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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA2735
2005-11-09 08:36:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT,

Tags:   PARM  KACT  US  RS  UP  BO  KZ  START  JCIC  INF 
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						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002735 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT,
NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002735

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT,
NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-049.


2. (U) At paragraph 3 is the text of the U.S. statement that
was made at the closing plenary meeting of Part II of the
Twenty-seventh Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the Russian Mission
on November 9, 2005.


3. (S) Begin text:

STATEMENT
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING
OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 2005

The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine in closing the Twenty-seventh
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission.

I

In this session, which was conducted in two parts, we
have had a mix of success and disappointment with respect to
specific issues. However, based on the tenor of our work, I
believe the relationships among the Parties continue to
develop in a productive and engaging manner.

II

During the first part of this session, we worked closely
with the other Parties to ensure that the many aspects of
bringing Russia's new RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty were
accomplished without difficulty. To that end, we completed
four critical documents that provided for technical data,

applicable inspection procedures, provisions for SLBM launch
canisters, and characteristics for training models of
missiles for Russia's new SLBM.

We also completed two documents related to changing
Russia's radiation detection equipment used during
inspections and reducing the boundary of the Zlatoust
facility subject to suspect-site inspections.

During the second part of the session, we completed a
Joint Statement related to measuring SS-25 first stages that
have been burned without their nozzles attached.

I'm especially pleased that we were able to exchange
statements on utilizing the supplemental procedures
successfully demonstrated during the February 2005, Trident
II RVOSI demonstration, which we have attached as an
unclassified Annex to this statement.

SIPDIS

III

However, the United States is disappointed that the
Parties were unable to agree on using the U.S.-proposed
procedures for confirming the type of Trident SLBM in its
loading tube or liner. This is an issue that is long overdue
for resolution and we hope that we can agree on the policy
statement during the next session.

Although we have achieved significant success with
respect to bringing the RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty, the U.S.
is disappointed that the Russian Federation has not provided
Treaty-required information relating to this new SLBM. Now
that this missile has been deployed, the U.S. believes that
the Russian Federation should be able to provide the required
information on throw-weight data and warhead attribution.

The United States explained in detail why the
eliminations of the SS-25 ICBMs in April and August of this
year were incomplete. The United States urges Russia to
bring its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance
with Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol by
eliminating the airframe for the forward section of the SCDM,
or that Russia develop alternative Treaty-compliant
procedures. We look forward to Russia's response during the
intersessional period.

IV

The United States appreciates the detailed briefing
provided by the Russian Federation with respect to its
proposal to conduct an SS-25 RVOSI demonstration. The United
States will respond as soon as possible to this proposal.

V

It is my hope that each Delegation will return to its
capital, review the work achieved here, and communicate any
follow-up ideas or actions through diplomatic channels. We
must follow through on our discussions here with additional
communication and dialog throughout the intersessional period
if we are to be successful.

Thank you for your work and your cooperation. I look
forward to our corresponding on outstanding issues during the
intersessional period.

And finally, I'd like to thank our interpreters for
their exceptional work. Without them, we could not function.

Have a safe journey home.

End text.


4. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley