FUNDING FOR PHASE II VIETNAM UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 003236 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR PM-WRA, EAP-BCLTV, AND S-GHD; OSD PASS TO DR. STERN; SOLIC PASS TO COL JORDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT EAID MARR MOPS PREF PREL KHDP VM MAS SUBJECT: FUNDING FOR PHASE II VIETNAM UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AND LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY REF: A. (A) SECSTATE 00214260 ¶B. (B) HANOI 2049 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. THE CURRENT ESTIMATED COST PROJECTION FOR PHASE II OF THE UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AND LANDMINE IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND TECHNICAL SURVEY IS USD 9.2 MILLION OVER THREE YEARS, WHICH INCLUDES TWENTY MILITARY CLEARANCE TEAMS. THIS TOTAL REPRESENTS A COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO OTHER PLANNED NGO-EXECUTED CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING THOSE SPONSORED BY THE USG. MINE CLEARANCE CARRIED OUT BY MILITARY DEMINERS AS PART OF PHASE I WAS SOME OF THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE MINE CLEARANCE TO DATE IN VIETNAM AT LESS THAN USD 2K PER HECTARE. THE TOTAL COST FOR PHASE II CLEARANCE WILL LIKELY BE OFFSET BY OTHER GOVERNMENT DONORS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE RECENTLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN JOINING THE PHASE II EFFORT. USG LEADERSHIP IN HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION IN VIETNAM IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. PHASE II OF THIS PROJECT IS ALSO VIEWED AS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF USG COMMITTMENT IN THE WIDER FIELD OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. IN LIGHT OF THESE FACTORS, POST BELIEVES FUNDING FOR PHASE II SHOULD BE CONTINUED INCREMENTALLY AT A LEVEL THAT WILL ALLOW PLANNING TO BE COMPLETED IN FY06 AND THE FIRST STAGE OF A MULTI-PHASE, MULTI-YEAR EXECUTION TO BEGIN IN FY07. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) POST IS IN RECEIPT OF REF A OUTLINING A RECENT PM/WRA DECISION TO TERMINATE FOLLOW-ON FUNDING FOR PHASE II. START-UP FUNDING FOR PHASE II OF THIS PROJECT WAS RECOMMENDED BY POST IN ITS INPUT FOR THE FY06 DEMINING COUNTRY PLAN (REF B). ¶3. (SBU) PHASE I OF THIS PROJECT WAS COMPLETED ON 14 NOVEMBER 2005 WITH THE PUBLICATION AND RELEASE OF A FINAL REPORT. THIS REPORT WAS THE CULMINATION OF NEARLY FOUR YEARS OF INCREASINGLY CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA FOUNDATION (VVAF) AND THE CENTER FOR BOMB AND MINE DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY (BOMICEN) OF VIETNAM'S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. PHASE I WAS CONDUCTED IN THE THREE CENTRAL VIETNAM PROVINCES OF HA TINH, QUANG BINH AND QUANG TRI FROM MARCH 2004 UNTIL MAY 2005. DURING THIS PERIOD, OVER 5,000 PEOPLE WERE INTERVIEWED IN 344 COMMUNES, PRODUCING A DATA SET THAT HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR MINE ACTION (IMSMA) DATABASE, ALONG WITH 
PRE-EXISTENT ARCHIVAL DATA MADE AVAILABLE BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. ANALYSIS OF THIS DATA HAS ALREADY HELPED IDENTIFY AND RANK ORDER THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CLEARANCE PROBLEMS IN THESE PROVINCES BASED ON THE INJURY RATE AND THE RELATIVE DEGREE OF SOCIO- ECONOMIC IMPACT. ¶4. (SBU) PARALLEL ACTIVITIES BY 17 BOMICEN TEAMS SUCCESSFULLY CLEARED 421 HECTARES AT 2,761 SITES TO A DEPTH OF ONE METER, REMOVING OVER 6,200 UXO-RELATED ITEMS, INCLUDING FIVE LARGE (250-1000 LB) BOMBS, 1,283 BOMBLETS, 859 ARTILLERY OR MORTAR ROUNDS, 180 M79 SHELLS, 32 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, 24 HAND GRENADES AND 3,822 OTHER PIECES OF MISCELLANEOUS ORDNANCE. UXO ITEMS DETECTED AT GREATER DEPTHS WERE MARKED AND ASSIGNED TO LOCAL MILITARY OFFICES FOR SUBSEQUENT CLEARANCE. ¶5. (SBU) THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF THIS PROJECT IS THE RECOGNITION