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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TRIDENT
ISSUES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005

REF: A. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017)

B. GENEVA 2719 (JCIC-XXVII-039)

C. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-040.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 3, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on November 3, 2005, to discuss the U.S. and Russian
proposals for Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection
(RVOSI) procedures (REF A) and the Russian proposal for
inspections of Trident SLBMs in Containers (REF B).


4. (S) In discussion of the two proposals for Trident II
RVOSIs, the Parties appeared to be close to resolution of the
issue with differences remaining over the number of
measurements that would be taken with the measuring device
demonstrated at the February 2005 Trident II RVOSI
demonstration at Kings Bay Submarine Base, and the meaning of
"official" and "unofficial" measurements. The Russians
proposed that each of the two subgroups observe two
measurements being made. The U.S. Delegation said that, for
safety reasons, each subgroup could observe only one
measurement.


5. (S) In the discussions of draft policy arrangements for
inspections of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs
in Loading Tubes during data update inspections, the U.S.
Delegation made clear that the United States was proposing,
at most, one Trident missile (regardless of type) to be
removed from its container per Treaty year as a matter of
po

licy. The U.S. Delegation also emphasized that if the
inspecting Party requested, more than once in a Treaty year,
the removal of a Trident missile under the policy
arrangement, the United States may have to reconsider this
proposed policy. The Russians stated that their requests for
removal of a Trident I or II missile have always been based
on substantial concerns. The Russian Delegation insisted,
since Trident I still existed in containers at the Silverdale
submarine base, that Russia still wanted to be able to
request a Trident missile removal of each type within the
same Treaty year under the policy arrangement. This would
equate to a total of two potential missile removals from
their containers for a Treaty year. The Russian Delegation
also reminded the U.S. Delegation that Russia believes it is
necessary to distinguish the difference between a
"verification removal" (i.e., a removal pursuant to the
Statement of Policy) and a removal to confirm missile type
based on Russia's Treaty right.


6. (S) The United States also sought to gain clarification
on Russia's request to remove specific hatches from the
containers in advance. The Russian Delegation said that if
specific hatches were not specified in the policy
arrangement, the inspected Party might not remove any
hatches. The U.S. Delegation stated that it would respond at
a later meeting.

--------------
RUSSIA'S PAPER ON
TRIDENT II RVOSI
--------------


7. (S) Fedorchenko opened the meeting by stating that the
U.S. proposal, dated October 11, 2005, and the
Russian-proposed paper, dated November 2, 2005, addressing
Trident II RVOSIs were both on the table for discussion. The
Russian Delegation was interested in the U.S. response to the
Russian proposal.


8. (S) The Russian proposal, for the conduct of Trident II
RVOSIs in response to REF A, was the first topic of
discussion. The text of the Russian proposal on the
Coordinated JCIC Plenary Statement on Reentry Vehicle
Inspections of Trident II SLBMs follows.

Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Text Proposed by the
Russian Side
November 2, 2005

Coordinated JCIC Plenary Statement by (Name of Party)
on Reentry Vehicle Inspections of Trident II SLBMs

(Name of Party) takes note of the statement by the
United States of America that the front sections of Trident
II SLBMs belonging to the United States of America are not
equipped with more than eight warheads and that the United
States of America will not equip those missiles with more
than eight warheads during the term of the START Treaty (text
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine).
The United States of America, as stated in the Memorandum of
Understanding, reaffirms that the front sections of Trident
II SLBMs belonging to the United States of America are not
equipped with more than eight warheads and that the United
States of America will not equip those missiles with more
than eight warheads during the term of the START Treaty (text
of the United States of America).

(Name of Party) notes that in order to resolve concerns
regarding confirmation that the Trident II SLBM is not
deployed with more reentry vehicles than its attributed
number of warheads, the United States of America conducted a
demonstration in connection with reentry vehicle inspections
of Trident II missiles at the Strategic Weapons Facility
Atlantic, King's Bay Submarine Base, Georgia, during the
period February 7-9, 2005 (hereinafter - the demonstration).

In this regard, (Name of Party) understands that the
United States of America will supplement existing procedures
for conducting Trident II reentry vehicle inspections with
procedures for using the measuring device demonstrated; those
procedures are designed to confirm that the cover used during
Trident II reentry vehicle inspections is installed on the
front section of the missile contained in the SLBM launcher
in the same manner as was observed during the demonstration.

Provided that measurements obtained using the device
referred to above are within the prescribed tolerances, the
inspecting Party:

-- will insert an "*" as a note instead of a number in
Section II of the report, in the column "Confirmed by
inspecting Party" and indicate on that page that the "*"
refers to the relevant note in Section IV of the Inspection
report, and:

-- will include the following as a note in Section IV of
the Inspection Report:

"In addition to the reentry vehicle inspection
procedures for the front sections, the inspected Party used
the measuring device demonstrated earlier during the
demonstration conducted February 7-9, 2005, at the Strategic
Weapons Facility Atlantic, King's Bay Submarine Base,
Georgia. The results of the changes (sic) specified in this
report show that the cover used during the inspection was
installed on the missile front section in the same manner as
was observed during the demonstration.

Thus, it has been indirectly confirmed, with the
assistance of the measuring device demonstrated during the
February 7-9, 2005, demonstration, that the front section of
the inspected SLBM contains no more than eight reentry
vehicles."

(Name of Party) also confirms that this understanding is
based on the following:


1. After all of the inspectors complete their 15
minutes of viewing of the installed cover used during Trident
II reentry vehicle inspections, the Inspection Team Leader,
at the request of the Escort Team Leader, shall designate
from among the inspection team members two measurement groups
consisting of two inspectors each. At the request of the
in-country escort, each group shall move in succession to the
temporary structure specially intended for preparing the
front section for viewing of the SLBM launcher, where it will
be given the opportunity to examine the measuring device used
during Trident II reentry vehicle inspections. Each group
will then observe as facility personnel successively take
official measurements in the same manner as was done during
the demonstration.

The results of these measurements shall be recorded in
Section III of the Inspection Report.


2. The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A
SLBM configuration is 23 cm /- 3 cm, as stated by the United
States of America during the demonstration. The benchmark
measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM configuration is
24.0 cm /- 3 cm, as stated by the United States of America
during the demonstration.

End text.

--------------
ARE WE CLOSE? -- THE
ONLY DIFFERENCE IS HOW
MANY MEASUREMENTS?
--------------


9. (S) Mullins said that the United States had a positive
response to the Russian revision, but sought clarification on
one point.


10. (S) Mullins reiterated that the United States was
willing to permit two different subgroups of two inspectors
to observe the measurements made using the Trident RVOSI
measuring device at the conclusion of the Trident II RVOSI.
He stressed, however, that U.S. escorts would be taking a
total of only two measurements with the measuring device at
each RVOSI, so each subgroup would see one measurement. He
asked whether this was the understanding of the Russian
Delegation.


11. (S) Fedorchenko explained that Russia expected to have
two measurements observed by each of the two subgroups of
inspectors for a total of four measurements. He explained
that the logic behind this expectation was based upon how
measurements are taken under the Treaty: two measurements
are taken and, if in agreement, the average is put into the
report; if there is some difference in the two measurements,
more measurements are taken until two agree within the
expected tolerance. He noted that inspection reports contain
tables to record the first and second measurements as well as
the average of the two. Under the Russian proposal, each of
the two subgroups would repeat this process.


12. (S) Mullins noted that there are safety concerns about
the use of the measuring device within the viewing structure
for an RVOSI. A sailor would be leaning over the open
launcher with this long measuring device attached to his
wrist with a lanyard and there would be obvious safety
concerns. Procedures are developed to reduce risk, but the
best way to reduce risk is to limit the number of
measurements that must be taken.


13. (S) Mullins suggested new language to replace the
statement under contention. The proposal was to replace the
Russian-proposed language "Each group will then observe as
facility personnel successively take official measurements in
the same manner as was done during the demonstration." with
the following: 'Each group will then observe as facility
personnel take one official measurement, using the procedures
that were used during the demonstration." Mullins handed the
head of the Russian working group a copy of the text he had
described.


14. (S) Mullins stated that the measurements the U.S.
escorts would be taking at an RVOSI are outside the Treaty;
they would be conducted under the procedures outlined in the
coordinated plenary statement. He also noted that in realty
measurements would be taken twice as in other inspections,
but each measurement would be observed by two different
subgroups of inspectors. This method, he pointed out, was
introduced by the United States to address the Russian
request to permit four inspectors rather then two inspectors.
The fact that the same measurement is achieved while being
observed by two different subgroups of inspectors should
increase Russia's confidence in the results.

--------------
OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL
MEASUREMENTS?
--------------


15. (S) Fedorchenko responded with a concern regarding the
possibility of each of the two subgroups observing different
measurements with one being outside the tolerance.


16. (S) Mullins stated that the U.S.-proposed text just
tabled referred to "official measurements" to address this
possibility. As an example, if the measuring device were
bumped accidentally, so that the measurement taken was in
error, this would not be considered an "official measurement"
and the U.S. escorts would measure again. He stated that the
United States is confident that measurements taken at RVOSIs
will be within tolerance. If a measurement were out of
tolerance, it would indicate a problem and inspectors on the
ground would try to work it out by suggesting another
measurement based on the assumption that there was an error
in the method of taking the measurement.


17. (S) Smith reiterated the differences between "official"
and "unofficial" measurements, from the perspective of an
inspector. If a measurement taken was in error, then another
measurement would be taken. The measurement that was
incorrect would be characterized as "unofficial," since it
would not be used for the inspection report. He pointed out
that there could be human error in making measurements.
This is usually noted by the inspectors. He also noted that
Russian inspectors are aware that due to the limited space in
the viewing area for a Trident II RVOSI, only two inspectors
at a time can view the inspection during the 15-minute
viewing period. That is the same reason that the United
States is limiting the number of inspectors for viewing the
measurements taken with the measuring device. In response to
Fedorchenko's question, of what happens if the inspectors
consistently see a measurement outside the tolerance of the
measurement contained in the Coordinated Statement, Smith
stated that this would be a reason for inspectors to raise a
concern on the report. However, the United States is
confident that the measurements will be within tolerance.

--------------
THE UKRAINIAN VIEW
--------------


18. (S) Shevtsov stated that Ukraine did not have a problem
with the U.S. proposal to take two measurements and average
the results for the inspection report.


19. (S) With respect to the question of how to proceed in
the event of erroneous measurements, Shevtsov expressed the
opinion that the language in the U.S.-proposed statement was
not clear. He suggested that two additions be made to the
statement to address both the U.S. and Russian views. Should
negative or false results be obtained, then the measurement
would be repeated. If there is repeated failure in the
measurements, a comment should placed in the inspection
report to state the discrepancy.

--------------
TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS
--------------


20. (S) Turning to Tridents in Containers, Mullins stated
that the Treaty provided only one reason to request that a
missile be removed from its container during a data update
inspection and that is if, after viewing and measuring the
missile within its container, inspectors still could not
confirm type. Mullins reminded the other Parties that the
United States offered the Trident in Container demonstration
and proposed a statement of policy to provide additional
procedures addressing the inspecting Party's issues with
Trident missile type confirmation, thereby eliminating the
need to request the removal of a Trident missile from its
container at each data update inspection. Mullins also
stated that the United States was confident that, in using
the procedures outlined in the Statement of Policy, the
inspecting Party would not have to request that any SLBMs be
removed to confirm type. However, in accordance with its
proposed statement, the United States would not object, under
the Statement of Policy, if the inspecting Party requested
that one Trident missile per Treaty year be removed. Mullins
emphasized that the missile removal request would entail one
SLBM per Treaty year total and not one per type. Mullins
stated that if the inspecting Party decided in the Treaty
year that it could not confirm type and requested that
another Trident missile be pulled, the missile would be
removed. That is the right of the inspecting Party under the
Treaty, but it would cause the United States to question the
effectiveness of its policy. Mullins stated that a second
request to remove any Trident SLBM in a Treaty year would
cause the United States to conclude that the policy was not
working, and it could cause the United States to terminate
the policy. Fedorchenko stated he understood, but hoped this
was not a return to the Cold War.


21. (S) Fedorchenko stated that all negotiations thus far,
with respect to Tridents in Containers, were conducted on the
basis of the inspecting team having some doubt about its
ability to confirm missile type. Fedorchenko emphasized that
the inspecting team has always tried to request a removal
based on substantial concerns. Fedorchenko said the Russian
proposal consisted of a request to remove one missile of each
type of Trident missile. Trident I and Trident II are two
different missiles with different reference aid material,
which produced two different results at the demonstration in

2000. Mullins stated that the United States had no problem
with the Russians exercising their Treaty right. The United
States acknowledged this in writing within the U.S. proposal.


22. (S) Fedorchenko reminded the United States that it
wanted to distinguish the difference between a "verification
removal" (i.e., a removal pursuant to the Statement of
Policy) from a request by inspectors to remove a Trident SLBM
from its container in order to confirm type in accordance
with Russia's Treaty right. Fedorchenko also stated that
each base has a quota of two data update inspections, which
provided for a total of four opportunities to request a
removal of a Trident from its container. Fedorchenko also
referred to JCIC-XXVII, Part I (REF C), noting that Russia
clearly stated that the inspecting Party should be permitted
to request removal of a missile one time a year and only at
one submarine base per Treaty year. But because Trident I
missiles still exist in containers at Silverdale, Russia
believed it had a right to request to pull one missile of
each type (Trident I and Trident II) within the same Treaty
year, if the inspectors requested this at Silverdale. He
further noted that there was another option and that was to
wait until there were no longer any Trident I SLBMs in
containers, to settle this issue. Mullins stated that both
sides understood each other's position and the United States
would take Russia's comments under consideration for later
discussion.

--------------
HOW MANY AND WHICH
HATCHES WILL BE REMOVED?
--------------


23. (S) Mullins stated the procedures provided for some
hatches to already be removed from the containers prior to
the commencement of the inspection. Mullins pointed out the
Russian proposal specifically stated which hatches would be
removed ("at least one end hatch removed from each end of the
liner or loading tube, respectively"). (Begin comment: The
Russian-proposed language is not consistent with current Navy
procedures for removing hatches in advance. End comment.)
The United States believes the phrase, "some access hatches
opened for the demonstration will already be removed to
permit viewing of the unique features to confirm type," is a
more suitable description of the procedure. Mullins explained
that this statement was more accurate because sometimes an
inspecting Party will find two different missile types with
different hatches. Also, the two different bases may not
necessarily remove the same hatches. Fedorchenko stated that
they added the language to specify which hatches were to be
removed in advance because of their observations during past
inspections. He stated the concern was that, if the
Statement of Policy did not specify which hatches were
removed, the Navy might not open any hatches. Specification
of hatches would allow some degree of confidence. Mullins
stated that he understood Fedorchenko's point.

24. (S) Mullins suggested that the Parties use the phrase,
"The inspection team may, as it encounters missiles in liners
or loading tubes during the course of the inspection, request
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000
demonstrations be removed from these liners or loading
tubes." (Begin comment: The purpose of this statement is to
ensure that as the containers are encountered, if, following
the standard procedures of viewing and measuring, the
inspection team is still unable to confirm the missile type,
it may request the same access hatches removed for the
demonstration be removed from these additional containers.
End comment.) Fedorchenko agreed to the proposal and stated
that this is how the Russians have always understood it.


25. (S) Shevtsov said both proposals imply that each of the
four Parties (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia)
request one removal per year allowing for a total of four
potential removal requests. Shevtsov suggested better
language such as "joint inspecting Party" vice "name of
Party." Kottmyer stated that the United States also recently
noticed the problem with that formulation and, if the United
States proposes a new text, that problem would be remedied in
the next version. She thanked Ukraine for raising the issue.


26. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Ad-Referendum-to-Governments text for JCIC Joint
Statement Number 39 "On First Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned
Without Nozzles Attached," dated November 3, 2005.


27. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Diehl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Col Rumohr
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Il'in
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Col Osetrov
Col Razumov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran


28. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley