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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1401
2005-06-07 11:56:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM  KACT  US  RS  UP  BO  KZ  START  JCIC  INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001401 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
VANDENBERG VISIT OFFER AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION
NOTIFICATION FORMATS

REF: A. STATE 53670 (JCIC-DIP-05-003)

B. GENEVA 1339 (JCIC-XXVII-009)

C. 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001401

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
VANDENBERG VISIT OFFER AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION
NOTIFICATION FORMATS

REF: A. STATE 53670 (JCIC-DIP-05-003)

B. GENEVA 1339 (JCIC-XXVII-009)

C. 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-017.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2005
Time: 3:00 - 5:05 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY


3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on June 2, 2005, at which Belarus, Russia, Ukraine,
and the United States were represented; Kazakhstan was not
represented. The Parties discussed the U.S. offer of a
one-time visit to the silo launchers that the United States
had attributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility (REF
A) and Ground Transportation notifications issues.


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation outlined the parameters for the
visit and assured the other Parties that the United States
would not view acceptance of the offer as an indication that
the other Parties no longer had concerns about the
reattribution of silos to the Vandenberg Space Launch
Facility. The U.S. Delegation also reminded the other
Parties that the visit must be conducted prior to June 1,

2006.


5. (S) The U.S. Delegation said it would not discuss the
Russian-proposed ground transportation formats (REF B)
because the draft formats specified changes to the content of
the Format 144 notifications. The U.S. Delegation sought
only to distinguish ground transportation notifications from

other Format 144 messages by the use of suffixes. After
lengthy discussion, the Russian Delegation withdrew its
proposed formats, and the Parties reached substantive
agreement whereby the Parties would add five letter suffixes
-- A, B, C, D and E - to the proposed letters under
discussion, which would authorize their use on subsequent
NRRC Format 144 notifications when used for ground
transportation. It would be up to the respective NRRCs to
agree on which suffix would be applied to the individuals
notification requirements spelled out in the ground
transportation agreement.

VANDENBERG: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VISIT


6. (S) At a Working Group Meeting at the Russian Mission on
June 2, 2005, Mullins began by stating that the United States
did not view acceptance of the U.S.-proposed offer to visit
the silo launchers that had been reattributed to the
Vandenberg Space Launch Facility as an indication that the
other Parties no longer had concerns about the reattributed
launchers at the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. He added
that the visit must be conducted before June 1, 2006, for
operational reasons. He provided the other Parties with
written parameters for the visit.

Begin text of notional paper that was provided (undated):

General Parameters for the Visit

-- The visit will be conducted on a date mutually agreed upon
by the Parties. However, it must be conducted before June 1,

2006.

-- The visit will not be conducted in conjunction with a
START inspection or sequentially following a START inspection.
-- Although the visit will not be a START inspection, the
United States will provide the observers with transportation,
lodging, meals, and, as necessary, medical services while
they are in the United States.

-- The United States will treat the observers with due
respect and take appropriate measures to ensure their safety
while they are in the United States.

-- The observers will be allowed to visit all five
reattributed silos at the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility.

-- The visit is expected to require no more than one day, not
including travel time.

Visit Details

-- A total of ten observers, including interpreters, will be
allowed to participate in the visit. Visiting Parties must
coordinate among themselves and provide the United States
with a listing of who will attend.

-- The observers will be escorted by U.S. personnel to the
Vandenberg Space Launch Facility from the West Coast Point of
Entry.

-- The United States will conduct a pre-visit briefing at
Vandenberg.

-- The observers will be allowed to visit each reattributed
silo in the observers' order of preference.

-- The observers will be allowed the opportunity to go below
grade at the four silos modified to contain Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs) and view those silos from the Launch
Equipment Room.

-- The observers will be allowed to measure the diameter of
any emplaced GBIs to confirm they are not START-accountable
items of inspection in accordance with START measurement
procedures.

-- The clamshell doors of the four modified silos will remain
closed during the visit.

-- The observers will be allowed the opportunity to view the
unmodified silo from ground level through the open silo door.

-- The observers will be escorted back to the West Coast POE
for departure home.

End text.


7. (S) Fedorchenko asked whether the visit would be a joint
visit or inspection. He noted that the written parameters
outlined several START inspection procedures. He asked
whether the JCIC agreement on joint inspections (sic) applied
with regard to the proportional representation by the
Parties, in which case no less than seven members of the
visiting delegation should be from Russia.


8. (S) Mullins repeated that the United States is offering a
visit, not a START inspection. The offer is for a single
visit, and it is up to the other Parties to determine among
themselves who will participate in the visit. The United
States will pay all associated costs of the visit while the
other Parties are in the United States, but the other Parties
must pay their own round-trip transportation costs to and
from their own respective country to the West Coast POE.


9. (S) Shevtsov asked what were the U.S. objectives or
purpose for the visit. Mullins stated that the visit would
provide an opportunity for the other Parties to view all five
silos reattributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility,
and to confirm that the emplaced GBIs are not strategic
offensive arms. The other Parties will also be able to see
that the empty silos do not contain items of inspection
(IOI). The offer is not being made within the context of
START, but as a positive measure without preconditions.


10. (S) In response to specific questions, Mullins provided
the following information. The silos have been modified to
launch GBIs, not converted under the treaty. Two modified
silos have emplaced GBIs, and the other two modified silos
are empty. The other Parties will not be allowed to measure
the silos, but they will be allowed to measure the diameter
of the GBIs pursuant to START procedures to confirm they are
not IOI. No additional documentation will be provided to the
other Parties following the visit, nor will a final report be
expected. Mullins also declined to discuss whether
interceptors would be emplaced at other facilities,
indicating he did not know the Missile Defense Agency's
plans. When asked why the United States insisted on a June
1, 2006 cutoff date for the inspection, Mullins explained
that it was a practical matter and not due to scheduled
launch activity. Shevtsov stated that Ukraine intends to
participate in the visit if it occurs. Fedorchenko said
Russia would take the U.S. offer for a visit under advisement.

PARTIES AGREE TO ADD SUFFIXES TO GROUND
TRANSPORTATION NOTIFICATION FORMATS


11. (S) Mullins deferred discussion on the Russian-proposed
ground transportation formats (REF B), stating that the
objective of exchanging the letters during this session was
to simply allow for the use of suffixes to the already
existing free-flowing Format 144; not to negotiate or agree
to new 144 Formats. The specific content of each sending
Party's ground transportation-related 144s is determined by
the ground transportation agreement, which the U.S. had no
interest in reopening. Suffixes would not alter the
structure and content of the information conveyed in START
Format 144 ground transportation notifications that are
exchanged by the Parties, as required by the March 20, 2002
Ground Transportation Agreement. Lengthy discussion ensued
between the Parties regarding both the number of suffixes to
be added to the Format 144 message number and the information
to be provided in formats.


12. (S) Disagreement arose regarding Russia's insistence
that border-crossing information be required in U.S. Format
144 ground transportation notifications. Mullins declared
this as unacceptable. He explained that the Russian trucking
company, the U.S. monitors, and Russian Department 162 at
Votkinsk had a good working relationship with regard to
ground transportation missions. The best solution is to
continue the current practice, where the Russian trucking
company determines which route it will take rather than the
United States being held responsible for border-crossing
information in the NRRC message. Mullins added that the
Russian position contravened the Ground Transportation
Agreement that had been completed in 2002. Ryzhkov stated
that Russia would consider border-crossing information to be
tentative and would remain flexible if timelines were not
met. Russia wanted the information to provide to its border
control and customs agencies to facilitate transfer of
equipment across the Belarus border. Mullins responded that
the U.S. cargo was commercial cargo, not diplomatic cargo.
Furthermore, the draft Format 144s submitted by Russia at the
first meeting had Russia providing locations and timelines
for border-crossings. Now, Russia was proposing for the
United States to provide border-crossing information. After
consultation on the Russian side, Fedorchenko asserted that
none of the Parties sought to change the content of the
Format 144s, but all agreed to add suffixes to the formats to
distinguish ground transportation notifications from other
Format 144 notifications. He withdrew the Russian-proposed
formats from the table.


13. (S) Acknowledging that the Parties were close to
agreement on the issue, and to ensure mutual understanding,
Mullins repeated the U.S. position that border-crossing
information should not be provided in the Format 144
notifications used for ground transportation. He suggested
that, for ground transportation notifications, the Parties
agree to add five suffixes, A-B-C-D-E, to the Format 144
notifications without comment, and defer to the respective
NRRCs to agree on which suffixes applied to which
requirements in the Ground Transportation Agreement. The
proposed exchange of letters that would be completed during
this session of the JCIC will include the suffixes A, B, C, D
and E.


14. (S) Fedorchenko agreed to the exchange of letters
provided by the United States on May 31, 2005 (REF C). He
then proposed to amend the Russian draft documents to reflect
agreement. Mullins said he was confident that the Parties
had reached substantive agreement on the issue.


15. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Dunn
Col(sel) Emig
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Jones
Mr. Miller
Maj Mitchner
Mr. Sessions
Mr. Smith
Mr. Singer
Mr. Tiersky
LCDR Woods
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Maksimenko
Col Razumov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Yegorov
Mr. Anisimov (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran


17. (U) Look sends.
Moley