BIC-IV: (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 002619 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR NA-24 JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT SUBJECT: BIC-IV: (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE MOSCOW TREATY IMPLEMENTATION BRIEFINGS, OCTOBER 27, 2005 REF: A. GENEVA 2618 (BIC-IV-02) ¶B. STATE 196407 (BIC-IV-GUIDANCE) ¶C. MOSCOW 12026 ¶D. STATE 92722 ¶E. GENEVA 1300 Classified By: DAS Karin L. Look, Acting U.S. Representative to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is BIC-IV-003. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2005 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:20 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (C) The U.S. and Russian Delegations met the morning of October 27, 2005, to provide answers to questions that arose from briefings (REF A) delivered the previous day on the status of implementation of the Moscow Treaty (MT). The Russian Delegation suggested that the Parties consider delivering plenary statements that would provide a common definition for strategic nuclear warheads (SNW). ¶4. (C) The U.S. Delegation reiterated the U.S. position that the MT permits each Party to count "strategic nuclear warheads" its own way, consistent with its operational practices. The United States had developed its own definition that accounted for unique aspects of how U.S. forces were deployed and operated, and the United States would prefer that Russia use its own definition that reflected how its forces were deployed. ¶5. (C) The U.S. Delegation received clarifications on the Russian definition and how it had counted the MT SNW in the briefing provided at the previous meeting (REF A). ¶6. (C) The U.S. Delegation provided answers to the Russian questions that had been asked on October 26, 2005 (REF A). The U.S. also asked additional questions on the Russian briefing on its Strategic Nuclear Forces. -------------- RUSSIAN QUESTIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Look opened the morning session, then gave the floor to the Russians in order to ask questions on the U.S. briefing delivered during the previous meeting. ¶8. (C) Fedorchenko, referring to Slide 2 of the briefing, asked what was meant by "Deactivating Trident I SLBMs?" Mullins responded that, during the preparation of the briefing, the United States was not sure when the final missile would be removed. He added that the last Trident I SLBM had, in fact, been removed. Artyukhin, also referring to Slide 2 of the briefing, asked what was meant by "Removing some warheads from operational status?" Mullins responded that, to reach the 1700-2200 Moscow Treaty warhead limit, downloading of more Minuteman ICBMs, for example from three warheads to one warhead, and downloading other systems would possibly be necessary. Artyukhin asked what was meant by "Downloading," to which Mullins replied that it was the removal of warheads from missiles. Artyukhin queried whether the downloading procedure would be used on Trident II SLBMs, to which Mullins replied that it may be considered in the future, but no decision had been made. -------------- HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶9. (C) Fedorchenko, referring to the phrase "In context of this Treaty...." on Slide 6 of the briefing, asked whether the United States would have a combination of nuclear and conventional warheads on its missiles. Look responded that the question was irrelevant to the MT and, therefore, not a question for the BIC. Fedorchenko wanted to know why the word "or" instead of "and" was used when describing nuclear warheads located at bomber bases on heavy bombers or weapon storage areas. Look responded that the United States used the word "or" to mean that the warheads would be either in one place or another and the aggregate number of warheads would be those in both locations. Kamenskiy, referring to the B-1 bomber's conventional role on Slide 2, asked whether nuclear weapons would ever be stored at B-1 bases. Look responded that the United States would study the question and respond later during this BIC Session. (Begin comment: At an informal meeting on October 28, 2005, Mullins, accompanied by Smith, provided Fedorchenko and Kamenskiy the following answer: - The B-1 has not had a nuclear role since 1995. - The Weapon Storage Areas at the two B-1 bases were decertified for nuclear weapon storage in 1997. - The requirement for the B-1s to be able to return to a nuclear capability was rescinded before 2002. The Russians thanked the U.S. Delegation for its answer. End comment.) ¶10. (C) Artyukhin queried whether the U.S. Navy portion of the aggregate number of warheads provided during the briefing was deployed only on 12 SSBNs. Smith responded that yes they were. -------------- B-2 TRANSPARENCY -------------- ¶11. (C) Fedorchenko, again referring to Slide 2, wanted to know the maximum number of warheads that could be loaded on a B-2 bomber. Look responded that this was not an MT question and that the Treaty was not about the number of warheads on a given system. Ul'yanov countered that the question was related to the Treaty. Look replied that speculating on the number of warheads was not the subject matter of the MT. She said that the strength of the Treaty was that it considered actual warheads deployed, therefore the actual threat. Artyukhin commented that the question came from the U.S. briefing that there would be 21 B-2 bombers. Look responded that the Slide he referred to described how many B-2 aircraft the United States plans to have in the strategic nuclear force structure in 2012. Artyukhin said that the United States should provide transparency for strategic nuclear forces since Russia does not have information on U.S. plans for the B-2. Look responded that the U.S. side noted Russia's concern on the B-2, but the transparency was that the United States provides information on force structure. -------------- CAN YOU BREAK THE NUMBERS DOWN? -------------- ¶12. (C) Ul'yanov, referring to the difference between the aggregate warhead numbers provided earlier in the year and yesterday's number, wanted to know where the reductions came from. Smith responded that the changes occurred in all three systems, SLBMs, ICBMs and in heavy bombers. He highlighted that the majority of reductions occurred in SLBM systems. -------------- WHY THE QUOTATION MARKS? -------------- ¶13. (C) Kuehne responded to Russia's question posed during the previous meeting on why there were quotation marks around the word "nuclear" on Slide 6 of the briefing. He said that the language came from two places: the Letter of Submittal and the Article-by-Article analysis. He said that, as Look had stated the day before, he