JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001387 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR AN-1 JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR MILLER DTRA FOR OSA DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON SS-25/SS-27 AND MINUTEMAN III REENTRY VEHICLE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, JUNE 1, 2005 REF: 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005) Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-015. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 1, 2005 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva SUMMARY ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on June 1, 2005, to discuss SS-25, SS-27, and Minuteman (MM) III reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI) issues. The U.S. Delegation confirmed that the Russian Federation had rejected the latest U.S. proposal to use INF radiation detection equipment (RDE) to resolve its SS-25 RVOSI concerns. The Russian Delegation reminded the U.S. Delegation that the Russian offer of a one-time demonstration and future use of the Karusel RDE were still on the table. When questioned, the Russian Delegation confirmed that there were no new elements to their offers. ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation emphasized that the SS-27 RVOSI issue continued to gain importance to the United States, given the Russian open source material stating that the SS-27 ICBM could be deployed with more than one warhead. It was noted that the United States previously had provided a whole list of solutions, none of which had been responded to in detail by Russia. The Russian Delegation explained that it could not understand how the United States could have an issue with their soft cover. ¶5. (S) On MM III RVOSI, the Russian Delegation explained that inspectors did not have an unobstructed view of the front section when conducting MM III RVOSIs. The Russians suggested that the United States pull the front section completely into the payload transport (PT) van or move the front section to a special allocated site for viewing. The U.S. side responded that the presentation of the front section was fully compliant with the Treaty and, in fact, the United States even had instituted additional procedures not required by the Treaty to try and resolve the Russian Federation's concerns. The Russian Delegation said that the additional procedures were not helpful. SS-25 RVOSI: LET ME ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ¶6. (S) Look opened the meeting by reminding the Parties that the issue of SS-25 RVOSIs has been an agenda item for quite some time, and a solution eluded the Parties even though multiple proposals had been tabled by both sides. The latest U.S. proposal was to include the use of INF Treaty RDE and procedures. Look asked whether he had heard correctly that during an earlier working group meeting the Russians had stated that the INF RDE equipment was not accurate enough and the process was too complicated. Boryak confirmed that this was the case. ¶7. (S) Look asked where the Parties should go from here. The United States, he said, has run out of ideas but continues to have concerns regarding U.S. inspectors' inability to confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with more warheads than it was attributed with. Boryak reminded Look that Russia's proposal for an SS-25 demonstration was still on the table. Look asked whether the proposal had any new elements. Boryak responded that the SS-25 was attributed and deployed with one reentry vehicle (RV). It had also never been flight-tested with more than one RV. The results of the demonstration, first proposed by the Russians in 1999, would confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with more than one RV. Boryak understood that the United States wanted procedures that could be demonstrated during every SS-25 RVOSI, but he said the procedures were too difficult from a complexity and security perspective to be conducted during each SS-25 RVOSI, particularly with the road-mobile versions. Boryak also reminded Look that, in March 2004, the Russian Federation had tabled a new proposal (REFTEL) that involved the use of new RDE called Karusel which was demonstrated to the United States in April 2004. Use of such equipment would allow inspectors a non-intrusive way to confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with more than one RV. Boryak believed that the use of the INF RDE would be a step back, therefore, the March 1999 offer remained on the table unchanged. ¶8. (S) Look observed that neither side was willing to accept the other side's proposal. Since the procedures proposed for the demonstration had already been seen by the United States during an earlier RVOSI, Look asked what the United States would learn from the one-time demonstration that was new. Boryak said the United States would be able to tell that one cone-shaped object was beneath the cover. Look asked whether the proposal included any new or changed procedures that would be used during subsequent RVOSIs. Boryak conferred with Fedorchenko, after which Fedorchenko replied that the demonstration, taken with all the other information the United States received regarding SS-25 RV deployment (i.e., telemetry, open source material, elimination of the RV platform during SS-25 elimination inspections) should be sufficient to satisfy U.S. concerns. The demonstration would involve choosing a deployed missile at random and included unprecedented procedures (i.e., pushing in on the cover). Such procedures required special methods and personnel which could not be duplicated for every RVOSI. ¶9. (S) Look asked whether the Russian Federation expected the United States to state that the demonstration would satisfy U.S. concerns prior to the demonstration being conducted. Boryak appeared to say it would, but then confused the response by drawing a parallel with the Trident II demonstration, which did not require that agreement be reached on the procedures as a prerequisite to Russia attending the Trident II demonstration. ¶10. (S) Look summarized his understanding of the Russian position as follows: The proposal was the same; the demo would show what the United States had already seen during an inspection several years ago; there would be no new procedures used during the demonstration; there would be no additional procedures used during subsequent RVOSIs that would result from the demonstration; the procedures could not be done during each RVOSI; and Russia wanted the United States to agree in advance that the demonstration would resolve its concerns prior to observing the demonstration. Boryak confirmed that Look's summary was a correct understanding of Russia's position. Boryak repeated Fedorchenko's arguments as to why the United States should be satisfied with the demonstration, but added that the Russian Federation is open to other solutions. Look stated the Parties would need to return to the issue. Shevtsov stated that he thought Fedorchenko's argument was convincing. He could not understand why the demonstration, plus the use of the new Karusel RDE, would not satisfy U.S. concerns. Grinevich concurred with Shevtsov's assessment. SS-27 RVOSIs: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ¶11. (S) Look noted that the issue of SS-27 RVOSIs was even more important to the United States than the SS-25 RVOSI issue. It was very important to resolve this issue because the United States continued to see open sources which described the SS-27 as having multiple warhead capability. Look quoted the Designer-General of Russia's SS-27s, Yuriy Solomonov, from the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, as stating recently that: "The standardized Solid-fuel three-stage Topol-M missile can be fitted with a single or multiple warheads." Look noted that the United States had proposed a whole list of solutions, citing the limiting of the diameter of the base of the cover as an example. However, the proposals had never been discussed fully, which showed that Russia had no interest in them. The United States was willing to work on any new proposals to resolve the issue, but it had no knowledge of why the shrouding was so large. Therefore, the United States had no other solutions to offer. Look asked Boryak where the Parties should go from here. ¶12. (S) Boryak replied that the SS-27 had only been flight-tested with one RV. He stated that Russia was now using a soft cone cover which allowed inspectors to confirm that there was no more than one RV on the missile. However, U.S. inspectors noted in the official inspection reports (OIR) the use of a large oversized, non-conformal cover which would not allow them to confirm there was only one RV underneath. Boryak stated that the Russian Federation, to date, had not received an answer to their question regarding why the cover must be conformal. In the Russian Federation's opinion, the inspectors' conclusions were ungrounded and biased. Look observed that the Parties were at a stalemate, but that additional discussions on the issue were required. MM III RVOSI ¶13. (S) Boryak listed the long-standing issues the Russians had with the way the United States presented the MM III front section during RVOSIs. Since Russian inspectors could not obtain an unobstructed view of the front section, Boryak asked that the United States either pull the front section entirely up into the PT van or conduct the viewing at a special allocated site like Russia. Look responded that he was puzzled why this issue was placed on the agenda. Early after entry into force of the Treaty, the Russians complained about how the United States presented its front section for an RVOSI. In response, the United States instituted additional procedures, believing they would resolve Russia's concerns. The additional procedures were not required by the Treaty, but they allowed Russian inspectors to view below the floor of the PT van and see the rest of the front section. Additionally, Look noted that he had attended a mock RVOSI at Minot AFB. In his opinion, the additional procedures provided an unobstructed view of the front section. The bottom line was that the RVOSI procedures used by the United States were fully compliant with the Treaty and there was no question that the additional procedures provided a full view of the front section. TWO SOCKS ON, ONE SOCK OFF ¶14. (S) Boryak responded that he thought the Russian inspectors must have a different view from Dr. Look's. Ryzhkov noted that he had participated in a MM III RVOSI. He added that when he looked over to observe the three soft covers, the wind blew, and one of the covers moved and revealed that there was nothing underneath. Ryzhkov could not understand why the United States continued to present the MM III front section as they did. He questioned whether the United States would have a problem if the Russian Federation removed only half of their SS-18 front section so U.S. inspectors could only see the top five warheads. He thought the United States would have concerns. It was up to the United States to demonstrate that the MM III did not have more than three warheads deployed on it. To date, the United States had not done that. Look asked whether the additional procedures provided during the MM III RVOSI helped at all. Ryzhkov stated that the Russian inspectors needed to see the whole front section. The Russian Federation had no issues in the way the United States presented the Peacekeeper (PK) front stage because they saw the whole front section. Since the additional procedures did not provide a full view, he believed that the additional procedures were not helpful. ¶15. (S) Look repeated that the MM III RVOSI procedures were compliant with the Treaty; however, he had no doubt that Russia would return to the issue. Commenting on an earlier statement he had made, Boryak recognized that the United States had attempted to raise the front section completely into the PT van but it would not fit. The attempt was a positive sign from the U.S. side but it still needed to do more. Shevtsov commented that the sides were at a dead end. He understood Russia's concerns, but also understood that to change the way in which the United States presented the MM III front section would be difficult and would require changes to the technical procedures. He offered that the United States might do a one-time demonstration like the U.S. Navy did with Trident II. The Parties agreed to return to the issue. ¶16. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶17. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Look Mr. Mullins Mr. Buttrick Mr. Dunn Col (Sel) Emig Mr. Foley Mr. Herrick Mr. Johnston Mr. Jones Ms. Kottmyer Mr. Kuehne Mr. Miller Maj Mitchner Mr. Page Mr. Singer Mr. Smith Mr. Tiersky Mr. Hopkins (Int) Belarus Mr. Grinevich Kazahkstan Mr. Baysuanov Russia Mr. Boryak Col Fedorchenko Ms. Kotkova Mr. Maksimenko Amb Masterkov Mr. Novikov Col Razumov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shabalin Ms. Sorokina Mr. Venevtsev Mr. Anisimov (Int) Ukraine Dr. Shevtsov Gen Fedotov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Taran ¶18. (U) Look sends. Moley