiting national food distribution to favor the ruling party's election prospects as hunger grows in most parts of the country. The most common practice appears to be channeling the para-statal Grain Marketing Board,s (GMB) distributions through ruling party MP candidates or rallies. While food is the most prominent abuse of GOZ resources, the ruling party taps into a host of GOZ benefits (e.g., fuel, agricultural inputs, "free cash" for the ostensibly disadvantaged) to secure voter support. The ruling party has also stepped up its efforts to influence votes by controlling locally influential chiefs through cash payouts and other leverage. We have witnessed police and military in uniform at ZANU-PF party offices moving campaign paraphernalia and food. ¶8. (C) State controls on the media remain yet another significant advantage for the ruling party. Recently implemented regulations afford the opposition radio and TV space for paid advertising (reportedly at rates significantly higher than ZANU-PF pays) and state news coverage has been giving the MDC unprecedented exposure. Nonetheless, news reporting continues to feature the ruling party more prominently and favorably, and ruling party ad spots far outnumber opposition ones. According to MDC Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Priscilla Misihairabwa-Mushonga, the state TV informed the MDC that its political advertising would no longer be aired after Sunday, March 26. No reason was offered. The MDC has not been given access to the state print media, which continues to be heavily biased in its news reporting. Moreover, AIPPA continues to chill freedom of speech and to be applied in a purely partisan manner. The nation's only opposition-aligned daily newspaper remains closed (Ref C),and a new independent weekly was closed earlier this year within months of its opening over purported violations of AIPPA. GOZ office raids last month prompted four local journalists associated with foreign publications to flee the country. -------------- Election Day Concerns -------------- ¶9. (C) Most observers here expect little overt violence on election day but we cannot rule out the possibility in selected constituencies, especially if national or local ruling party leaders conclude that violence is the only way to secure what they regard as a particularly vital seat. That said, prospects of other kinds of skullduggery seem more probable. The poor state of the voter rolls is a primary concern. There were widespread reports of GOZ-ballot stuffing in past elections. There are currently 5.8 million voters are on the rolls, an increase of 200,000 in just the past two weeks (well after registration was to have ended) and a sizeable increase over the numbers in 2002 ) despite the fact that some 3 million Zimbabweans have left the country. ¶10. (C) In addition, opposition polling agents and independent observers will have difficulty fully covering the more than 8,000 polling stations, many of them in remote rural areas. These remote polling stations reportedly will also not do vote counting &in situ8 given the lack of electricity, but will have to transport their ballots to other polling stations to be counted ) further raising concerns of fraud. More subtle forms of vote-rigging ) the presence of traditional chiefs, party people appearing to record names, etc. ) are also likely to influence the voting at many polling stations, especially in rural areas. MDC leaders assure us that they have identified at least four party polling agents to staff each polling station, and ZESN advised that it already has more than 6,000 accredited observers but it remains to be seen how effective they will be in preventing ruling party fraud. (Note: The diplomatic community is planning to deploy about 50 teams of observers, including 25 U.S. Embassy teams, that will visit polling stations in 75 of the 120 contested constituencies. End note.) ¶11. (C) The performance of key election institutions ) the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC),the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC),and the ad hoc electoral court ) remain potentially key unknown variables. In its first substantive decision, the electoral court surprisingly ruled in favor of jailed MDC MP Roy Bennett (Ref B) but reversed itself in consultation with Bennett's lawyers after an emotional public attack on the decision by Mugabe. In any event, serious resource and procedural constraints make the court's capacity to handle any large volume of disputes questionable. The ZEC, which was constituted only in February, lacks sufficient resources or track record to inspire much confidence. Nonetheless, the opposition, which consulted with the GOZ on the ZEC's composition, grudgingly accepted its authority publicly, and confided to us that it had faith in three or four of the five commissioners. Finally, the ESC historically has been technically competent in most areas but either powerless or too partisan to address significant inter-party disputes in the field. Embassy field trips so far suggest that the coordination and quality of ZEC and ESC officials is uneven at best. -------------- And the Winner Is? -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite the ruling party's overwhelming advantages, the opposition has effectively exploited the openings available to it and made significant inroads nationally, including in former "no-go" areas. The size and frequency of MDC rallies have been impressive. The party's exposure on radio, TV and in the independent media and its growing rallies have created a buzz in much of the country, and our sense is that the political apathy endemic just six months ago is yielding to an atmosphere of cautious hope. With USAID-funded assistance from IRI and NDI and others, the MDC is projecting a message that appears to be resonating with a beleaguered electorate. ZANU-PF's contentious primaries, Party Congress, and widely publicized espionage and corruption scandals have fueled divisions and disaffection within the ruling party, sapping its energy and further fueling the appearance of an opening for the opposition. The collapsing economy and growing hunger in the face of all GOZ propaganda to the contrary further undermine ZANU-PF support in both rural and urban areas. ¶13. (C) Buoyed by its unprecedented exposure and connection with the electorate, the MDC leadership speaks confidently of winning 70-80 seats. An increasing number of observers outside the party also acknowledge that most voters may be prepared to signal "zvakwna" - the opposition slogan meaning "enough!" Winning more than half the contested seats, 61, could be enough to bring into question the democratic legitimacy of the GOZ. There are too many key unknown variables - the impact of a legacy of fear and continuing intimidation, whether voter apathy will prevail, and the degree to which ZANU-PF will cheat ) for us to endorse the MDC,s optimism. That said, we are increasingly confident that the MDC will win at least the 51 seats it needs to continue to block the ruling party's intended constitutional amendments and setting the stage for renewed intra-party negotiations. The stronger the showing by the MDC, the more likely the prospect that the end-game of Mugabe's long rule will have begun. Conversely, were ZANU-PF and Mugabe to steal the elecitons and claim a 2/3 majority based on fraud and cheating alone, the end-game may begin in a different way. Dell