believed the author's intent was to highlight that the Moscow Treaty referred to nuclear reentry vehicles which was different from START. He noted that when the Moscow Treaty was presented in 2002, the U.S. Senate was familiar with START which captures all reentry vehicles on strategic systems, and the intent of the quotation marks was to alert the Senate to the difference under the Moscow Treaty. ¶14. (C) Look added that the United States would study the possibility of removing the quotation marks in future briefings. -------------- ADDITIONAL U.S. QUESTIONS -------------- ¶15. (C) Buttrick, referring to Slide 5 of the Russian briefing, asked whether Russia meant that new production SS-N-23 SLBMs would be loaded on Delta IV SSBNs or just modernized existing missiles. ¶16. (C) Fedorchenko responded that a recent NRRC notification had informed the United States of the beginning of SS-N-23 elimination at Krasnoyarsk. He said that Russia continued to produce new SS-N-23 missiles and that, in October, Russia had notified the START Parties that Yagelnaya received six new missiles of this type. They are the same type of missiles that are currently installed on the Delta IV SLBM. There could be some improvements to the missile, but the technical characteristics of the new missile are the same as those listed in the START Memorandum of Understanding. -------------- RUSSIA SEEKS IDENTICAL "NATIONAL STATEMENTS" ON THE DEFINITION OF ODSNWs -------------- ¶17. (C) Ul'yanov reiterated the Russian desire to have a common understanding for how the sides count SNW. He hoped that the work accomplished during the last two BIC sessions could be completed during this session in the form of coordinated plenary statements on a common definition of SNW. He provided the U.S. side a revised draft coordinated plenary statement on defining SNW, as follows. Begin text: Official Translation Draft Proposed by the Russian Side October 2005 STATEMENT At the October 27, 2005, Plenary Meeting on a Definition of the Term "Strategic Nuclear Warheads" for Purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty), (Name of the Party) regards the "strategic nuclear warheads," referred to in Article I of the Moscow Treaty, to be the reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, the reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers on board submarines, and the nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or those stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases. End text. ¶18. (C) Ul'yanov noted that the phrase "operationally deployed" was not in the proposed definition because this phrase was not in the Treaty. He also noted that the Russian proposal would include all bomber warheads located on heavy bomber air bases, including spares, in the aggregate count toward the 1700-2200 number. He hoped that the U.S. side would review Russia's proposal and respond back. ¶19. (C) Look said that the United States would review the proposal and respond at a later date. She went on to comment that the Parties had discussed the issue of a definition for SNW at previous BIC sessions. She noted that today's Russian proposal reflects how the United States deployed its forces, but not how Russia deploys its forces. Look said that one of the main aspects of the MT, unlike START, was to reflect reality. ¶20. (C) Look added that the Parties had already achieved the goal that they had been seeking. She noted that the briefings provided during the meeting the previous day described -- and used -- each side's definition. She said that the briefings describe how each sides' systems were counted. She noted that a formal plenary statement would not improve anything since the information is already on the table in our briefings. ¶21. (C) Look added that, while the United States plans to continue to use the same definition for the duration of the Treaty, both sides should remain flexible so that a side would not be constrained should it decide to change its method of counting SNW. ¶22. (C) Masterkov made a soliloquy on how Look's comments frightened him because changing a definition had the potential of changing the Treaty itself. He said that there should be stability in the implementation of the Treaty and that any changes a side made should be based only on extraordinary circumstances. Masterkov reiterated the Russian position on having a common understanding of SNW to ensure that each side was reducing the same things. He said that the Russian-proposed draft text is close to what was needed and emphasized that the sides needed to come to closure on a definition of SNW. He then apologized for "lecturing" the U.S. side. ¶23. (C) Look responded that there was no need to apologize since his comments were part of a good discussion of each other's viewpoints. She agreed that both sides should seek stability in this relationship, but noted that we have different views of how to achieve that stability. Look reiterated that the briefings provide a clear understanding on each other's SNW reductions and the Russian-proposed document was not required. She said that the United States would study the proposal, however, and asked the Russian side to consider that the continued inclusion of "definitions" in the briefings achieve the necessary understanding of the SNW reductions and thus a sense of stability. ¶24. (C) Ul'yanov stated that other countries would ask for agreed definitions as a common international practice. He asked if the Russian proposal did not negatively affect U.S. national security, why not accept it? He noted that Russia considered U.S. concerns and expected the United States to do the same. He reiterated that Russia was not comfortable with the U.S. description of its SNW definition, highlighting that it had redundancies and items not contained in the body of the Treaty. He asked the United States to remove this irritant from our relationship. ¶25. (C) Look said that a one-size-fits-all definition would not work because our forces are different. She noted that the briefings that contain a definition were the right approach. Nonetheless, Look said the United States would consider whether each side should make a formal statement of its own national definition. ¶26. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Draft Plenary Statement of Strategic Nuclear Warheads, dated October 27, 2005. ¶27. (U) Participants: U.S. DAS Look Mr. Buttrick Mr. Johnston Mr. Kuehne Mr. Mullins Mr. Siemon Mr. Singer Col Smith Mr. Vogel Mr. French (Int) Russia Mr. Ul'yanov Mr. Artem'yev Gen Maj. Artyukhin Col Fedorchenko Col Kamenskiy Amb Masterkov Mr. Mezhennyy Ms. Sorokina Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaytsev Mr. Gusev (Int) ¶28. (U) Look sends. Moley