1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-018.



2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2005
Time: 5:10 - 5:50 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY



3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on June 2, 2005, to discuss inspection procedures to
address Russian concerns that its inspectors cannot confirm
that Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
are not deployed with more reentry vehicles than attributed.
The U.S. proposed the added procedure of using the RVOSI
measuring device demonstrated to the Parties at Kings Bay
Submarine Base, February 7-9, 2005. The U.S. Delegation
provided answers to questions raised at a May 31, 2005 Heads
of Delegation (HOD) meeting (REFTEL) regarding the use of the
RVOSI measuring device and provided additional details
regarding the U.S.-proposed procedures.

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM
MAY 31, 2005 HOD MEETING



4. (S) Emig began the meeting by stating its objectives,
which he summarized as: (1) to respond to Russian questions
raised during the May 31, 2005 HOD meeting (REFTEL); (2) to
provide additional details regarding the U.S.-proposed
supplemental procedures for Trident II RVOSIs; and (3) to
identify areas where the sides agreed and disagreed as part
of an effort to resolve Trident II RVOSI concerns.



5. (S) Emig provided the following answers to the questions
raised at the May 31, 2005 HOD meeting (REFTEL):

-- Question 1: Would the 3 percent rule apply during
the use of the RVOSI measuring device as it usually applies
to measurements in the Treaty?

-- Answer 1: No. Look correctly stated (REFTEL) that
this rule could not apply. Use of the Trident RVOSI
measuring device involves the relationship between three
items: the missile, the RVOSI cover, and the device itself.
This is very different from normal Treaty measurements, which
usually measure one, much larger object. The 3 percent rule
would allow less than 1 cm of tolerance. U.S. engineers
determined that 3 cm overall tolerance is necessary to
account for the variances among the three elements, along
with the process of field measurements. The United States
believes a 3 cm tolerance would provide the necessary
confidence in the measurements and the measuring device.

-- Question 2: What if the measurements obtained during
the inspection differ from the measurements agreed to as a
result of the Trident II demonstration?

-- Answer 2: As Look previously stated (REFTEL), if
measurements are not within the 3 cm tolerance of the
benchmark value, the United States anticipates inspectors
would include an ambiguity in the inspection report.

REVIEW OF U.S.-PROPOSED
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEDURES



6. (S) Emig provided the following description of the
supplemental procedures envisioned by the United States for
Trident II RVOSIs:

-- After all of the inspectors complete their 15 minutes
of viewing of the installed Trident II RVOSI hard cover, the
escort team chief will request the inspection team chief and
one additional member of the inspection team return to the
temporary structure for viewing the SLBM launcher, where the
inspectors will be given the opportunity to examine the
measuring device.

-- The two inspectors would then observe the facility
personnel take two official measurements in the same manner
as performed at the February 2005 demonstration. The escort
team chief would record these measurements for the inspection
report.

-- To reiterate, the benchmark measurement for a Trident
II Type A SLBM configuration is 23 cm plus/minus 3 cm. Type
B benchmark measurement is 24 cm plus/minus 3 cm.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON PROCEDURES



7. (S) Fedorchenko inquired about the reference to a
15-minute viewing period for the inspectors, stating that the
Treaty contains the right for each inspector to view and
participate in measurements, and that current RVOSI practice
is to allow two inspectors a total of 15 minutes of viewing
time each. He questioned whether the U.S. proposal was to
allow 15 minutes each for five subgroups of two inspectors to
confirm the measurements. Emig responded that the viewing
structure is small and, as a consequence, only two inspectors
could be allowed inside at the same time. He reiterated that
the U.S. proposal provided for a total of two measurements
with the measuring device.



8. (S) Fedorchenko stated that within the Treaty there are
only two or three cases in which subgroups are pulled from
inspection teams. Emig sought clarification whether
Fedorchenko was suggesting the Treaty required the United
States to allow five measurements with the measuring device.
Fedorchenko responded that there were two options: either
all ten inspectors are allowed to view the measurements with
the measuring device or five sets of measurements are
completed by five teams of two inspectors. Mullins then
engaged, noting that the idea of using a subgroup of two
inspectors to confirm measurements is not without precedence,
providing as an example SS-18 RVOSIs. Fedorchenko replied
that he understood, but the U.S. proposal limited inspectors
performing inspections under Article XI, Paragraph 6 of the
Treaty. He disagreed with the U.S. position that the
proposal was sufficient for RVOSIs, stating that of ten
inspectors, only two could be sure that the front section did
not contain more reentry vehicles than the number attributed.
Mullins replied that the U.S. proposal did not limit
inspectors; rather, these procedures were in addition to
current practice. Shevtsov suggested that the U.S. proposal
be provided in writing for evaluation by the Parties.



9. (S) Taran noted that inspection teams could include
inspectors from each Party, and not all Parties would be
represented if only two inspectors were allowed to confirm
the measurements.

NEXT STEPS



10. (S) Emig asked whether there were other concerns, to
which the Parties replied there were not. He asked the
Parties to consider how an agreement would be documented,
noting that the United States was considering a Coordinated
Plenary Statement. He continued by stating that, regardless
of form, an agreement should include a description of the
procedures for using the measuring device, along with a
statement confirming that the February 7-9, 2005
demonstration of the RVOSI measuring device at Kings Bay
Submarine Base, in combination with the use of the measuring
device at future Trident II RVOSIs, would resolve past
concerns provided that benchmark measurements were achieved
within the tolerances provided.



11. (S) Fedorchenko requested that the United States provide
a written proposal to the Parties to allow formal discussions
to begin as soon as possible. Emig replied that the United
States would consider this request.



12. (U) Documents Exchanged: None.



13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Col (S) Emig
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Jones
Mr. Miller
Mr. Mitchner
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Page
Mr. Sessions
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tiersky
LCDR Woods
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Maksimenko
Col Razumov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Yegorov
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Taran



14. (U) Look sends.
Moley