|05GENEVA2618||2005-10-28 09:23:00||CONFIDENTIAL||US Mission Geneva|
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
1. (U) This is BIC-IV-002.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 26, 2005
Time: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
3. (C) The U.S. and Russian Delegations each provided
briefings on the status of implementation of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the "Moscow
Treaty" (MT)) as of October 2005. The Russian Delegation
said, as of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of Russian
warheads accountable under the Treaty would be 2,913. The
U.S. Delegation said as of September 30, 2005, aggregate
number of U.S. operationally-deployed strategic nuclear
warheads (ODNSW) was 4,073. The Parties also asked questions
to clarify the briefings that were presented.
4. (C) The Russian Delegation's responses to U.S. questions
indicated that Russia continues to count the reentry vehicles
on ICBMs and SLBMs in launchers, as well as heavy bomber
weapons on bombers and in storage areas on bomber bases as MT
strategic nuclear warheads. They confirmed that none of
Russia's heavy bomber weapons are included in the aggregate
number of 2,913 strategic nuclear warheads.
5. (C) The Russian Delegation again asked for an explanation
of why the United States used quotation marks around the term
"nuclear" in the U.S. definition and why the United States
referred to "nuclear" reentry vehicles and nuclear armaments
in its briefing? Should nuclear be used inside quotation
marks, carried over from the MT Letters of Transmittal, in
both places? The U.S. Delegation explained that the
quotation marks carried over from the MT Letters of
Transmittal and were only meant to highlight that this Treaty
applied to only nuclear warheads. When the Treaty was
submitted to the U.S. Congress, the Executive Branch wanted
to make this point clear.
6. (C) Ul'yanov stated that progress had been made during
the previous BIC meeting on the definition for strategic
nuclear warheads and he hoped to resolve the issue by the
spring 2006 BIC meeting. He expected the BIC to provide an
opportunity for transparency discussions and to move closer
to the effective implementation of the MT.
7. (U) DAS Look began by noting her pleasure at seeing so
many familiar faces on the Russian side, and added that Dr.
Look was sorry he was unable to head this BIC meeting in
order to say good-bye and to help in the transition for the
new JCIC representative. She commented that she had been
working issues related to the control and reduction of
missiles for 20 years and said that the relationship between
the United States and Russia had changed significantly in
that time, and that the change had been for the good. The
way the Parties talk about issues and the tools at our
disposal have also changed. The MT is emblematic of the new
relationship and offers a different way to work as partners.
She also noted that the BIC had been a useful form for
discussion. Ul'yanov said that he was sorry to see Dr. Look
leave the BIC, as he had established a positive relationship
with him. He agreed with DAS Look's assessment of the MT,
but did not think that the BIC itself was a good benchmark.
It needs to be more substantive.
8. (U) After opening comments, the U.S. and Russian
Delegations each provided briefings on the status of
implementation of MT, as of October 2005.
9. (U) Paragraph 11 contains the slides and notes from the
U.S. presentation on Strategic Nuclear Forces delivered at
the Russian Mission on October 26, 2005. Hard copies of the
briefing slides, without the narratives, were provided to the
Russian Delegation. Paragraph 13 contains the official
translation of the Russian briefing.
10. (U) Mullins presented the U.S. briefing and clarifying
text, which included the updated U.S. ODSNW number of 4,037,
as of September 30, 2005.
11. (U) Begin text (U.S. Briefing):
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces
Bilateral Implementation Commission
Narrative for Slide One:
- This will be a short briefing that will provide you an
update on our plans for strategic nuclear forces.
- You will notice that this briefing has not changed much
since the last session.
- This briefing will summarize actions we have taken and
long-range plans for these forces.
U.S. Plans for Strategic Nuclear Forces
- Reduce total operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012:
-- Remove some delivery systems from service; and
-- For delivery systems retained, remove some warheads
from operational missiles to reduce the number of
operationally deployed nuclear warheads.
- Completed actions:
-- Removed 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service.
-- B-1B conventional role only.
-- Deactivated 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs
- Ongoing actions:
-- Removing some warheads from operational missiles.
-- Modifying 4 Trident I SSBNs to carry Trident II SLBMs.
-- Deactivating Trident I SLBMs.
- Baseline 2012 Strategic Nuclear Force Structure:
-- 14 Trident II SSBNs
-- 21 B-2 Bombers
-- 500 Minuteman III ICBMs
-- 76 B-52H Bombers
Narrative for Slide Two:
- Our existing strategic nuclear force structure, with the
reductions mentioned during previous briefings, will remain
in service at least through 2020.
-- Minuteman service life is projected through 2020.
-- Ohio class ballistic missile submarines have been
extended in life and the oldest of the remaining 14 is
planned to be operational beyond 2025.
-- Our oldest bomber, the B-52, has had numerous upgrades
and, along with the B-2, should remain operational for
- We have underway, or in the planning stages, life extension
programs to ensure that these systems remain reliable and
safe and incorporate modern electronics.