THAT IT IS NOT ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE TO CLEAR ALL 330,000 SQUARE KILOMETERS OF VIETNAM'S TERRITORIAL LANDMASS, MUCH OF WHICH IS CONTAMINATED TO SOME DEGREE BY EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW). CONSEQUENTLY, AN ASSESSMENT THAT MEASURES THE SOCIO- ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PERSISTENT UXO/LANDMINE CONTAMINATION IS INTENDED TO HELP PLANNERS DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR ALLOCATING SCARCE RESOURCES FOR PRIORITIZED CLEARANCE, EDUCATION AND SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. ¶6. (SBU) CURRENTLY, MINE CLEARANCE EFFORTS IN VIETNAM UNDERTAKEN BY NGOS WITH INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP ARE, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON THE THREE CENTRAL VIETNAM PROVINCES SURVEYED IN PHASE I. THE MAJORITY OF BOMICEN'S CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES ARE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF LARGE-SCALE, GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AT STATE-INVESTED INDUSTRIAL ZONES OR IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES. OTHER SMALL-SCALE AND RELATIVELY LOW-ECONOMIC-IMPACT CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE DIFFICULT TO SERVICE WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES. CLEARLY, DATA FROM A NATIONWIDE ASSESSMENT WOULD ASSIST COMMUNITIES IN ALL 64 PROVINCES IN THE COMPETITION FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION RESOURCES BASED ON OBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED NEEDS. ¶7. (SBU) VIETNAM'S CURRENT LACK OF A NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY REMAINS DISAPPOINTING AND INHIBITS EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THIS AREA. PHASE II WOULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A STRATEGY BY PROVIDING THE BASIC DATA NEEDED TO BEGIN TO PRIORITIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVITIES, WHILE IDENTIFYING WHERE NGOS CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO FILL THE RESOURCES GAP. SECTION II (PARA 2.2) OF PART V (RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION) OF THE FINAL REPORT FOR PHASE I OUTLINES AN INITIAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGY FOR CLEARING THE REMAINING ERW FROM THESE THREE PROVINCES. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN ENCOURAGING STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. ¶8. (SBU) BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TERMINATING USG SUPPORT FOR PHASE II, SUCH AN ACTION ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL TO HAVE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. PHASE I/II HAS ALREADY TAKEN ON THE PATINA OF A FLAGSHIP PROGRAM BETWEEN THE USG AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IN AN AREA THAT REMAINS HIGHLY VISIBLE AND EMOTIVE. THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL COOPERATION ON PHASE I HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SENIOR U.S. AND VIETNAMESE LEADERS. THE VALUE OF A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AN AMERICAN NGO AND VIETNAM'S MILITARY, WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN CONSERVATIVE AND INWARD-LOOKING, SHOULD NOT BE PREMATURELY DISMISSED. CONTINUED CONTACT NOT ONLY WITH NATIONAL LEVEL MILITARY AGENCIES (I.E., ENGINEERING COMMAND AND BOMICEN),BUT ALSO AT THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL THROUGH COORDINATION WITH LOCAL MILITARY DEMINING UNITS, IS GOOD FOR THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND FOR ENCOURAGING MILITARY INTERACTION WITH OTHER CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS. IN FACT, MOD REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE FIRST TIME RECENTLY ATTENDED A LANDMINE WORKING GROUP PROJECT REVIEW CONFERENCE, HELD IN HUE ON 2 DECEMBER 2005 BY VARIOUS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN THE FIELD OF MINE ACTION. ¶9. (SBU) REF A NOTED A FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY USD 13 MILLION OVER THREE TO FOUR YEARS TO COMPLETE PHASE II. BASED ON BEST AVAILABLE DATA, POST BELIEVES THIS FIGURE IS OVERSTATED. VVAF ESTIMATES THE COST OF PHASE II TO BE $6.36 MILLION OVER THREE YEARS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL $2.83 MILLION TO EQUIP AND DEPLOY 20 RESPONSE TEAMS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL VERIFICATION AND HIGH-PRIORITY CLEARANCE. WHILE LESSONS FROM THE PHASE I EXPERIENCE, ESPECIALLY FROM THE PLANNING PERIOD, INDICATE THE POTENTIAL FOR COST OVERRUNS DUE TO EXTENDED AND LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, THE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN VVAF AND BOMICEN PERSONNEL OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS MITIGATES AGAINST THIS. EARLY INDICATIONS FROM PHASE II PLANNING MEETINGS SUGGEST THAT THE PLANNING PERIOD FOR THE FOLLOW-ON EFFORT WILL BE FACILITATED BY SHARED PAST EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED. MANY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HAVE ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED. ¶10. (SBU) THE LEARNING CURVE FOR THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY DURING PHASE I, BOTH INSTITUTIONALLY AND AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, WAS STEEP, BUT POST BELIEVES THAT MOD IS NOW WILLING TO MOVE FORWARD AT A QUICKER PACE IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING PHASE II. WHILE IT IS PREMATURE TO SUGGEST THAT BOTH PARTNERS SHARE A UNIFIED VISION ON HOW TO PROCEED IN PHASE II, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE MORE COMFORTABLE WORKING WITH EACH OTHER AND ARE CAPABLE OF ARRIVING AT COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS THAT SATISFY THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT WHILE CONCURRENTLY SAFEGUARDING VIETNAM'S VALID STATE SECURITY INTERESTS. ¶11. (SBU) REF A ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE PROJECTED COST FOR PHASE II OUTWEIGHS THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS. POST DISAGREES. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY THE LONG- TERM BENEFITS OF A STUDY OF THIS NATURE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM NEEDS A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE VERY REAL PROBLEM OF ERW. DOMESTIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS OF MONEY AND EQUIPMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM ARE BOTH CURRENTLY INADEQUATE. A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THIS TYPE WILL NOT ONLY FACILITATE ALLOCATION OF CURRENT RESOURCES, BUT WILL ALSO ALLOW BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO IDENTIFY AND JUSTIFY REQUESTS FOR FURTHER AID. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE ONLY OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF VIETNAM'S OVERALL PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF ERW. ALREADY, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN RECEIVING THE DATA FROM PHASE I IN ORDER TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE PROJECTS IN VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, COPIES OF THE FINAL REPORT HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO 17 EMBASSIES, 25 NGOS, VARIOUS UNITED NATIONS OFFICES IN HANOI AND SEVERAL BUSINESSES, INCLUDING SHELL, SIEMENS AND BHP BILLITON, LTD. SINCE A PRESENTATION OF PHASE I RESULTS AT THE RECENT LANDMINE WORKING GROUP PROJECT REVIEW CONFERENCE, SEVERAL OTHER NGOS WORKING IN VIETNAM HAVE OFFERED UP THEIR OWN DATA FOR INCLUSION IN THE IMSMA DATABASE. ¶12. (SBU) CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR BOMICEN'S EFFORTS TO UNDERTAKE TECHNICAL CLEARANCE ALONGSIDE THE SURVEY TEAMS PROVIDES A VERY COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO NGO CLEARANCE OPERATIONS. AS NOTED ABOVE, 17 MILITARY DEMINING TEAMS DEDICATED TO THE PHASE I EFFORT CLEARED 421 HECTARES DOWN TO A DEPTH OF ONE METER. THE COST FOR THIS EFFORT WAS APPROXIMATELY USD 800,000. PHASE II PROPOSES TO EQUIP AND EMPLOY TWENTY TECHNICAL RESPONSE TEAMS AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY USD 950,000 PER YEAR. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY INDICATED AN INTEREST IN EXPANDING THE CLEARANCE CAPACITY ASSOCIATED WITH PHASE II BY FUNDING ADDITIONAL TEAMS. ¶13. (USD) BY WAY OF COMPARISON, IN FY06, MAG-AMERICA HAS PROPOSED TO USE FOUR TEAMS TO CLEAR 20 HECTARES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE AT A COST OF USD 1.5 MILLION OVER 12 MONTHS, AND 30 HECTARES IN PHU THO PROVINCE AT A COST OF USD 1.8 MILLION OVER A PERIOD OF 15 MONTHS USING AN ADDITIONAL FOUR TEAMS. WHILE THE TECHNICAL STANDARDS EMPLOYED AND QUALITY OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED MAY VARY SOMEWHAT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NGO DEMINING PERSONNEL, POST BELIEVES IT IS ALMOST ALWAYS PREFERABLE TO EQUIP AND TRAIN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE OPERATIONALLY FLEXIBLE, MORE MOBILE AND HAVE A MORE ROBUST NETWORK TO PROVIDE THE FULL SPECTRUM OF REQUIRED MEDICAL, LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. IT ALSO SUPPORTS THE USG OBJECTIVE OF EXPANDING NATIONAL CAPACITY. ¶14. (SBU) POST RECOMMENDS THAT FUNDING FOR PHASE II NOT BE TERMINATED IN ITS ENTIRETY. ADEQUATE FUNDING SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO VVAF TO CARRY OUT PLANNING FOR PHASE II UNTIL THE END OF FY06. SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTI-YEAR, MULTI-PHASED PLAN OF EXECUTION BEGINNING IN FY07 AND EXTENDING FOR THE PROJECTED LIFE OF THE PROJECT SHOULD BE USED AS THE CRITERIA TO REINFORCE SUCCESS AND TO DEVELOP SUBSEQUENT GRANT PROPOSALS FOR FOLLOW-ON EXECUTION FUNDING IN THE COMING YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF THIS PROJECT, POST RECOMMENDS LIMITING THE SURVEY TO THREE TO FOUR ADDITIONAL PROVINCES. THE FUNDING FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT SUB-PHASE BEYOND THIS ONE SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON ITS TIMELY COMPLETION. THIS WILL PERMIT STAGGERED FUNDING FOR THE LIFE OF THE PROJECT AND ALLOW NOT ONLY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS, TO OBSERVE AND THEN TO REINFORCE SUCCESS. IT WILL ALSO PERMIT DONORS TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT IF THE RESULTS DO NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS. PREMATURE TERMINATION OF FUNDING FOR PHASE II WILL NOT ONLY REFLECT ADVERSELY ON THE USG COMMITMENT TO VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY, BUT MAY ALSO JEOPARDIZE OTHER STREAMS OF INTERNATIONAL DONOR FUNDING. MANY DONORS LOOK TO THE USG FOR LEADERSHIP IN THIS AREA, AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. SUPPORT FROM THIS FLAGSHIP EFFORT MAY BE PERCEIVED AS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PROJECT GOALS, THE PARTNERS, OR BOTH. A UNRELATED PLANNED DECREASES IN USAID HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM FUNDING FOR VIETNAM FROM USD 4 MILLION IN FY 05 TO USD 1 MILLION IN FY 06 MAY FURTHER EXACERBATE NEGATIVE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PERCEPTIONS OF USG COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN VIETNAM. ¶15. (SBU) WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE UPCOMING VISIT OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PM/WRA IN FEBRUARY 2006 AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY PHASE II, BUT ALSO OTHER WAYS TO FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEMINING CAPACITY IN VIETNAM, STRATEGIC MINE ACTION PLANNING, TRAINING SUPPORT, AS WELL AS OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN THE AREAS OF MINE ACTION, MINE RISK EDUCATION AND VICTIM'S ASSISTANCE. ¶16. (U) THE POINTS OF CONTACT AT ARE MAJOR R.E. LUCIUS, MARINE AND NAVAL ATTACHE, (84-4) 772-1500, EXT. 2307 OR PROGRAM ASSISTANT MS. NGO KIM THUY, (84-4) 772-1500, EXT. 2232; UNCLAS E-MAIL: LUCIUSRE@STATE.GOV, NGOTK@STATE.GOV AND CLASSIFIED EMAIL: DILUCRE@ NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL. MARINE