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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA2719
2005-11-08 10:57:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM  KACT  US  RS  UP  BO  KZ  START  JCIC  INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002719 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, AND
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM

REF: A. 04 GENEVA 2992 (JCIC-XXVI-040)

B. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020)

C. GENEVA 2712 (JCIC-XXVII-038)

D. GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034)

E. STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002719

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, AND
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM

REF: A. 04 GENEVA 2992 (JCIC-XXVI-040)

B. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020)

C. GENEVA 2712 (JCIC-XXVII-038)

D. GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034)

E. STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-039.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 2, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Working Group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission
on November 2, 2005, to discuss the Ukrainian proposal for
elimination of the SS-24 rocket motor cases, the draft
Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers, and the
Russian proposal on reductions to the boundaries of the
Kartaly Site Diagram.


4. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation restated its position to
propose a change to the Conversion or Elimination (C or E)
Protocol which would permit the drilling of holes into the
upper end dome of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs as a means of
eliminating the motor casings. The U.S. Delegation informed
Ukraine that it was not convinced that drilling holes in the
motor cases would serve as an acceptable substitute for the
existing elimination procedures outlined in the C or E
Protocol. The Ukrainian Delegation suggested a potential
demonstration of the ability of the motor case to sustain
pressure after the holes have been drilled, as well as
providing additional technical data concerning the effect of

drilling holes into the motor casing.


5. (S) The Parties also discussed the draft Statements of
Policy for Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs in
Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections. The Russians
proposed that the paragraph, that referenced the inspection
team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM, be an
independent statement relative to the rest of the proposal
and requested that it be moved to the last paragraph of the
document. They also clarified that the Russian proposal was
to request one removal for each Trident type, for a total of
two each year. The Russians suggested the United States
consider language to distinguish the difference between
requesting removal of a Trident from its container under the
Statements of Policy versus requesting removal of a Trident
from its container pursuant to Treaty right. The United
States responded to all points stating that it would take the
proposal under consideration and prepare a response.


6. (S) Finally, the U.S. Delegation informed Russia that its
proposed reductions to the site diagram boundaries of the
Kartaly Maintenance Facility should be acceptable, but that
the United States preferred to wait until after the close-out
inspection had been completed before finalizing the JCIC
S-Series Joint Statement (JS). The Russian Delegation
replied that it would be unprecedented to change the
boundaries of a formerly-declared facility (FDF) and
suggested that Russia would have no reason to initial the JS
after the close-out had been completed.

--------------
UPDATE ON UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL
FOR SS-24 ELIMINATION
--------------


7. (S) Shevtsov opened the meeting by stating that the
United States had received the draft text of a JCIC JS on the
draft JCIC Agreement regarding changes to the C or E Protocol
concerning additional procedures for the elimination of SS-24
ICBMs, provided on October 25, 2004 (REF A), and stated that
Ukraine had not received any feedback on the proposal. Since
it had not received a response, Ukraine was unsure what
course to take, so it proceeded to further analyze the effect
drilled holes would have on pressurized motor casings. He
said that all offers and assurances from the first part of
JCIC-XXVII (June 2005) (REF B) remained in effect. He
expressed concern that the issue may be impacted by what
Ukraine wanted to do regarding the change-in-function of the
Pavlograd C or E Facility discussed earlier that day during a
Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting (REF C). Shevtsov stated
that, if the Pavlograd C or E Facility were to change its
function, Ukraine must know, in advance, what procedures the
United States would find acceptable to consider the SS-24
solid rocket motors to have been eliminated. This would
allow Ukraine to select an appropriate location, develop
procedures, and allow for inspections without any undue delay.


8. (S) Fedorchenko voiced his support with the Ukrainian
proposal, stating that there was merit in changing the C or E
Protocol based on how long this issue had been discussed in
the JCIC and remained unresolved.


9. (S) Mullins acknowledged that the United States had
reviewed and studied the Ukrainian-proposed elimination
procedures with an eye towards resolution within the confines
of the C or E Protocol. The United States remained
unconvinced that the proposed method sufficiently altered the
motor casing for it to be considered eliminated under the
Treaty. The United States was willing to listen to any other
information the Ukrainians had to offer, to include alternate
methods of elimination or additional technical data on SS-24
motor stage construction.