- In addition, we are just beginning to examine options to
replace these weapon systems when each reaches the end of its
October 2005 Update on ICBMs
ICBMs -- Deactivate all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs
- Status: As of 19 September 2005: 50 Peacekeeper missiles
removed from strategic service.
-- All 50 missiles deactivated.
-- Silos will remain START accountable and inspectable.
Narrative for Slide Three:
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:
- Our entire force of Peacekeeper missiles has been
-- The first missile was deactivated in October 2002.
-- On 19 September 2005, we completed deactivation on all
-- Peacekeeper silos will remain START accountable and
October 2005 Update on SSBNs
Modification of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs
- Status: Four Trident I SSBNs have been removed from
strategic service and have begun refueling overhauls and
modification to SSGNs.
- All launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable
- There are no plans to return Trident I SSBNs to strategic
Modification of 4 Trident I SSBNs to Trident II
- Status: Two submarines have been converted from Trident I
to Trident II; a third has begun conversion and the fourth
will begin conversion in early 2006.
- Trident I SLBMs are being deactivated.
Narrative for Slide Four:
Ballistic missile submarines
- Our plan to remove 4 Trident I ballistic missile submarines
from strategic service and to modify them for other roles is
-- All four of the submarines have already been withdrawn
from strategic service. The ballistic missiles have been
removed from all 4 of the submarines.
- We plan for Initial Operational Capability of the four
SSGNs to begin in 2007.
- Launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable.
- Our plan for the other four Trident I submarines is to
modify them to carry the Trident II SLBM.
-- Two of these modifications are complete; a third has
begun modification and the fourth and final modification will
begin in early 06.
October 2005 Update on
Heavy Bombers - No Change
Narrative for Slide Five:
- There are no changes in our heavy bomber force since the
last meeting of the BIC.
Total U.S. Operationally Deployed
Strategic Nuclear Warheads
- For purposes of the Moscow Treaty, the United States
considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
-- reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles
in their launchers,
-- reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic
missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and
-- nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in
weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases.
-- In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy
bomber bases. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
-- In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only
"nuclear" reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are
subject to the 1700-2200 limit.
- As of September 30, 2005, the aggregate number of U.S.
Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads was 4037.
Narrative for Slide Six:
- As we have stated previously, this is the U.S. definition
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
- The aggregate number of U.S. operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads as of September 30, 2005, was 4037.
In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear
weapons (including spare ICBM warheads and bomber weapons)
are located in the weapon storage area at a heavy bomber
base. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only
"nuclear" reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles in their
launchers, as well as nuclear-armed cruise missiles or bombs
at heavy bomber bases or loaded on bombers, are subject to
the 1700-2200 limit.
- U.S. strategic nuclear force reductions remain consistent
with previous briefings.
- Current and planned strategic nuclear force structure and
activities are consistent with the new strategic environment.
Narrative for Slide Seven:
- In summary, our strategic nuclear force plans remain
unchanged from the plans we presented to Defense Minister
Ivanov in 2002.
-- Our actions to date have been consistent with those
- As you have seen, we have a number of activities in
progress related to sustainment of these forces and
implementation of our defense strategy.
- These activities, and our strategic nuclear forces, are
consistent with the new strategic environment.
- Our intention is to continue to provide transparency and
predictability on our activities and forces through actions
such as this briefing.
12. (C) Fedorchenko delivered the Russian briefing by
reading most of the text and clarifying that the number of
Russian strategic nuclear warheads, as of November 1, 2005,
was 2,913. In addition, on slide Four, he remarked that
Russia had not yet decided whether to put the road-mobile
SS-27 into service. On slide Five, he added that Russia is
replacing existing SS-N-23 SLBMs with new ones.
13. (U) Begin text (Russian Briefing):
Briefing by the Russian Delegation
October 26, 2005
Title Page: Status of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces and
Results of their Reduction in 2005. Briefing in the
Bilateral Implementation Commission for the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions, October 2005
Total Number of Strategic Nuclear Warheads
-- Within the framework of the Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, for purposes of counting nuclear
warheads the Russian Federation considers the following:
-- nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs;
-- nuclear warheads on deployed SLBMs;
-- nuclear warheads on deployed heavy bombers and those
located in storage depots of airbases (airfields) where heavy
bombers are based.
As of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of warheads of
the Russian Federation that are accountable under the Treaty
on Strategic Offensive Reductions will be 2913.
Russian Federation's Plans to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces
OBJECTIVE: By the end of 2012, reduce the total number of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200.
AREAS OF IMPLEMENTATION:
-- removal from service of missile complexes, submarines,
and heavy bombers that have reached the end of their
warranted service life;
-- elimination of strategic offensive arms that have been
removed from service;
-- conversion of ICBM silo launchers, SSBN launchers, and
heavy bombers into new reduced-armament strategic offensive
-- developing and putting into service the newest
land-based and sea-based strategic missile complexes.
Russia's plans to reduce its strategic nuclear forces have
not changed since the previous session of BIC.
