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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA1419 2005-06-08 10:43:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001419 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF
JCIC-XXVII, JUNE 7, 2005

REF: A. GENEVA 1404 (JCIC-XXVII-021)

B. GENEVA 1415 (JCIC-XXVII-024)

C. GENEVA 1417 (JCIC-XXVII-025)

D. GENEVA 1418 (JCIC-XXVII-026)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-023.



2. (U) The Parties met, with all delegation members of each
Party present, at the U.S. Mission on June 7, 2005 for the
final meeting of this part of the session. At the meeting,
all Parties expressed their satisfaction for the work of the
session. It had been a very fruitful session, given that a
total of seven documents had been initialed or signed (REFS
A, B, C and D).



3. (U) Look said the U.S. Delegation wanted to compliment
the work of the Russian lawyer. Having a lawyer on the other
side of the table made our collective work better. He added
that he wanted to reinforce the need for our delegations to
continue our work during the intersessional period.



4. (S) Specifically, Look proposed that the Parties focus
efforts on three items during the intersession. First, we
need to continue the effort on SS-25 eliminations. Second,
the Parties need to codify that arrangement that had been
discussed for resolving the Trident II RVOSI issue. The
United States was providing a paper today, in the form of a
coordinated plenary statement (para 5 below), that could
record the resolution of this issue. We need to have the
other Parties' response to this proposal. On a similar note,
the Russian Delegation had provided an informal proposal to
resolve the Tridents in Containers issue. The United States
would study the proposal and respond during the intersession.
The third area of focus was for Russia to provide timely
information on the RSM-56. As this program develops, the
Parties need to anticipate problems so they can be taken care
of before they become actual issues between the Parties.



5. (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary
Statement on Trident II RVOSI):

JCIC-XXVII
U.S.-PROPOSED TEXT
Jun 07, 2005

UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION
COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY
OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION,
JUNE 07, 2005

COORDINATED PLENARY STATEMENT
ON THE INSPECTION OF TRIDENT II SLBMS DURING REENTRY
VEHICLE INSPECTIONS

To resolve concerns regarding confirmation that the
Trident II SLBM is not deployed with more reentry vehicles
than its attributed number of warheads, the United States
conducted a Trident II RVOSI demonstration at the Strategic
Weapons Facility, Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia on February
7-9, 2005, and will augment existing Trident II RVOSI
procedures by utilizing the measuring device demonstrated at
Kings Bay to confirm that the Trident II RVOSI cover is
attached to the front end of the missile while in the SLBM
launcher in the same manner as was observed during the
demonstration.

The procedures for using the measuring device during
future Trident II RVOSIs are as follows:

-- After all of the inspectors have completed their fifteen
minutes of viewing of the installed Trident II RVOSI cover,
the Escort Team Chief will request that the Inspection Team
Chief and one additional member of his team return to the
temporary structure specially intended for preparing the
front section for viewing the SLBM launcher, where the
inspectors will be given the opportunity to examine the
Trident RVOSI measuring device.

-- The two inspectors will then observe as facility personnel
take two official measurements in the same manner as
performed at the demonstration. The Inspection Team Chief
will record these measurements in the Official Inspection
Report.

-- The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM
configuration, as presented by the United States at the
demonstration, is 23 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters.
The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM
configuration, as presented by the United States at the
demonstration, is 24 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters.

Provided measurements obtained using the measuring
device are within the prescribed tolerances, the Parties
understand that past Trident II RVOSI concerns are resolved
and inspectors will not record in Official Inspection Reports
their previous statements relating to the inspecting Party's
inability to obtain an unobstructed view of the Trident II
front section and corresponding inability to ascertain that
the inspected Trident II SLBM contains no more reentry
vehicles than its attributed number of warheads.

End text.



6. (U) Look sends.
Moley