10. (S) Shevtsov stated he wanted to ensure that he
understood the U.S. position correctly, that the United
States would not consider the missile eliminated if Ukraine
used the proposed method of drilling additional holes in the
end dome. He opined that the motor case theoretically could
not be pressurized to the point of being operationally used
as an ICBM solid rocket motor after the holes were drilled.
He offered to provide additional technical data on the
effects of the drilled holes on the motor case and then
proposed that Ukraine host a physical demonstration of the
case's inability to be pressurized, which would be paid for
by the United States. Mullins completed the discussion by
once again stating that the United States was willing to
receive any additional information or alternative methods for
elimination from the Ukrainian Delegation.

--------------
TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS
--------------


11. (S) The following Russian proposal for U.S. and other
Parties' Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers
was the subject of the next Working Group discussion.

Begin text:

Official Translation
JCIC-XXVII
Draft Proposed by the
Russian Side
November 1, 2005

Statement of Policy by (the Republic of Belarus, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine) Concerning
Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs
in Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections

(Name of Party) makes the following statement concerning
its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in
liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data
update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading
tube, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors, during
all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the
date of this statement, at Strategic Weapons Facility
Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic
Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia,
to use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the
indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint
Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the
Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I
and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading
tube, respectively.

(Name of Party) will as a matter of policy, instruct its
inspectors to request the removal of an SLBM of these types
from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States
of America that safety and security considerations and time
constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale
Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base will not permit
all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000
demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes
containing SLBMs. (Name of Party) understands that some
access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will
already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of
unique features of the missiles to confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading
tubes during future inspections, (name of Party) will
instruct its inspectors to use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the
in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June
2000 demonstrations.

- For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or
loading tube, respectively. The inspection team may request
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000
demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading
tubes.

- The United States of America will respond to any such
requests to remove these access hatches from particular
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not
deviate from established safety and security procedures.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States
of America that inspection time constraints may limit the
number of additional access hatches that can be removed
during an inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the United States of
America will be prepared to implement the above procedures
for each data update inspection that is conducted at the
Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base
beginning 30 days from the date of this statement.

(Name of Party) notes that this statement of policy, and
the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this
matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the
first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings
Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the
date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days,
no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that:

1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;

2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements
of policy; and,

3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the use of the Trident
Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth
in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set
forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the
inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident
SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is
unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring
the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with
the additional procedures set forth above.

Statement of Policy by the United States of America
Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and
Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes
During Data Update Inspections

The United States of America makes the following
statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading
tubes during data update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading
tube, the United States of America expects that, during all
future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the
date of this statement at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific,
Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons
Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia,
inspection teams will use the Trident Reference Aid in
conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set
forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set
forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for
a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner
or loading tube, respectively.
The United States of America understands that the
inspecting Party will, as a matter of policy, request the
removal of an SLBM of these types from its liner or loading
tube no more than once each year.

The United States of America notes that safety and
security considerations and time constraints during data
update inspections at Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine
Bases will not permit all the access hatches that were opened
during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all
liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs. The United States
of America also notes that some access hatches opened for the
June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time
to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to
confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading
tubes during future inspections, the United States of America
will use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the
in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June
2000 demonstrations.

- For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or
loading tube, respectively. The inspection team may request
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000
demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading
tubes.

- The United States of America will respond to any such
requests to remove these access hatches from particular
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not
deviate from established safety and security procedures.

The United States of America notes that inspection time
constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches
that can be removed during an inspection.

The United States of America will be prepared to
implement the above procedures for each data update
inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base
or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date
of this statement.

The United States of America notes that this statement
of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other
Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after
completion of the first data update inspection that is
conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale
Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided
that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through
diplomatic channels that:

1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;

2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements
of policy; and,

3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

The United States of America understands that the use of
the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement
procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the
viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no
way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the
removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if
the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by
viewing and measuring of the missile in its liner or loading
tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth
above.

End text.


12. (S) Mullins stated that the U.S. Delegation had reviewed
the Russian Delegation's proposal on Tridents in Containers
and highlighted the differences between the U.S. and Russian
proposals, as follows:

- Treaty Right Paragraph. Mullins noted that the first
major change was the Russian move of the paragraph that
referenced the inspection team's right to request the removal
of a Trident SLBM. This paragraph was moved to the end of
the proposal. Fedorchenko stated that this paragraph did not
raise any concerns, but he believed it to be independent of
the rest of the proposal, so as to not mix proposed SOP with
Treaty rights. Mullins acknowledged the proposed paragraph
move, but also noted the omission of the phrase, "in good
faith." Fedorchenko fervently acknowledged the omission and
stated that the noted phrase was "redundant and irritating."
Fedorchenko added that he believed the Russian inspectors at
the facilities would work in good faith. Mullins
categorically acknowledged Fedorchenko's statement and added
that all inspectors work in good faith, as well as all of the
delegates within the working groups.

- Trident I and II Removal Request. Mullins sought
clarification on the Russian's proposed statement that
requested the removal of an SLBM "of these types" from its
liner or loading tube no more than once each year.
Fedorchenko agreed to delete the phrase, "of these types,"
but stated that Russia's intent was to request one removal of
each type of SLBM (for a total of two opportunities, one
Trident I and one Trident II) each year. Mullins stated that
the U.S. position was to allow the removal of only one SLBM
(i.e., one opportunity) per Treaty year, but would take
Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and respond later.

- Proposed Policy Versus Treaty Right. Fedorchenko
proposed to distinguish the difference between the removal of
a Trident from its container as a matter of policy versus
requesting a removal of a Trident from its container pursuant
to Treaty right. In an attempt to make this distinction,
Fedorchenko suggested utilizing the phrase "verification
removal," which he defined as a confirmation of what the
Russians were shown in the demonstration, for the sake of
verifying the procedures. Fedorchenko explained that the
term "verification removal" would identify the removal
request as a matter of policy, so as not to be confused with
a removal request made pursuant to Treaty right. He
distinguished this point by illustrating that Russia did not
want to lose its ability to request a removal under the SOP
as a "verification removal" if earlier in the same Treaty
year it exercised its Treaty right to request a removal
because the inspection team could not confirm the type of
missile. Mullins stated that the United States would take
Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and prepare a
response.

--------------
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM
REDUCTION -- RUSSIA JUST
TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF U.S.
--------------


13. (S) Mullins raised for discussion the issue of the
Russian-proposed changes to the Kartaly Maintenance Facility
site diagram. He stated that the United States was planning
for the close-out inspection of the Kartaly Silo ICBM Base
and intended to use the site diagram of the Kartaly
Maintenance Facility, dated January 1, 1999, for that
inspection. He confirmed with Fedorchenko that Russia's
proposal, as reflected in the new draft S-Series JS provided
on October 31, 2005 (REF D), called for the use of the
existing site diagram (1999) for the close-out inspection and
the use of the new site diagram with the reduced boundaries
for any subsequent FDF inspections at Kartaly. Mullins
informed Fedorchenko that the United States should be able to
accommodate the proposed reduction, but preferred to wait
until after the close-out inspection had been completed
before finalizing the JCIC S-Series JS. He said that by
doing it this way would make for a simpler JS that could be
either initialed at the next JCIC session or arrangements
could be made to initial it in capitals during the
intersession.


14. (S) Fedorchenko responded that the new Russian-provided
S-Series JS could only be initialed at this session and he
did not understand why the United States wanted to wait
because it made no sense to initial the paper after the
close-out had been conducted. He suggested that the proposal
should be dropped from the agenda, which would result in
inspectors facing difficult times at that facility over the
next four years, since the site would be abandoned with no
one to watch over it. Only those few buildings remaining on
the site diagram would be in good shape. He then opined that
he could not imagine what the S-Series JS would look like
after the completion of the close-out.


15. (S) Fedorchenko reminded the U.S. Delegation of the
Russian notification of the closure of Kartaly transmitted on
October 21, 2005 (REF E), and that the close-out needed to be
completed prior to December 20, 2005. He said that it would
be unprecedented for the boundaries of an FDF to be changed
and he did not believe that Russia would have any reason to
initial the JS after the close-out. Mullins observed that
initialing the JS after the close-out would ensure that any
future FDF inspection would be conducted only against the
five remaining buildings and not the entire site.
Fedorchenko said that Russia just wanted to take care of the
U.S. inspectors, but it did not appear that the United States
wanted to take care of its inspectors. He concluded by
implying that, with the number of FDF facilities and the
annual quota of FDF inspections permitted under the Treaty,
an FDF inspection may never be conducted at Kartaly.

16. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:
-- Russian-Proposed Draft of Coordinated Plenary
Statement for Trident II RVOSI Procedures, dated November 2,
2005


17. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Mezhennyy
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Col Razumov
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
Mr. Dotsenko


18. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley