VIETNAM-DPRK TIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001179

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PARM PHUM KN KS VM DPRK
SUBJECT: VIETNAM-DPRK TIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND
CONSTRAINTS ON POSITIVE ROLE FOR HANOI

REF: A. 03 HANOI 2650

B. 04 HANOI 2175

C. HANOI 204

D. HANOI 136

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., John Boardman per 1.4 (b),(d)

Summary and Comment
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1. (C) The Vietnam-DPRK bilateral relationship, although
strained by last year's "mass defection" of North Korean
asylum-seekers from Ho Chi Minh City to Seoul, is slowly
returning to normal. Vietnam recognizes that its
"traditional ties" with the North, combined with its
proximity to China and economic reform experience, put it in
the unique, and often difficult, position, of having to deal
with North-South and DPRK-related issues. It appears that
Vietnam is willing to use its position to make a positive,
although very limited, contribution to efforts to both
resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and encourage the
DPRK to open up -- and the ROK is quietly encouraging Vietnam
to do so. However, Hanoi's ties with Pyongyang also
constrain its range of action, particularly in the case of
DPRK asylum-seekers entering Vietnam. Although Vietnam's
political ties with the DPRK are dwarfed by its economic
relationship with the ROK, Vietnam will not turn its back on
its old friend, and there may be future opportunities for
Hanoi to take advantage of its "in" with Pyongyang. As the
United States and Vietnam discuss regional and global matters
of mutual concern, it may be worthwhile to encourage the
Vietnamese to look beyond their immediate neighborhood and
add DPRK-related matters to the list of issues in which we
share an interest in addressing and resolving. End Summary
and Comment.

"Traditional Friendship" Slowly on the Mend
--------------


2. (SBU) Pyongyang was among the first to establish
diplomatic relations with Hanoi, and the "close and
traditional ties" that North Korean and Vietnam came to enjoy
were bolstered by the DPRK's assistance during the Vietnam
War. Although the relationship suffered in the 1970s and
1980s because of Pyongyang's support for Pol Pot and its
criticism of Vietnam for invading Cambodia, bilateral
relations regained their footing in the 1980s. That said,
while political ties are the mainstay of the Vietnam-DPRK
relationship, in truth, Vietnam's growing trade and
investment relations with South Korea offer more real value
to Vietnam: the ROK was ranked seventh in two-way trade in
2003 and second (after the United States) in terms of
investment in Vietnam in 2004; on the other hand, there does
not appear to be any trade with the DPRK at all (Ref A).
Furthermore, Vietnam and the ROK now regularly trade
high-level visitors, while senior Vietnam-DPRK exchanges are
increasingly moribund. However, political and ideological
fraternity, close ties between the Communist Party of Vietnam
and the Korean Workers Party and Vietnam's loyalty to an old
ally ensure that Vietnam continues to honor North Korea with
the title "traditional friend."


3. (SBU) The two countries' ties took a hit last July with
the transport of 468 DPRK asylum-seekers from Ho Chi Minh
City to Seoul (Ref B). In addition to lodging a number of
official protests with Hanoi, Pyongyang recalled Ambassador
Pak Ung Sop and publicly accused Vietnam of participating in
a "mass kidnapping conspiracy." In subsequent months,
several low- and mid-level bilateral exchanges were also
cancelled.


4. (C) Relations now appear to be returning to normal.
According to ROK Embassy DCM Bae Jae-hyun and MFA Korea Desk
Director Tran Van Hieu, North Korean Ambassador Pak returned
to Hanoi on March 27 (reportedly in time to prepare for and
host the April 15 Kim Il-sung birthday event.) Bilateral
exchanges are now back on track as well: Northeast Asia
Institute (NAI) Director Ngo Xuan Binh told us that, in a
recent conversation with North Korean Embassy officials, the
two sides agreed that a delegation led by Binh could travel
to Pyongyang for a visit hosted by the DPRK's Institute for
International Relations.

Vietnam's Ties with the DPRK a Help and a Hindrance
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5. (C) Vietnamese officials and academics acknowledge that
Vietnam's long-standing ties with the DPRK, together with its
economic reform experience and shared border with China, put
it in a unique, and sometimes difficult, position to play
some kind of role in a number of North-South and DPRK-related
issues, namely: DPRK asylum-seekers, the North Korean
nuclear problem and efforts to encourage Pyongyang to open
up. They express a desire for Vietnam to take advantage of
its situation to do something positive in dealing with these
matters -- and note that the ROK is increasingly encouraging
Vietnam to do so. But they also quickly point out that,
while friendly relations with the DPRK give Vietnam an "in"
that others do not have, these same relations have
constrained its range of options, particularly in the case of
asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, when circumstances allow,
Vietnam seems to be attempting to play a limited, indirect
and positive -- if not proactive -- role.

Asylum-Seekers: Avoid Straining Ties with the DPRK
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6. (C) Although surprised and annoyed by North Korea's
reaction to last year's "mass defection" (Ref C),Vietnam
nonetheless appears to be working to prevent a repeat of the
accumulation of DPRK asylum-seekers that ultimately led to
strained relations with the North. A nine-year South Korean
resident of Ho Chi Minh City told us that it is now
"difficult" for North Koreans to make it to Vietnam from
China and that South Korean residents here are fearful of
drawing the attention of the police. South Korean Embassy
Political First Secretary Lee Kang-kuk said that his Embassy
believes there are "very few, if any" DPRK asylum-seekers now
in Vietnam. (Note: It is unclear if this is because of a
reduced inflow of asylum-seekers or an increased, and quiet,
outflow, or both. End Note.) NAI's Director Binh noted
that, while Vietnam recognizes the "humanitarian nature" of
this issue, its policy is not to allow Vietnam to become a
"refugee camp" (a desire he observed may be shared by the
ROK.)


