EAST ASIA SUMMIT: VIETNAM'S TAKE ON RECENT ASEAN

UNCLAS HANOI 000437

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL VM ARF ASEAN
SUBJECT: EAST ASIA SUMMIT: VIETNAM'S TAKE ON RECENT ASEAN
SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETINGS

REF: A. Vientiane 108; B. 04 Hanoi 3042; C. Hanoi 42


1. (SBU) Summary: During recent Senior Officials Meetings
in Hanoi and Jakarta, ASEAN members agreed that ASEAN should
be at the center of East Asia Summit (EAS) process, the
ASEAN chair should be the EAS chair and the EAS should be
held in an ASEAN country (with exceptions made only under
special circumstances). The issues of openness and
frequency remain unresolved: Vietnam is pushing for the
inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand and for the
EAS to take place every three years. Although our
interlocutor suggested that a decision to include India and
others "has already been made," until these issues are
formally resolved, ASEAN will not officially present its
position to China, Japan and the ROK. The March SOM in
Jakarta may present the next opportunity to reach agreement
on outstanding issues. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Ministry of Foreign Affairs ASEAN Department Deputy
Director General Nguyen Tien Minh told us February 23 that
the February 16-18 ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in
Rangoon was a continuation of the ASEAN SOM "brainstorming
session" held in Hanoi January 12-14 (Ref A),with the
modalities of the East Asia Summit (EAS) the focus of
discussion at both meetings. The ten members of ASEAN
reached agreement that, whatever form the EAS ultimately
takes, ASEAN should "be at the center of the EAS process."
Furthermore, they agreed in Hanoi and Rangoon that, at the
EAS, ASEAN should "speak with one voice," that the ASEAN
chair should always chair the EAS and that the EAS should be
held in an ASEAN country. That said, a decision to hold the
EAS outside ASEAN could be made on a "case-by-case basis"
under "special circumstances," Minh explained.


3. (SBU) With several key matters still unresolved, ASEAN is
not yet ready to present its consensus position to China,
Japan and Korea. The most important among these is the
issue of "openness," Minh continued. Vietnam's position is
that the EAS should be open to a number of countries outside
the ASEAN Plus 3 framework, namely India, Australia and New
Zealand. Vietnam considers this position to be "middle of
the road." (Note: Certain ASEAN members are strongly
opposed to expanding the EAS beyond the current ASEAN Plus 3
members. Others want to see many of the current ASEAN
Regional Forum members included. Adding India, Australia
and New Zealand is seen as the middle ground between these
positions. End note.) It seems, Minh said, that the
"decision to include additional countries such as India has
already been made," and ASEAN now has to decide "how and in
what format" to include them. ASEAN may reach a final
decision on this during the March SOM in Jakarta, Minh
added.


4. (SBU) The issue of frequency also remains unresolved.
Vietnam's preference is to hold the EAS every three years,
but some in ASEAN are looking to increase the frequency to
once every two years. From Vietnam's perspective, the EAS
will be a chance for the region's leadership to get together
to exchange ideas and "discuss strategic and transnational
issues." The EAS is "highly unlikely" to be anything more
than a "talkfest" like the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting
(ASEM),and Vietnam will continue to look to APEC and the
ASEAN Plus 3 as the key forums to discuss and carry out
cooperative measures.


5. (SBU) Comment: The GVN seems uncomfortable with its
position in the EAS debate. Vietnam's regional foreign
policy is based on maintaining a strong connection to ASEAN
and on preserving that organization's preeminent position in
Asian diplomacy as a way to ensure that the smaller
countries of Southeast Asia (including Vietnam) are not
trampled by the political and economic heavyweights of
Northeast Asia. At the same time, Vietnam maintains close
relations with China and, on matters that do not involve
Sino-Vietnamese territorial questions (such as the
Spratlys),supports Chinese positions in international
forums. In the EAS debate, however, Vietnam feels that the
interests of ASEAN and the interests of China are opposed:
supporting China's position on the EAS would necessarily
mean diluting the importance of the ASEAN Plus 3 mechanism.
Vietnam is finding it difficult to simultaneously placate
China, shore up ASEAN and avoid confrontation with its pro-
EAS neighbors. The likely outcome is that Vietnam, which
lacks both experience and expertise in multilateral
diplomacy, will choose the path of least resistance and join
ASEAN consensus on this issue. End Comment.

MARINE