Future Development of the SRF
1. MC (Missile Complex) with SS-18 ICBMs - Scheduled removal
from service at end of service life; elimination of missiles
and silo launchers.
2. MC with SS-19 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at
end of service life; elimination of missiles and conversion
of silo launchers.
3. MC with SS-25 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at
end of service life; elimination of missiles and road-mobile
4. MC with SS-24 ICBMs - Completion of elimination of
missiles and rail-mobile launchers.
5. MC with SS-27 ICBMs for silo launcher - Scheduled
introduction into service, using converted ICBM SS-19 silo
6. MC with SS-27 ICBMs for road-mobile launcher - Continued
flight and design testing.
Prior to 2013 the Russian Federation does not plan to build
new silo launchers or to develop new rail-mobile launchers.
Future Development of the Strategic Forces of the Russian Navy
1. Delta III-Class Submarines with SS-N-18 SLBMs - Scheduled
removal from service at end of service life, elimination of
missiles, launchers, and submarines.
2. Delta IV-Class Submarines with SS-N-23 SLBMs -
Modernization of the weapons system.
3. Typhoon-Class Submarines with SS-N-20 SLBMs - Removal
from service and elimination of missiles and submarine
4. New-Generation Submarines - Development, testing, and
preparations for putting into service.
5. Development of new SLBM (RSM-56). Continuation of
flight-design testing of the missile.
Future Development of Russia's Strategic Aircraft
1. Bear Heavy Bomber - Removal from service of heavy bombers
that have reached the end of their service life.
Modernization of weapons systems.
2. Blackjack Heavy Bomber - Modernization of weapons systems.
The Russian Federation is implementing its plans to reduce
its strategic nuclear forces with an aim to fulfilling its
obligations under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions. The Russian Federation is independently
determining the structure of its SNF guided by national
security interests and the maintenance of strategic stability.
14. (C) Look observed that both briefings reflected that
both the United States and Russia were on glide paths to
lower ODSNW numbers. Both sides were willing to discuss the
actual status of their forces and, while there was always
room for improvement, the sides need to remember that the
dialogue had come a long way toward openness. Ul'yanov
replied that he shared Look's assessment, but that there is
always room for perfection and additional transparency. Look
responded that perfection is in the eye of the beholder.
15. (C) Ul'yanov stated that he appreciated the inclusion in
the briefing of the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW and hoped
that the number would continue to be exchanged at least twice
each year. He suggested that the sides ask questions today
and the answers be provided on Thursday. He asked why the
U.S. ODSNW definition continued to use the word nuclear in
quotation marks. Look replied that she had noted that this
question had been asked at the previous BIC meeting and had
asked her delegation for an answer. She continued that, in
her view and that of her delegation, the quotation marks had
been added for emphasis to reflect the difference from how
START accounted for reentry vehicles when the Treaty had been
forwarded to the U.S. Congress.
16. (C) Artyukhin asked about the difference between
"nuclear" reentry vehicles and other nuclear armaments.
Mullins answered that the words "other nuclear armaments"
were used to distinguish bombs and cruise missile warheads
from nuclear reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs. Artyukhin
indicated he still did not understand the sentence as
rendered in the Russian language and asked for a
clarification. Look agreed to look into whether the text
could be made clearer.
17. (C) Ul'yanov stated that the United States had reduced
543 ODSNW since the last briefing and he believed that this
was partially based on the deactivation of 70 Peacekeeper
warheads. He asked how the remainder of the U.S. reductions
were made. Could the U.S. Delegation provide a breakout of
the reductions by ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers?
18. (C) Look referred to the repeated reference to service
life for Russian strategic systems in the Russian briefing
and asked whether there was a specific end of service life
for each type of Russian system. Fedorchenko answered that
each system had a specific service life, but the service life
could be extended. He believed both the United States and
Russia used the service life concept.
19. (C) Siemon asked whether the strategic nuclear warhead
number presented in the Russian briefing was calculated using
the definition provided by Russia in March 2005. Fedorchenko
responded that the Russian definition was described on slide
Two of the Russian presentation and the United States would
see the definition when the briefing was translated.
20. (C) Smith asked whether Russia had included any heavy
bomber weapons in its strategic nuclear warhead total.
Artyukhin responded that Russia only counted heavy bomber
weapons located on heavy bomber bases. Since Russian
practice did not locate heavy bomber weapons storage
locations on heavy bomber bases, no heavy bomber weapons were
21. (C) Singer asked whether there were any SLBM warheads
attributed to SLBM launchers that did not contain missiles.
Fedorchenko answered that, with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs,
the Russian aggregate 2,913 number only related to launchers
actually containing missiles with warheads on them. He added
that the Typhoon SSBN converted for RSM-56 missiles and the
Typhoon awaiting elimination did not count because there were
no missiles in the launchers.
22. (U) Documents exchanged.
-- Briefing on Strategic Nuclear Forces, dated October
-- Briefing on Nuclear Strategic Forces, dated October
23. (U) Participants:
Mr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Gusev (Int)
24. (U) Look sends.