JCIC-XXVII: (U) TAYLOR-BORYAK DINNER, OCTOBER 30,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 002683 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR NA-24 JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) TAYLOR-BORYAK DINNER, OCTOBER 30, 2005 REF: 03 GENEVA 2757 (JCIC-XXV-055) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-032. ¶2. Meeting Date: October 30, 2005 Time: 7:00 - 8:15 P.M. Place: Restaurant Le Creux-de-Genthod Participants: U.S. Russia Mr. Taylor Mr. Boryak -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor hosted a dinner for Russian JCIC Representative Boryak on October 30, 2005, prior to the opening of Part II of JCIC-XXVII, scheduled to begin October 31, 2005. ¶4. (S) Taylor emphasized that he intended to continue the good work began by Dr. George Look in focusing the work on those issues where the Parties could move forward. Much groundwork had been laid in Part I and two long-standing issues -- Trident RVOSI and Tridents in Containers -- were very close to resolution. In addition, the Parties had been able to exchange draft JCIC Joint Statements on Confirming First Stages of SS-25s that had been damaged (burned without nozzles) during the intersession and this issue was ready to be completed. Taylor provided a draft agenda for the week which focused on the work during the first three days. Boryak said that Russia would have something to present on both Trident issues and the confirmation measurement for damaged SS-25 first stages. Boryak asked whether the United States would have any response to Russian proposals on Castor ¶120. Taylor emphasized that the United States had nothing to add and that our time could be better spent on the issues the Parties were in agreement on. Boryak agreed that the Parties should focus our efforts, but said Russia had its views, as did the United States, on certain issues and he was not certain he could turn back the desire of his delegation to raise these issues. -------------- PREVIOUS WORK PATTERN TO CONTINUE -------------- ¶5. (S) Boryak opened the conversation by welcoming Taylor to the work of the JCIC, noting that he recalled working together on the SVC and, more recently, on the BIC. Boryak said he was pleased with the constructive approach that Dr. Look had taken concerning the issues and hoped this would continue. Taylor assured him that he intended to continue the good work that Look had begun in revitalizing the JCIC. In this regard, Taylor was proposing that the Parties take up the Trident RVOSI and containers issue along with the SS-25 first stage measurement (damaged first stages) during the first HOD in order that these issues could quickly be referred to the Conforming Group. ¶6. (S) Boryak stated that Russia would have something to present on Trident RVOSI and a response to our paper on Tridents in containers. The Trident RVOSI statement was very close to resolution and Boryak was hopeful this long-standing issue would be resolved. With regard to the Tridents in containers issue, he said he was very pleased that the United States had accepted Russia's proposal and that this issue was close to resolution also. -------------- OLD ISSUES DIE SLOWLY -------------- ¶7. (S) Boryak next raised Castor 120 and Peacekeeper (PK) and asked whether the United States would have anything new to say on either of these issues. Taylor said that the United States had not changed its position and any discussion of these issues would likely cover the same ground as before. Boryak acknowledged that on several issues Russia had its position and that these were unlikely to be resolved. ¶8. (S) Taylor asked Boryak whether Russia would accept the U.S. offer to visit the Vandenberg silo. Boryak would not commit to a yes or no answer, rather saying that Russia would say what it had to say about U.S. actions at Vandenberg. Going more into detail, Boryak questioned Taylor on how the United States could defend its actions by saying the launcher was now part of a space launch facility when it did not use ICBMs or SLBMs to launch objects into space. This was not in accordance with how an SLF was defined in the Treaty. Taylor explained that the Treaty did not prohibit such activity. The launchers were still accountable under the Treaty as ICBM launchers. ¶9. (S) Boryak raised the issue of the Bulava flight test, saying that there was still much work that needed to be done, however, Russia was not in a position to provide any information on throw-weight or attribution. This would be a topic for future meetings. Taylor said that the fact that we had worked hard to bring this missile under the Treaty now seemed to be turned on its head since we had a deployed missile without any attribution. ¶10. (S) Taylor turned the conversation to the two Trident issues, saying that he was hopeful these long-standing issues could be resolved this session. Boryak agreed that the Parties were very close on both. Russia would be providing papers on both issues. In addition, Russia was hopeful the agreement on SS-25 measurement of damaged first stages could be completed soon also. Taylor said that, with the completion of the confirmation of the measurement, we were prepared to conclude the Joint Statement. ¶11. (S) Boryak concluded the conversation by asking whether any special message was intended to be conveyed by the recent publication of the U.S. Report on Arms Control Compliance. There had been much discussion in Moscow over the U.S. decision to include the details of our negotiations and Boryak questioned whether Taylor felt this violated the confidentiality of the START Treaty. SIPDIS ¶12. (S) Taylor explained that the issues reflected in the recent Compliance Report were not unfamiliar to Russia, as DAS Karin Look had made a special trip to Geneva to consult with the Russian Delegation on these issues in August 2003 (REFTEL). As for a special message, the United States was fulfilling its obligation to the Congress to report as fully as possible on compliance issues including those pertaining to Russia's implementation of START. ¶13. (S) Boryak wondered why the United States said it was compliant with all aspects of the Treaty, but that it had a problem with Russian implementation. He asserted that Taylor was fully aware Russia had concerns about the U.S. implementation of START. Boryak said he did not want to have an extended debate but this was an interesting question to think about. Nonetheless, Boryak closed by saying he was hopeful for success this session. ¶14. (U) Taylor sends. Moley