TSVANGIRAI AIDE ON PARTY RIFT, CIVIL ACTION, PITCH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001512 SIPDIS NOFORN AF/S FOR B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 TAGS: PGOV ASEC PREL PHUM ELAB ZI MDC SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI AIDE ON PARTY RIFT, CIVIL ACTION, PITCH BY THIRD FORCE REF: (A) HARARE 1509 (B) HARARE 1508 (C) HARARE 1490 (D) HARARE 1455 (E) HARARE 1421 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs Gandhi Mudzingwa on November 2 told poloff that opposition President Morgan Tsvangirai would stand his ground in the intra-party conflict, even if it meant driving the party's current Ndebele leadership away. He said that Tsvangirai would make his case at the November 5 National Council meeting and would then go to the people of Matabeleland at rallies next week. Mudzingwa said the MDC and civil society were co-planning public "events," starting next week and peaking in December. Mudzingwa added that a &third force8 delegation led by Jonathan Moyo approached him last month about making common cause with the MDC. End Summary. -------------- National Council Agenda -------------- ¶2. (C) Mudzingwa reported that the agenda for the National Council meeting scheduled for November 3 included (1) participation in senate elections, (2) preparations for the National Congress, (3) an action plan for confronting the regime, and (4) the status of MP Job Sikhala (who the party suspended recently over his public statements that Nigeria, Ghana and Taiwan had funded the party, a claim he later publicly conceded was false). -------------- Leadership Struggle Central -------------- ¶3. (C) Mudzingwa said that senate election participation was not the real issue dividing the party. It was instead the ground disloyal elements had chosen on which to attack Tsvangirai. The opposing faction wanted Tsvangirai to SIPDIS acknowledge procedural wrongdoing by in disregarding the National Council's vote in favor of participation. However, Tsvangirai had done nothing wrong and would not compromise. SIPDIS According to Mudzingwa, an earlier resolution of the National Executive had required Councilors to consult with their constituencies. However, the consultation in many cases had been nonexistent or inadequate and therefore the Council vote had been null and void. ¶4. (C) Mudzingwa said that leadership issues were central to the party's divisions and could only be resolved at a National Congress. To that end, Tsvangirai intended to call an Extraordinary Congress in December. The Congress would require support from 3/4 of the National Council, which Mudzinwa expressed confidence could be mustered. Ultimately, Mudzingwa continued, the party's constitution would have to amended to better establish lines of authority and improve party procedures. To this end, he was aware an amended version had been drafted - by whom he did not know - but had not been circulated. -------------- "Irreparable" Fractures -------------- ¶5. (C) Mudzingwa said the opposing faction members were motivated by personal greed or a misguided belief that by participating in the senate elections the party could "regain" political ground lost to the ruling party in the most recent parliamentary election. In fact, the party was likely only to further lose ground given the election climate and certain GOZ manipulations. He claimed the Ndebele people were solidly behind Tsvangirai and that Sibanda was the only one of the party's Ndebele leaders who commanded any real support at the grassroots level. Mudzingwa discounted the notion that an MDC split would sap the party's historical strength in Matabeleland. ¶6. (C) Mudzingwa said breaches between Tsvangirai and others in the "Top Six" were "irreparable." When pressed, he allowed that Tsvangirai could probably continue to work with Secretary-General Welshman Ncube, Vice President Gibson SIPDIS Sibanda, Treasurer Fletcher Dhulini-Ncube, and Chairman Isaac Matongo (who historically has been closely aligned with Tsvangirai) but not Deputy Secretary-General Gift SIPDIS Chimanikire, whose public attacks on Tsvangirai had been beyond the pale. Mudzingwa added that the dissidents meeting with South African President Mbeki had further alienated Tsvangirai and the party faithful. SIPDIS -------------- -- Collaboration With Civics; Action Plan Emerging -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Mudzingwa reported that Tsvangirai was personally leading the party,s interaction with civil society leaders on a combined strategy of civil action against the Mugabe regime. The party was working particularly closely with the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). They also intended to secure the participation of churches, students, resident associations, women, the Crisis Coalition, and other democratic elements. ¶8. (C) According to Mudzingwa, Tsvangirai wanted a series of different kinds of events - party rallies, public demonstrations, civil disobedience in various guises - that would build toward a December peak. The NCA was planning unspecified street action in several locations within the next week (Ref A); the party would "activate local structures" to be supportive. Mudzingwa anticipated that the principal rallying issue would be the economy, particularly prices. Actions would have to be geographically dispersed, not just in Harare and Bulawayo where the GOZ would be well prepared to respond. He said the MDC was already mobilizing for events in Masvingo, Midlands, and Manicaland. -------------- Third Force Pitch -------------- ¶9. (C) Mudzingwa said he had met on Tsvangirai's behalf three weeks ago with &third force8 leaders Moyo, ex-ZANU-PF Central Committee member Pearson Mbalekwa, and former ZANU-PF Chairman for Masvingo and telecom magnate Daniel Shumba at the threesome's confidential instigation. They had confirmed that the "United People's Movement" or UPM was a vehicle for Emmerson Mnangagwa and had asked if Tsvangirai would collaborate with them and consider joining forces under Mnangagwa. Mudzingwa said he told them that there was nothing to discuss until the UPM and the identity of its principals emerged publicly. -------------- Bio Note -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Mudzingwa has frequently been accused by his critics within the party and civil society of being behind intra-party violence and of being compromised by GOZ security forces. Sensitive reporting indicates that his name was disclosed by a South African agent (who is still being held by the GOZ) as one of several MDC figures on the SAG payroll. This information may have been used by the GOZ to induce Mudzingwa's cooperation. In this vein, though not conclusive, Mudzingwa had difficulty explaining to poloff (and no doubt to his MDC colleagues) the recent hiring of his wife as a professor at Chinhoyi University of Science and Technology after she was fired as a secondary school teacher years ago for her association with the MDC. In any event (and unfortunately if these allegations are correct),he appears for now to retain Tsvangirai's confidence. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While Mudzingwa is a close and important aide, we do not necessarily take his characterizations of Tsvangirai's position as fully accurate. Nonetheless, his posture is illustrative of the "unelected kitchen cabinet" that many in the party and civil society - even outside the Ncube faction - resent. Mudzingwa,s comments would seem to confirm MDC mediator Brian Raftopolous' suspicions (Ref B) that this group of advisors appears to be encouraging Tsvangirai not to compromise with the Ncube faction by offering a face-saving concession on process issues ) a compromise Tsvangirai appeared prepared to accept when the Ambassador met with him the evening of the October 27 leadership meeting (Ref C). As to the UPM's approach, we would argue that this testifies to a growing power vacuum in Zimbabwe as Mugabe,s grip loosens, as well as to the internal weaknesses of both principal political parties. DELL