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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1365
2005-06-03 11:39:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM  KACT  US  RS  UP  BO  KZ  START  JCIC  INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001365 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE TRIDENT II RVOSI DEMONSTRATION RESULTS, MAY 31, 2005

REF: MOSCOW 3686

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001365

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE TRIDENT II RVOSI DEMONSTRATION RESULTS, MAY 31, 2005

REF: MOSCOW 3686

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-014.


2. (U) Meeting Date: May 31, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, to discuss the results of the
Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI)
Demonstration conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base,
February 7-9, 2005.


4. (S) Prior to discussion of the primary agenda item, the
U.S. Delegation clarified the parameters under which the
other Parties should consider the U.S.-proposed visit to
Vandenberg to observe silos that have been reattributed from
the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch
Facility. Specifically, the United States had not intended
to imply that the other Parties commit to the visit prior to
listening to the U.S. proposal on the visit. The United
States recognizes that the other Parties may still have
concerns after the visit was conducted.


5. (S) With respect to the results of the Trident II RVOSI
demonstration, all Parties expressed agreement that the
primary objectives of the demonstration had been met and that
the measurement data obtained during the demonstration could
be used during future inspections. The Russian Federation
conveyed that it was not ready to record resolution of the
Trident II RVOSI issue until after the United States had

presented it with procedures to use during an inspection and
it had time to evaluate those procedures.

U.S. CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE VANDENBERG VISIT


6. (S) Look began the meeting by clarifying a point
regarding the parameters under which the other Parties should
consider the U.S.-proposed visit to Vandenberg to observe the
launch silos that have been reattributed from the Vandenberg
Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. He did
not want to imply that the United States wanted the other
Parties to commit to the Vandenberg visit prior to listening
to the U.S. proposal for the visit. He emphasized that he
was not trying to set any preconditions and that he
understood that the Parties may either accept or refuse the
offer at a point in the future. He also stated that
acceptance of the offer for the visit did not indicate that
the Parties would not still have concerns after conducting
the visit. He emphasized that, due to a number of factors,
the visit would need to be conducted prior to June 1, 2006.

TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE RESOLVED


7. (S) Look expressed his pleasure at the acceptance by the
Parties of the Trident RVOSI demonstration that took place at
the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia,
this past February. He noted that members from Kazakhstan,
Russia and Ukraine participated in the demonstration.
Additionally, he was pleased to note that the Russian
non-paper, dated March 31, 2005, stated that "the objective
of the Trident II front sections could be considered to have
been achieved" (REFTEL). He concluded by stating that he
wanted to obtain the views of the other Parties regarding
reaching final resolution, as well as the next steps in
documenting final resolution.

RUSSIAN REACTION POSITIVE, BUT THEY HAVE QUESTIONS


8. (S) Boryak stated that the general reaction of the
Russian Federation to the results of the Trident II RVOSI
demonstration in resolving the issue of Trident II front
sections was positive. He noted that the use of methods,
such as those used during the demonstration to resolve
concerns, improved confidence and relations between the
Parties. He praised the high level of preparation and
conduct of the demonstration by the U.S. side and stated that
most of the issues related to the Trident II front sections
were resolved. The Russian Federation believed that the
measurement from the top of the RVOSI cover to the top of the
third-stage rocket motor could be used for future RVOSI
inspections.

NOW, THE QUESTIONS


9. (S) Boryak stated that he had some questions to ask
regarding the actual inspection procedures:

- Would the three percent rule apply during the use of
the RVOSI measurement device, as was usually the case in the
Treaty? (Begin Note: During data update inspections a
tolerance of three percent is allowed for measurements in
order to account for manufacturing differences in accordance
with Paragraph 19, Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.
End Note.)

- What would the Parties do if the measurements obtained
during the inspection differ from the measurements agreed to
as a result of the Trident RVOSI demonstration?

- What record should be made by the inspection team
chief within the inspection report?

Boryak emphasized that the sides should elaborate on
coordinated procedures for the conduct of inspections.

TRIDENT TESTING ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED


10. (S) Boryak made special note of the fact that, despite
the positive results from the Trident II RVOSI demonstration,
Russia did not consider the issue regarding the number of
dispensing procedures for the Trident II during
flight-testing to be resolved.

SS-25 ONE-TIME POKE OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE


11. (S) Boryak reminded Look that the Russian side was ready
to conduct a one-time demonstration related to the oversized
cover used during SS-25 RVOSIs by pushing in on the center of
that cover in conjunction with an RVOSI inspection.

UKRAINE WANTS TO CONTINUE TO PLAY


12. (S) Shevtsov noted that Ukrainian experts participated
in the Trident II RVOSI demonstration as part of a
multinational group and that they had reached a common
conclusion with the other participants that the objectives of
the demonstration were met. He stated that Ukraine was ready
to record the results of the demonstration in any form
desired and Ukraine was ready to participate in the Trident I
RVOSI demonstration.

LOOK PROVIDES PRELIMINARY RESPONSES


13. (S) Look thanked the other Parties for such a positive
response and provided some preliminary answers to the Russian
Delegation's questions. Regarding whether the three percent
rule would apply, he reminded the other Parties that the
United States had established a value for the type A cover as
demonstrated at Kings Bay, of 23 cm with a 3 cm tolerance and
that the established value for the type B cover was 24 cm
with a 3 cm tolerance. He admitted that he had not
anticipated this question and realized that the 3 cm
tolerance was not within three percent of the total distance,
but did not know what drove that tolerance. He would have
to consult with his technical advisors. Regarding what to do
if the measurement obtained during an inspection differed
from the established measurements, the United States would
expect the Russian Federation to raise the issue within the
JCIC. He reminded the other Parties that the measuring
device was intended to relate the results of the
demonstration to future inspections and that, if it did not
relate, the United States would expect the other Parties to
have continued concerns. Finally, in response to what record
the inspection team chief would place in the inspection
report, Look responded that the inspection team would simply
record the results obtained during the inspection so that the
Parties would have a clear record of the measurement values.

U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT TRIDENT TESTING
PRACTICES ARE STILL ON THE TABLE


14. (S) Look said the United States recognized that the
Trident demonstration did not take the issue of Trident II
dispensing procedures during flight-tests off the table. He
reiterated that the objective of the demonstration was the
same for all Parties, given that Russian inspectors had
expressed two concerns. One was the inability to confirm
that the number of reentry vehicles was not greater than the
number of warheads attributed, and the second was that the
design of the Trident II hard covers did not provide an
unobstructed view of the front section. The U.S.
understanding was that future use of the measurement device
would alleviate these two concerns and comments would no
longer be placed in the inspection report. The demonstration
was not designed to address the flight-test issue, but the
U.S. expectation was that the two Trident II RVOSI issues
would not be raised in the future.

NEED FOR PROCEDURES FOR ADDED MEASUREMENT


15. (S) Boryak asked what the intentions were of the United
States in documenting common Trident RVOSI practices. Look
asked whether all Parties were clear that the purpose of
recording these measurements was to alleviate inspection
concerns and that, by reaching agreement, there would be no
ambiguities during future inspections. Boryak reiterated
that the Russian Federation believed that the objectives of
the demonstration were achieved and now the task was to agree
on procedures for conducting the inspections.

IF AMBIGUITIES CONTINUE, THEN NO
INTEREST IN DISCUSSING PROCEDURES


16. (S) Look explained that if measurements were taken
during inspections and were within tolerance, and ambiguities
continued to be written, then the United States was not
interested in continuing with the measurement procedures. If
the goal of the Parties was that the end result of developing
inspection procedures was that no ambiguities were written,
then the United States would be willing to discuss such
inspection procedures. Boryak explained that, due to the
simplicity of the instrument being proposed for use during
inspections, there was not a one hundred percent assurance
that problems would not arise. Look emphasized that he was
not requesting a commitment for the future, but rather
resolution of past issues. Ryzhkov chimed in, stating that
the American side should propose inspection procedures that
answered some fundamental questions like how many inspectors
would be allowed to conduct the measurement and what the
restrictions and limitations would be during the inspection.


17. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Look
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Dunn
Col(sel) Emig
Mr. Foley
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Jones
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Mr. Sessions
Mr. Smith
LCDR Woods
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baysuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Maksimenko
Amb Masterkov
Lt Col Novikov
Col Razumov
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Yegerov
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Taran


19. (U) Look sends.
Moley