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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA2682
2005-11-03 10:16:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A

Tags:   PARM  KACT  US  RS  UP  BO  KZ  START  JCIC  INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002682 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A
DRAFT JCIC JOINT STATEMENT ON SS-25 ICBM FIRST STAGES
BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED; SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATION
PROCEDURES IN VOTKINSK; KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM REDUCTION;
U.S. PROPOSALS ON TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES; AND TRIDENT

SLBMS IN CONTAINERS, OCTOBER 31, 2005

REF: A. STATE 135913 (JCIC-DIP-05-012)

B. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017)

C. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014)

D. STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002682

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A
DRAFT JCIC JOINT STATEMENT ON SS-25 ICBM FIRST STAGES
BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED; SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATION
PROCEDURES IN VOTKINSK; KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM REDUCTION;
U.S. PROPOSALS ON TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES; AND TRIDENT

SLBMS IN CONTAINERS, OCTOBER 31, 2005

REF: A. STATE 135913 (JCIC-DIP-05-012)

B. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017)

C. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014)

D. STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-034.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 31, 2005
Time: 3:00 - 4:35 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on October 31, 2005, to discuss a draft Joint
Statement on confirming SS-25 ICBM first stages which had
been burned (end domes burned out) without nozzles attached
(REF A); SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures in Votkinsk;
Russian-proposed reductions to the Kartaly Site Diagram; U.S.
proposals for Trident RVOSI procedures (REF B); and
inspections of Trident SLBMs in containers (REF C). All
Parties were represented.


4. (S) On the issue of confirming SS-25s with shortened
first stages, the United States provided a U.S.-Proposed
Joint Draft Text (JDT) and suggested that the document be
referred to the Conforming Working Group. With respect to
Trident RVOSIs and Tridents in containers, the Russians
stated they would provide the Russian response to the U.S.
proposals later during the session. On reducing the Kartaly

site diagram, the Russian Delegation stated that Russia had
met all Treaty requirements to eliminate the facility,
including sending a NRRC notification (REF D). The U.S.
Delegation stated that the United States would study the
Kartaly issue and respond at a later meeting. With respect
to SS-25 ICBM eliminations, the Russian Federation restated
its position that Russia was not required to eliminate the
section of the missile which the United States had identified
as being part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism
(SCDM). The U.S. Delegation said it would provide a detailed
presentation at a later meeting.

--------------
MAKING PROGRESS ON
BURNED SS-25 STAGES
--------------


5. (S) Boryak opened the first meeting of Part II of
JCIC-XXVII. He said that, on the issue of confirming type of
first stages of SS-25 missiles which were damaged due to
being burned without nozzles, all Parties were in agreement
that, due to the significant intersession work accomplished,
this issue would hopefully come to resolution during this
part of JCIC-XXVII. Taylor tabled a U.S.-Proposed JDT (text
is in para 6 below) that had incorporated U.S. changes to
Russia's proposed text. He explained that the section on
confirming accuracy of the length measurement (6.5 meters)
had been removed because confirmation had already taken place
during the course of an elimination inspection. All Parties
agreed to forward the JDT to the Conforming Working Group.


6. (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed JDT):
Draft
JCIC-XXVII
U.S.-Proposed
Joint Draft Text
October 31, 2005
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER (blank)

ON FIRST STAGES OF SS-25 ICBMs BURNED WITHOUT
NOZZLES ATTACHED

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as
the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections,
or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages
without nozzles attached of SS-25 ICBMs, that have had their
end domes burned out as a result of having had fuel removed
by burning the stages without their nozzles attached, may be
located at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the photographs of the first
stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such
configuration, and declared data on the length of such a
first stage, which were provided to the other Parties by the
Russian Federation at JCIC-XXVII, may be used by the
inspecting Party during data update inspections or conversion
or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming
this type of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the
first stage without nozzle attached of the SS-25 ICBM, in
such configuration, declared for such first stages, is the
distance between the extreme points of the cylindrical
portion of the motor case of that stage, without taking into
account protruding elements attached to the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days
after entry into force of this Joint Statement, the Russian
Federation will provide texts of footnotes specifying the
length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached
of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, in a notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this
connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be
superscripted after the first mention of the first stage
length for the SS-25 ICBM in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F
to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of
the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The Parties agree that the inspecting Party shall have
the right during such inspections to confirm the type of ICBM
by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of a
first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such
configuration.

.... (Republic of Belarus)
.... (Republic of Kazakhstan)
.... (Russian Federation)
.... (Ukraine)
.... (United States of America)
End text.

--------------
NO PROGRESS ON SS-25
ICBM ELIMINATIONS
--------------


7. (S) With respect to SS-25 elimination inspections at
Votkinsk, Fedorchenko discussed the problems encountered
during the first two elimination inspections. He also
restated Russia's belief that 11 SS-25 ICBMs had been
eliminated at Votkinsk. He noted that this was contrary to
the U.S. view. The item, which the United States stated was
part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM), is
not part of the SCDM, has never been declared as part of the
SCDM, and is not required to be eliminated. He indicated
that the "compartment case" of the part of the missile that
the United States believed was part of the SCDM was, in fact,
part of the structure of the guidance and control devices,
and cannot be dismantled without destruction of the devices.
He requested that the United States respond by instructing
its inspectors to confirm the elimination of SS-25 mobile
ICBMs even if the guidance and control compartment is not
eliminated. Taylor stated that the Russian position would be
studied and the U.S. Delegation would provide a response at a
later time.

