TSVANGIRAI ASCENDANT AS MDC STRUGGLES CONTINUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001537 SIPDIS AF/S FOR B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ASCENDANT AS MDC STRUGGLES CONTINUE REF: (A) HARARE 1534 (B) HARARE 1527 (C) HARARE 1512 (D) HARARE 1508 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) At a meeting with diplomats at party headquarters November 10, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai confirmed the party's planned boycott of scheduled November 26 senate elections but left the door open for reconciliation with the Ncube faction that had supported participation. However, despite key swing players within the party lining up behind Tsvangirai, the Ncube faction continues to show little SIPDIS inclination to reconcile. Party leaders also confided that the party has been heavily involved in the NCA and ZCTU demonstration (refs A and B) and said internal tensions would not keep the party from increasing its public opposition to the regime. End Summary. -------------- Tsvangirai Sustained on Boycott SIPDIS -------------- ¶2. (U) At his November 10 briefing, Tsvangirai confirmed the results of the party's National Council meeting on November 5 (N.B. Attended by 54 out of 66 NEC members but not by the four party leaders who have favored participation in the Senate elections). The Council had passed four resolutions by consensus: (1) it approved a party boycott of the senate elections, thus rescinding its vote of October 12, (2) the party would remain united in democratic principles in opposition to the "real enemy", ZANU-PF, (3) the party would engage civil society to partner on next steps, and (4) the party would conduct its National Congress before the end of February 2006. ¶3. (U) Tsvangirai added that individuals purporting to stand as senate candidates for the MDC had seven days within which to withdraw their nominations or they would be "auto-expelled" from the party because of their status as independents. He explained that the initial vote to participate had not been within the competence of the National Council, since it had no authority to change party policy, and the MDC's policy was to support comprehensive rather than piecemeal consitutional reforms. The vote to participate was therefore null and void. Tsvangirai noted that a committee of four had been deployed to meet with Ncube faction representatives on November 11 in a continuing effort to heal internal divisions. ¶4. (SBU) Queried by the Ambassador, Tsvangirai noted that the Ncube faction had no attractive options other than returning to the fold; collaboration with ZANU-PF or Moyo's United Peoples Movement or going it alone offered little prospect of meaningful influence and he expected the rebellious faction would return to the fold after the November 26 elections. Responding to other inquiries, Tsvangirai reported that he had told South African President SIPDIS Mbeki that he was open to dialogue with other party elements but did not see any point to burdening Mbeki himself with involvement in internal party matters. He also asserted the party had not received any foreign funding. -------------- Polarization Deepening -------------- ¶5. (C) MDC MP and Shadow Minister for Economics Tendai Biti on November 9 told poloff that party divisions were deepening but that the MDC,s center of gravity had shifted decisively behind Tsvangirai. Noting that he had long been in the middle and suspected by each camp of leaning toward the other, Biti said he had endeavored to play a mediating role until he came to the conclusion that the Ncube faction had an agenda that precluded reconciliation. He noted that Tsvangirai had earlier agreed to a compromise along the lines SIPDIS proposed by mediator Brian Raftopolous (ref D),but that Ncube's group had then refused to meet to discuss it. ¶6. (C) Citing the Ncube faction's absence from the constitutional vote in parliament, its opposition to a popularly supported Senate election boycott, its "lies and manipulations" with South African President Mbeki, and its refusal to meet with Tsvangirai on key occasions, Biti said he feared that some or all of the faction must have made some accommodation with the ruling party that revolved around isolating Tsvangirai. He said the Ncube faction had made strong pitches to draw in himself, MP and Secretary for Youth Affairs Nelson Chamisa and ex-MP Roy Bennett, but their duplicity and intransigence had only alienated all three. ¶7. (C) Biti said he had always been critical of Tsvangirai's acting outside the constitution but came to recognize that "everybody" - especially Secretary-General Ncube - was ignoring the party constitution willy-nilly, so why should Tsvangirai be held to a higher standard? In spite of the SIPDIS real procedural grievances, the situation now required a political rather than a legalistic solution, and Tsvangirai held the commanding political position. ¶8. (C) Over breakfast November 10, Chamisa essentially corroborated Biti's account to poloff. He added that Job Sikhala had told him in confidence that Ncube had advised him to file the lawsuit against Tsvangirai over his suspension grievance. Chamisa concluded that opening the party up to disruption and manipulation by the GOZ-controlled courts was political lunacy and further evidenced Ncube's malign agenda. -------------- Fallout in Matabeleland -------------- ¶9. (C) Chamisa maintained further that the party could afford to slough off the three Ndebele in the "Top Six" because there were other prominent Ndebele who would then rise to MDC leadership roles. Tsvangirai's ongoing rallies in Matabeleland (next one scheduled in Bulawayo on November 13) would be key to substantiating his appeal to the masses there and to further isolating the Ncube faction. Chamisa anticipated that Ncube faction might try to boycott or disrupt the National Congress and acknowledged that assuring provincial structures did not follow the faction was a priority. -------------- Civil Action -------------- ¶10. (C) Chamisa and Biti predicted that street protests opposing the regime, with the MDC playing a leading role, would grow significantly within the next two months. Chamisa maintained that Tsvangirai had long been held back by Ncube's influence and could not "follow his heart." He asserted that the party had been responsible for getting at least 75 percent of the ZCTU street presence out on November 8 and was heavily involved in the NCA rallies on November 5. Party planners had yet to decide whether the party should have an overt street presence before or after the November 26 Senate elections. However, Biti added that internal tensions would not distract the party leadership from increasing its public opposition to the regime. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The latest developments appear to be leading the MDC further down the path to catharsis and renewal. Biti and Chamisa are among the few MDC luminaries who reinforced their credibility with strong responses to Operation Restore Order. Their lining up behind Tsvangirai dealt a significant blow to the Ncube faction, which is desperate for more ethnic diversity and for more support within the party. Tsvangirai's growing confidence, buoyed by his success in SIPDIS winning the intra-party struggle over the Senate elections, is a potentially important positive trend as the MDC steps up its opposition activities and renews its credibility with ordinary Zimbabweans. DELL