JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002735 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR NA-24 JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-049. ¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 is the text of the U.S. statement that was made at the closing plenary meeting of Part II of the Twenty-seventh Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),held at the Russian Mission on November 9, 2005. ¶3. (S) Begin text: STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION NOVEMBER 9, 2005 The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in closing the Twenty-seventh session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. I In this session, which was conducted in two parts, we have had a mix of success and disappointment with respect to specific issues. However, based on the tenor of our work, I believe the relationships among the Parties continue to develop in a productive and engaging manner. II During the first part of this session, we worked closely with the other Parties to ensure that the many aspects of bringing Russia's new RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty were accomplished without difficulty. To that end, we completed four critical documents that provided for technical data, applicable inspection procedures, provisions for SLBM launch canisters, and characteristics for training models of missiles for Russia's new SLBM. We also completed two documents related to changing Russia's radiation detection equipment used during inspections and reducing the boundary of the Zlatoust facility subject to suspect-site inspections. During the second part of the session, we completed a Joint Statement related to measuring SS-25 first stages that have been burned without their nozzles attached. I'm especially pleased that we were able to exchange statements on utilizing the supplemental procedures successfully demonstrated during the February 2005, Trident II RVOSI demonstration, which we have attached as an unclassified Annex to this statement. SIPDIS III However, the United States is disappointed that the Parties were unable to agree on using the U.S.-proposed procedures for confirming the type of Trident SLBM in its loading tube or liner. This is an issue that is long overdue for resolution and we hope that we can agree on the policy statement during the next session. Although we have achieved significant success with respect to bringing the RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty, the U.S. is disappointed that the Russian Federation has not provided Treaty-required information relating to this new SLBM. Now that this missile has been deployed, the U.S. believes that the Russian Federation should be able to provide the required information on throw-weight data and warhead attribution. The United States explained in detail why the eliminations of the SS-25 ICBMs in April and August of this year were incomplete. The United States urges Russia to bring its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance with Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol by eliminating the airframe for the forward section of the SCDM, or that Russia develop alternative Treaty-compliant procedures. We look forward to Russia's response during the intersessional period. IV The United States appreciates the detailed briefing provided by the Russian Federation with respect to its proposal to conduct an SS-25 RVOSI demonstration. The United States will respond as soon as possible to this proposal. V It is my hope that each Delegation will return to its capital, review the work achieved here, and communicate any follow-up ideas or actions through diplomatic channels. We must follow through on our discussions here with additional communication and dialog throughout the intersessional period if we are to be successful. Thank you for your work and your cooperation. I look forward to our corresponding on outstanding issues during the intersessional period. And finally, I'd like to thank our interpreters for their exceptional work. Without them, we could not function. Have a safe journey home. End text. ¶4. (U) Taylor sends. Moley