7. (C) Furthermore, even when Vietnam has also shown
flexibility in dealing with North Korean asylum-seekers --
most recently in the case of the six North Koreans who
entered the Swedish and French Embassy compounds last
December (Ref D and previous) -- the Vietnamese authorities
assiduously sought to avoid causing offense to the DPRK.
According to Swedish DCM Helena Sangeland, although the
Vietnamese were "very cooperative" in dealing with the
situation, they nonetheless insisted on discretion and that
the French and Swedes provide the North Koreans with travel
documents. They also underlined that, in the event of future
episodes, the North Koreans would have to be turned over to
the GVN -- for eventual return to the country from which they
crossed into Vietnam.

Nuclear Issue: Attempting to Send Indirect Message
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In the case of the North Korean nuclear issue, Vietnam
is attempting to play a positive, if limited and indirect,
role. During the April visit to Hanoi of ROK Prime Minister
Lee Hae-chan, Vietnam State President Tran Duc Luong's
position of "strong support" for the ROKG's "Peace and
Prosperity Policy" was included in the two countries' joint
statement. According to the ROK Embassy's Lee Kang-kuk, this
was the "first time ever" the GVN went on record in support
of South Korea's efforts to address the North Korean nuclear
issue. MFA Korean Desk Director Hieu was less effusive,
noting that, although this was the first direct reference to
President No Moo-hyun's policy, this is not a "new position"
for Hanoi: "Vietnam's long-standing position has been to
support a peaceful and non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. We are
very concerned about the situation, and our position on North
Korea's nuclear program is clear," he stressed.


9. (C) However, as much as Vietnam would like to make a
positive contribution -- both to respond to the growing
encouragement of the ROK and others and broaden Vietnam's
diplomatic horizons -- "there are limits to what we can do to
address this problem," Hieu continued. Because of Vietnam's
relationship with the DPRK and its policy of non-interference
in another country's internal affairs, "we are not in a
position to do much. We must deal with this issue
indirectly." Similarly, according to NAI's Binh, "we cannot


criticize the North directly, but what we can do is ensure
that our message gets out in the press or on State-run
television. When there are reports on TV or in Nhan Dan
('People's Daily', the Communist Party's newspaper) about
Vietnam's support for a peaceful and non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula, that is how we are delivering our views" to the
North.

Vietnam as a Model: Yes, but...
--------------


10. (C) Both the MFA's Hieu and NAI's Binh observed that
Vietnam "could be a model for North Korea in the areas of
economic reform and opening up to the world." Vietnam's
economic transition and "Doi Moi" (renovation) experience
offer a more practical model than China, which is too large
and decentralized (also Ref A). Similarly, MFA Asia
Department Director General Nguyen Ba Cu told us that
Vietnam's relationship with the United States could provide
North Korea with a model of "two former enemies changing and
improving their ties." In the area of economic reform, over
the past several years several delegations of DPRK academics
have visited Vietnam for two- to three-week "familiarization
and training visits" organized by a Swedish university; the
most recent visit was less than a month ago. In addition,
according to the ROK Embassy DCM, South Korea recently
quietly offered -- and Vietnam accepted -- financial
assistance to launch a program bring DPRK officials to
Vietnam for similar visits, and the ROK Embassy has
approached the Swedes to learn about their ongoing program.


11. (SBU) Although our contacts acknowledge that Vietnam's
reform experience and relationship with the DPRK put it in a
unique position to reach out to and influence North Korea,
they are nonetheless cautious about what, if any, effect
Hanoi can have on Pyongyang. "The South Koreans wants us to
encourage North Korea to open up. Unfortunately, our
influence is more limited than they think," the MFA's Hieu
said. He reiterated that, "Vietnam cannot interfere in North
Korean internal issues." The NAI's Binh expressed a similar
view, noting that, although Vietnam believed its experience
could help North Korea, its influence is limited and that,
for now, "lower-level official and academic exchanges will
have to be enough." Recalling a conversation he had with the
North Korean Ambassador, Binh said, "Ambassador Pak accused
us of changing too much and selling out."

Comment
--------------


12. (C) The gap between Vietnam's economic relationship with
the ROK and its political ties with the DPRK will likely
continue to widen. Regardless, based on its historical ties
with and loyalty to its old ally, it is doubtful that Hanoi
will turn its back on the DPRK. Vietnam is seeking to
broaden its own foreign policy horizons, and with the
encouragement of the ROK, there may continue to be
opportunities for it to use its relationship with the DPRK to
make positive contributions to ongoing issues of interest.
Any efforts in this regard will be limited, however, by
Vietnam's lack of real leverage. As the United States and
Vietnam discuss regional and global issues of mutual concern,
it may be worth urging the Vietnamese to look beyond their
immediate neighborhood and underline to them our shared
interest in using whatever influence we can muster to address
and resolve DPRK-related issues of concern. End Comment.
Boardman


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