--------------
KARTALY REDUCED SITE
DIAGRAM AND BASE CLOSE-OUT
--------------


8. (S) Fedorchenko led the discussion on reducing the
boundary of the Kartaly Site Diagram. He stated that there
were many changes to the facility since the first part of
JCIC-XXVII. He said all silo launchers, including the silo
training launcher, had been eliminated, and there was no more
equipment to support silo operations at the base. He stated
that, under START, the site was considered to be eliminated
as affirmed in the notification sent on October 21, 2005 (REF
D) notifying the United States of that fact. He concluded by
stating that the only inspection the United States may do
from now until December 20, 2005 is a close-out inspection.
Boryak provided a Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement
on the reduction of the Kartaly Site Diagram. (Begin
comment: The Russian Federation had previously provided a
draft of a Joint S-Series document which significantly
reduced the inspectable area of the site for the United
States to review. End comment.) The Russian Federation
proposed that the text be clarified by excluding references
to inspections under paragraph 3 of Article XI and, instead,
refer to inspections under paragraph 9 of Article XI. Taylor
responded that the United States would study the issue and
reply at a later meeting.


9. (S) Begin text (Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint
Statement):

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Draft Proposed by the
Russian Side
October 31, 2005

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint Statement Number S-(blank)
On Changes to the Boundary of the
Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into
account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base
for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint
Statement, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site
diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is
attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement.

(2) The site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, shall be used only
for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of this Joint
Statement.

(3) The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint
Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram
of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall be subject to
inspection using the appropriate procedures only during the
inspection conducted at this facility under paragraph 9 of
Article XI of the Treaty. Subsequently, the portions to be
excluded shall not be subject to inspection if they are not
included (sic) within the boundary of any inspection site.

(4) The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM
Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on
the date specified in the notification provided by the
Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section
I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or
the date such notification is provided by the Russian
Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint
Statement, whichever is latest.

..... (United States of America)
..... (Republic of Belarus)
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan)
..... (Russian Federation)
..... (Ukraine)

Annex A

Information Provided by the Russian Federation
on Changes to the Boundary of the
Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs

The Russian Federation:

(1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data
Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the
Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements
set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX
of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or
Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met
with respect to the portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for
Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the
boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility;

(2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the
Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that
were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing
site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of
ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, pursuant to subparagraph
9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of
Understanding and that will be excluded from within the
boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement,
are unchanged but will no longer be used for items of
inspection as of March 1, 2002;

(3) beginning October 21, 2005, considers the
above-mentioned facility to have been eliminated (No. RNC/STR
05-375/009 of October 21, 2005, gave notice thereof) and to
be subject to inspection under paragraph 9 of Article XI of
the Treaty.

(Begin comment: Attached to the Russian-Proposed S-Series
Joint Statement is a site diagram for the facility dated
March 1, 2002. End comment.)

End text.

--------------
TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES
NEARING RESOLUTION
--------------


10. (S) Taylor stated he was pleased to receive the Russian
comments on the U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement
on new Trident RVOSI procedures during the intersession. He
noted the recent U.S. response to Russia's proposed changes
and provided a copy of the U.S. proposal from REF A. He said
that he viewed the issue as being very close to resolution
and he looked forward to the other Parties' responses,
hopefully early in the week, and hoped to move the draft
Coordinated Plenary Statement to conforming as soon as
possible. Boryak said that the Russian Delegation would
respond to this issue later in the week. Shevtsov agreed
with moving the draft coordinated plenary statement to the
Conforming Working Group. Boryak stated that the Russians
would be prepared to return to this later during the session.

--------------
TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS
--------------


11. (S) Taylor stated that the Trident in Containers issue
was a long-standing one that he hoped to move to the
Conforming Working Group as soon as possible. He provided
the other Parties with the U.S. proposal from REF B. He
referenced the Russian proposal, to open one container per
Treaty year, and said that if this would resolve this issue
the United States would incorporate it into current
procedures. Boryak was pleased that the proposals were
closer and noted that Russia had studied the U.S. position.
He hoped to provide the Russian response as soon as possible,
and stated that it may be appropriate to pursue this further
in a working group meeting on November 2. Responding to a
question from Fedorchenko, about the need to include Trident
I SLBMs in containers in the U.S.-proposed policy documents,
Mullins stated that there was the potential to see a Trident
I SLBM in a container during Data Update Inspections, since
the last submarine attributed with Trident I SLBMs was just
unloaded. He stated that the United States was not prepared
at this time to remove all Trident I references from the
U.S.-Proposed Trident in Containers Policy Statement.


12. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT for a Joint Statement on First
Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated
October 31, 2005;

-- U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement for RVOSI
for Trident II, dated October 11, 2005 (from DIP-017); and

-- U.S.-Proposed Statement of Policy for Inspections T-I
and T-II, dated September 9, 2005 (from DIP-014).

- Russia:

-- Kartaly Site Diagram dated March 1, 2002, attached to
October 31, 2005 Russian-Proposed S-Series Document; and

-- Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement on Changes
to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Bases for Silo Launchers
of ICBMs, dated October 31, 2005.


13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Diehl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Col Smith
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich
Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov
Russia
Mr. Boryak
Mr. Yegorov
Gen Maj Artyukhin
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Istratov
Mr. Kamenskiy
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Mezhennyy
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Col Razumov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Dotsenko
Mr. Fedotov
Col Taran


14. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley