JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002682 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR NA-24 JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A DRAFT JCIC JOINT STATEMENT ON SS-25 ICBM FIRST STAGES BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED; SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATION PROCEDURES IN VOTKINSK; KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM REDUCTION; U.S. PROPOSALS ON TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES; AND TRIDENT SLBMS IN CONTAINERS, OCTOBER 31, 2005 REF: A. STATE 135913 (JCIC-DIP-05-012) ¶B. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017) ¶C. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014) ¶D. STATE 194955 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-034. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 31, 2005 Time: 3:00 - 4:35 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on October 31, 2005, to discuss a draft Joint Statement on confirming SS-25 ICBM first stages which had been burned (end domes burned out) without nozzles attached (REF A); SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures in Votkinsk; Russian-proposed reductions to the Kartaly Site Diagram; U.S. proposals for Trident RVOSI procedures (REF B); and inspections of Trident SLBMs in containers (REF C). All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) On the issue of confirming SS-25s with shortened first stages, the United States provided a U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) and suggested that the document be referred to the Conforming Working Group. With respect to Trident RVOSIs and Tridents in containers, the Russians stated they would provide the Russian response to the U.S. proposals later during the session. On reducing the Kartaly site diagram, the Russian Delegation stated that Russia had met all Treaty requirements to eliminate the facility, including sending a NRRC notification (REF D). The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States would study the Kartaly issue and respond at a later meeting. With respect to SS-25 ICBM eliminations, the Russian Federation restated its position that Russia was not required to eliminate the section of the missile which the United States had identified as being part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). The U.S. Delegation said it would provide a detailed presentation at a later meeting. -------------- MAKING PROGRESS ON BURNED SS-25 STAGES -------------- ¶5. (S) Boryak opened the first meeting of Part II of JCIC-XXVII. He said that, on the issue of confirming type of first stages of SS-25 missiles which were damaged due to being burned without nozzles, all Parties were in agreement that, due to the significant intersession work accomplished, this issue would hopefully come to resolution during this part of JCIC-XXVII. Taylor tabled a U.S.-Proposed JDT (text is in para 6 below) that had incorporated U.S. changes to Russia's proposed text. He explained that the section on confirming accuracy of the length measurement (6.5 meters) had been removed because confirmation had already taken place during the course of an elimination inspection. All Parties agreed to forward the JDT to the Conforming Working Group. ¶6. (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed JDT): Draft JCIC-XXVII U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text October 31, 2005 JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER (blank) ON FIRST STAGES OF SS-25 ICBMs BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of SS-25 ICBMs, that have had their end domes burned out as a result of having had fuel removed by burning the stages without their nozzles attached, may be located at conversion or elimination facilities. The Parties understand that the photographs of the first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, and declared data on the length of such a first stage, which were provided to the other Parties by the Russian Federation at JCIC-XXVII, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities. The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the first stage without nozzle attached of the SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, declared for such first stages, is the distance between the extreme points of the cylindrical portion of the motor case of that stage, without taking into account protruding elements attached to the motor case. The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement, the Russian Federation will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length for the SS-25 ICBM in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The Parties agree that the inspecting Party shall have the right during such inspections to confirm the type of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of a first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration. .... (Republic of Belarus) .... (Republic of Kazakhstan) .... (Russian Federation) .... (Ukraine) .... (United States of America) End text. -------------- NO PROGRESS ON SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATIONS -------------- ¶7. (S) With respect to SS-25 elimination inspections at Votkinsk, Fedorchenko discussed the problems encountered during the first two elimination inspections. He also restated Russia's belief that 11 SS-25 ICBMs had been eliminated at Votkinsk. He noted that this was contrary to the U.S. view. The item, which the United States stated was part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM),is not part of the SCDM, has never been declared as part of the SCDM, and is not required to be eliminated. He indicated that the "compartment case" of the part of the missile that the United States believed was part of the SCDM was, in fact, part of the structure of the guidance and control devices, and cannot be dismantled without destruction of the devices. He requested that the United States respond by instructing its inspectors to confirm the elimination of SS-25 mobile ICBMs even if the guidance and control compartment is not eliminated. Taylor stated that the Russian position would be studied and the U.S. Delegation would provide a response at a later time. -------------- KARTALY REDUCED SITE DIAGRAM AND BASE CLOSE-OUT -------------- ¶8. (S) Fedorchenko led the discussion on reducing the boundary of the Kartaly Site Diagram. He stated that there were many changes to the facility since the first part of JCIC-XXVII. He said all silo launchers, including the silo training launcher, had been eliminated, and there was no more equipment to support silo operations at the base. He stated that, under START, the site was considered to be eliminated as affirmed in the notification sent on October 21, 2005 (REF D) notifying the United States of that fact. He concluded by stating that the only inspection the United States may do from now until December 20, 2005 is a close-out inspection. Boryak provided a Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement on the reduction of the Kartaly Site Diagram. (Begin comment: The Russian Federation had previously provided a draft of a Joint S-Series document which significantly reduced the inspectable area of the site for the United States to review. End comment.) The Russian Federation proposed that the text be clarified by excluding references to inspections under paragraph 3 of Article XI and, instead, refer to inspections under paragraph 9 of Article XI. Taylor responded that the United States would study the issue and reply at a later meeting. ¶9. (S) Begin text (Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement): Official Translation JCIC-XXVII Draft Proposed by the Russian Side October 31, 2005 Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number S-(blank) On Changes to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following: (1) The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. (2) The site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, shall be used only for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of this Joint Statement. (3) The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall be subject to inspection using the appropriate procedures only during the inspection conducted at this facility under paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty. Subsequently, the portions to be excluded shall not be subject to inspection if they are not included (sic) within the boundary of any inspection site. (4) The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest. ..... (United States of America) ..... (Republic of Belarus) ..... (Republic of Kazakhstan) ..... (Russian Federation) ..... (Ukraine) Annex A Information Provided by the Russian Federation on Changes to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs The Russian Federation: (1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility; (2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, are unchanged but will no longer be used for items of inspection as of March 1, 2002; (3) beginning October 21, 2005, considers the above-mentioned facility to have been eliminated (No. RNC/STR 05-375/009 of October 21, 2005, gave notice thereof) and to be subject to inspection under paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty. (Begin comment: Attached to the Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement is a site diagram for the facility dated March 1, 2002. End comment.) End text. -------------- TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES NEARING RESOLUTION -------------- ¶10. (S) Taylor stated he was pleased to receive the Russian comments on the U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement on new Trident RVOSI procedures during the intersession. He noted the recent U.S. response to Russia's proposed changes and provided a copy of the U.S. proposal from REF A. He said that he viewed the issue as being very close to resolution and he looked forward to the other Parties' responses, hopefully early in the week, and hoped to move the draft Coordinated Plenary Statement to conforming as soon as possible. Boryak said that the Russian Delegation would respond to this issue later in the week. Shevtsov agreed with moving the draft coordinated plenary statement to the Conforming Working Group. Boryak stated that the Russians would be prepared to return to this later during the session. -------------- TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS -------------- ¶11. (S) Taylor stated that the Trident in Containers issue was a long-standing one that he hoped to move to the Conforming Working Group as soon as possible. He provided the other Parties with the U.S. proposal from REF B. He referenced the Russian proposal, to open one container per Treaty year, and said that if this would resolve this issue the United States would incorporate it into current procedures. Boryak was pleased that the proposals were closer and noted that Russia had studied the U.S. position. He hoped to provide the Russian response as soon as possible, and stated that it may be appropriate to pursue this further in a working group meeting on November 2. Responding to a question from Fedorchenko, about the need to include Trident I SLBMs in containers in the U.S.-proposed policy documents, Mullins stated that there was the potential to see a Trident I SLBM in a container during Data Update Inspections, since the last submarine attributed with Trident I SLBMs was just unloaded. He stated that the United States was not prepared at this time to remove all Trident I references from the U.S.-Proposed Trident in Containers Policy Statement. ¶12. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-Proposed JDT for a Joint Statement on First Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated October 31, 2005; -- U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement for RVOSI for Trident II, dated October 11, 2005 (from DIP-017); and -- U.S.-Proposed Statement of Policy for Inspections T-I and T-II, dated September 9, 2005 (from DIP-014). - Russia: -- Kartaly Site Diagram dated March 1, 2002, attached to October 31, 2005 Russian-Proposed S-Series Document; and -- Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement on Changes to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Bases for Silo Launchers of ICBMs, dated October 31, 2005. ¶13. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Mr. Mullins Mr. Buttrick Lt Col Diehl Mr. Dunn LCDR Feliciano Mr. Fortier Mr. Hay Mr. Johnston Ms. Kottmyer Mr. Kuehne Mr. Miller Maj Mitchner Col Rumohr Mr. Singer Col Smith Mr. Smith Mr. Vogel Dr. Zimmerman Lt Col Zoubek Mr. French (Int) Belarus Mr. Grinevich Kazakhstan Mr. Baisuanov Russia Mr. Boryak Mr. Yegorov Gen Maj Artyukhin Col Fedorchenko Mr. Istratov Mr. Kamenskiy Mr. Kashirin Ms. Kotkova Amb Masterkov Mr. Mezhennyy Lt Col Novikov Col Osetrov Col Razumov Mr. Smirnov Ms. Sorokina Mr. Venevtsev Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Zaytsev Mr. Gusev (Int) Ukraine Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Dotsenko Mr. Fedotov Col Taran ¶14. (U) Taylor sends. Moley