JCIC-XXVII: (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001419 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR AN-1 JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR MILLER DTRA FOR OSA DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF JCIC-XXVII, JUNE 7, 2005 REF: A. GENEVA 1404 (JCIC-XXVII-021) ¶B. GENEVA 1415 (JCIC-XXVII-024) ¶C. GENEVA 1417 (JCIC-XXVII-025) ¶D. GENEVA 1418 (JCIC-XXVII-026) Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-023. ¶2. (U) The Parties met, with all delegation members of each Party present, at the U.S. Mission on June 7, 2005 for the final meeting of this part of the session. At the meeting, all Parties expressed their satisfaction for the work of the session. It had been a very fruitful session, given that a total of seven documents had been initialed or signed (REFS A, B, C and D). ¶3. (U) Look said the U.S. Delegation wanted to compliment the work of the Russian lawyer. Having a lawyer on the other side of the table made our collective work better. He added that he wanted to reinforce the need for our delegations to continue our work during the intersessional period. ¶4. (S) Specifically, Look proposed that the Parties focus efforts on three items during the intersession. First, we need to continue the effort on SS-25 eliminations. Second, the Parties need to codify that arrangement that had been discussed for resolving the Trident II RVOSI issue. The United States was providing a paper today, in the form of a coordinated plenary statement (para 5 below),that could record the resolution of this issue. We need to have the other Parties' response to this proposal. On a similar note, the Russian Delegation had provided an informal proposal to resolve the Tridents in Containers issue. The United States would study the proposal and respond during the intersession. The third area of focus was for Russia to provide timely information on the RSM-56. As this program develops, the Parties need to anticipate problems so they can be taken care of before they become actual issues between the Parties. ¶5. (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement on Trident II RVOSI): JCIC-XXVII U.S.-PROPOSED TEXT Jun 07, 2005 UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION, JUNE 07, 2005 COORDINATED PLENARY STATEMENT ON THE INSPECTION OF TRIDENT II SLBMS DURING REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS To resolve concerns regarding confirmation that the Trident II SLBM is not deployed with more reentry vehicles than its attributed number of warheads, the United States conducted a Trident II RVOSI demonstration at the Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia on February 7-9, 2005, and will augment existing Trident II RVOSI procedures by utilizing the measuring device demonstrated at Kings Bay to confirm that the Trident II RVOSI cover is attached to the front end of the missile while in the SLBM launcher in the same manner as was observed during the demonstration. The procedures for using the measuring device during future Trident II RVOSIs are as follows: -- After all of the inspectors have completed their fifteen minutes of viewing of the installed Trident II RVOSI cover, the Escort Team Chief will request that the Inspection Team Chief and one additional member of his team return to the temporary structure specially intended for preparing the front section for viewing the SLBM launcher, where the inspectors will be given the opportunity to examine the Trident RVOSI measuring device. -- The two inspectors will then observe as facility personnel take two official measurements in the same manner as performed at the demonstration. The Inspection Team Chief will record these measurements in the Official Inspection Report. -- The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM configuration, as presented by the United States at the demonstration, is 23 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters. The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM configuration, as presented by the United States at the demonstration, is 24 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters. Provided measurements obtained using the measuring device are within the prescribed tolerances, the Parties understand that past Trident II RVOSI concerns are resolved and inspectors will not record in Official Inspection Reports their previous statements relating to the inspecting Party's inability to obtain an unobstructed view of the Trident II front section and corresponding inability to ascertain that the inspected Trident II SLBM contains no more reentry vehicles than its attributed number of warheads. End text. ¶6. (U) Look sends. Moley