VIETNAM - CONDITIONS FOR DPRK REFUGEES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000149

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KN VM HUMANR DPRK ASEAN
SUBJECT: VIETNAM - CONDITIONS FOR DPRK REFUGEES

REF: A. 04 STATE 275712 B. 04 STATE 275820


1. (SBU) Summary: Vietnam has not signed any international
refugee convention and does not officially recognize North
Koreans as refugees in need of protection. Several thousand
North Koreans, however, have passed through Vietnam en route
to other Southeast Asian countries where they have received
protection, or in some cases, en route to South Korea
directly. Most North Koreans passing through Vietnam do not
stop; those who do require assistance from and sometimes the
protection of foreign embassies against refoulement. The
U.S. Embassy in Hanoi has not experienced any incidents
involving North Koreans requesting asylum or assistance, but
other western embassies have. The Embassy and the Consulate
General in Ho Chi Minh City are ill-equipped to accommodate
asylum seekers, especially those who might not be able to
leave the grounds for days or weeks pending diplomatic
resolution of their cases. Vietnam would not accept any
official USG assistance program for North Koreans on
Vietnamese soil. End Summary.

International Refugee Protection
--------------


2. (SBU) North Korean refugees in Vietnam have no access to
formal international refugee protection. The UNHCR has an
office in Hanoi, but the Vietnamese authorities do not
recognize North Koreans as refugees, and Vietnam is not a
signatory to any international refugee convention. As a
result, North Koreans who appear in Vietnam and attempt to
present themselves to the UNHCR or foreign embassies or
consulates run the risk of arrest and deportation (most
likely to China) for immigration violations. UNHCR Hanoi
notes that no North Korean has ever presented himself at the
UNHCR and requested assistance. The UNHCR is involved,
however, with quiet negotiations between the South Korean
Embassy, the GVN and some foreign embassies that have
received asylum-seeking North Koreans. In most cases, the
GVN agrees to a quiet departure for the North Koreans. In
some cases, however, North Koreans have been deported to
China, according to UNHCR officials.


3. (SBU) Many hundreds of North Koreans have successfully
contacted South Korean institutions (churches, businesses,
community organizations or the Embassy) and been able to
travel to South Korea, according to ROK Embassy contacts.
Hundreds (or possibly thousands) have ended their journeys
by exiting Vietnam and then flying to South Korea from
Cambodia, Singapore or Thailand, and hundreds have made the
trip directly, including 468 North Koreans who flew from Ho
Chi Minh City to Seoul on a charter flight in July 2004.
Following this incident, the GVN cracked down on North
Koreans in Vietnam illegally; however, in October 2004 and
again in January 2005 the GVN again permitted groups of
North Koreans who had taken refuge in the South Korean,
Swedish and French Embassies in Hanoi to travel directly to
Seoul.


4. (SBU) For years, the GVN has attempted to reconcile its
political friendship with Pyongyang with its responsibility
to protect vulnerable populations, including North Korean
refugees entering Vietnam overland from China. The uneasy
compromise has been to turn a blind eye to North Korean
refugees as long as they do not stop and request asylum or
refugee status while in Vietnam. This allows the GVN to
facilitate the travel of North Korean refugees without
politically antagonizing the North Korean government.

Challenges when/if North Koreans Present Themselves at the
U.S. Embassy or Consulate
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) The initial challenge we have at the U.S. Embassy
in Hanoi is that there is physically no space to shelter
securely any potential asylum-seekers. The employee
lunchroom or the conference room might suffice for a brief
period, but these areas lack sufficient sanitary facilities
(a single toilet in a hallway nearby) and are behind the
hardline and would therefore require full-time security
escorts. North Koreans presenting themselves at the U.S.
Embassy could need shelter inside U.S. facilities to avoid
being arrested and deported (most likely to China) by GVN
security forces. If this happened, resolution of the
situation through negotiation with the GVN and other
relevant actors could take two weeks or more.


6. (SBU) The U.S. Embassy does not have the funds to supply
food and other necessities to any long-term visitors. We
currently lack policy guidance on this possibility. U.S.
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City shares the same problems
as Embassy Hanoi with regard to a lack of facilities,
personnel and funds to care for any North Koreans who might
need refuge on USG property.

Host Government Attitude towards Vietnam-based Programs
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) The GVN would not support the establishment of a
U.S. refugee resettlement program for North Koreans on
Vietnamese territory. Vietnam officially considers North
Korea a "traditional friend" and views the recognition of
North Koreans as refugees to be a kind of interference in
North Korea's internal affairs. The GVN's (often
overlooked) policy is to arrest and deport any North Korean
who requests asylum in Vietnam; it would not cooperate in a
program to resettle them officially.


8. (SBU) Similarly, the GVN would reject the suggestion of
overt U.S. assistance to North Koreans in its territory.
The GVN refuses to acknowledge the presence of North Korean
refugees in Vietnam, saying only that some North Koreans
enter Vietnam illegally by posing as Chinese. To allow the
USG to provide assistance to North Koreans would complicate
Vietnam-North Korea relations and would require the GVN to
ignore its fears of pull factors attracting more refugees to
Vietnam.


9. (SBU) Previous practice indicates, however, that the GVN
is willing at times to turn a blind eye to the efforts of
South Korean organizations to assist North Korean refugees
in Vietnam. U.S. programs that assisted these organizations
discreetly and indirectly through their parent organizations
in South Korea could have a positive impact on the situation
of refugees in Vietnam.

MARINE