JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001365 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR AN-1 JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR MILLER DTRA FOR OSA DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE TRIDENT II RVOSI DEMONSTRATION RESULTS, MAY 31, 2005 REF: MOSCOW 3686 Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-014. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: May 31, 2005 Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva SUMMARY ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, to discuss the results of the Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI) Demonstration conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, February 7-9, 2005. ¶4. (S) Prior to discussion of the primary agenda item, the U.S. Delegation clarified the parameters under which the other Parties should consider the U.S.-proposed visit to Vandenberg to observe silos that have been reattributed from the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. Specifically, the United States had not intended to imply that the other Parties commit to the visit prior to listening to the U.S. proposal on the visit. The United States recognizes that the other Parties may still have concerns after the visit was conducted. ¶5. (S) With respect to the results of the Trident II RVOSI demonstration, all Parties expressed agreement that the primary objectives of the demonstration had been met and that the measurement data obtained during the demonstration could be used during future inspections. The Russian Federation conveyed that it was not ready to record resolution of the Trident II RVOSI issue until after the United States had presented it with procedures to use during an inspection and it had time to evaluate those procedures. U.S. CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE VANDENBERG VISIT ¶6. (S) Look began the meeting by clarifying a point regarding the parameters under which the other Parties should consider the U.S.-proposed visit to Vandenberg to observe the launch silos that have been reattributed from the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. He did not want to imply that the United States wanted the other Parties to commit to the Vandenberg visit prior to listening to the U.S. proposal for the visit. He emphasized that he was not trying to set any preconditions and that he understood that the Parties may either accept or refuse the offer at a point in the future. He also stated that acceptance of the offer for the visit did not indicate that the Parties would not still have concerns after conducting the visit. He emphasized that, due to a number of factors, the visit would need to be conducted prior to June 1, 2006. TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE RESOLVED ¶7. (S) Look expressed his pleasure at the acceptance by the Parties of the Trident RVOSI demonstration that took place at the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, this past February. He noted that members from Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine participated in the demonstration. Additionally, he was pleased to note that the Russian non-paper, dated March 31, 2005, stated that "the objective of the Trident II front sections could be considered to have been achieved" (REFTEL). He concluded by stating that he wanted to obtain the views of the other Parties regarding reaching final resolution, as well as the next steps in documenting final resolution. RUSSIAN REACTION POSITIVE, BUT THEY HAVE QUESTIONS ¶8. (S) Boryak stated that the general reaction of the Russian Federation to the results of the Trident II RVOSI demonstration in resolving the issue of Trident II front sections was positive. He noted that the use of methods, such as those used during the demonstration to resolve concerns, improved confidence and relations between the Parties. He praised the high level of preparation and conduct of the demonstration by the U.S. side and stated that most of the issues related to the Trident II front sections were resolved. The Russian Federation believed that the measurement from the top of the RVOSI cover to the top of the third-stage rocket motor could be used for future RVOSI inspections. NOW, THE QUESTIONS ¶9. (S) Boryak stated that he had some questions to ask regarding the actual inspection procedures: - Would the three percent rule apply during the use of the RVOSI measurement device, as was usually the case in the Treaty? (Begin Note: During data update inspections a tolerance of three percent is allowed for measurements in order to account for manufacturing differences in accordance with Paragraph 19, Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. End Note.) - What would the Parties do if the measurements obtained during the inspection differ from the measurements agreed to as a result of the Trident RVOSI demonstration? - What record should be made by the inspection team chief within the inspection report? Boryak emphasized that the sides should elaborate on coordinated procedures for the conduct of inspections. TRIDENT TESTING ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED ¶10. (S) Boryak made special note of the fact that, despite the positive results from the Trident II RVOSI demonstration, Russia did not consider the issue regarding the number of dispensing procedures for the Trident II during flight-testing to be resolved. SS-25 ONE-TIME POKE OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE ¶11. (S) Boryak reminded Look that the Russian side was ready to conduct a one-time demonstration related to the oversized cover used during SS-25 RVOSIs by pushing in on the center of that cover in conjunction with an RVOSI inspection. UKRAINE WANTS TO CONTINUE TO PLAY ¶12. (S) Shevtsov noted that Ukrainian experts participated in the Trident II RVOSI demonstration as part of a multinational group and that they had reached a common conclusion with the other participants that the objectives of the demonstration were met. He stated that Ukraine was ready to record the results of the demonstration in any form desired and Ukraine was ready to participate in the Trident I RVOSI demonstration. LOOK PROVIDES PRELIMINARY RESPONSES ¶13. (S) Look thanked the other Parties for such a positive response and provided some preliminary answers to the Russian Delegation's questions. Regarding whether the three percent rule would apply, he reminded the other Parties that the United States had established a value for the type A cover as demonstrated at Kings Bay, of 23 cm with a 3 cm tolerance and that the established value for the type B cover was 24 cm with a 3 cm tolerance. He admitted that he had not anticipated this question and realized that the 3 cm tolerance was not within three percent of the total distance, but did not know what drove that tolerance. He would have to consult with his technical advisors. Regarding what to do if the measurement obtained during an inspection differed from the established measurements, the United States would expect the Russian Federation to raise the issue within the JCIC. He reminded the other Parties that the measuring device was intended to relate the results of the demonstration to future inspections and that, if it did not relate, the United States would expect the other Parties to have continued concerns. Finally, in response to what record the inspection team chief would place in the inspection report, Look responded that the inspection team would simply record the results obtained during the inspection so that the Parties would have a clear record of the measurement values. U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT TRIDENT TESTING PRACTICES ARE STILL ON THE TABLE ¶14. (S) Look said the United States recognized that the Trident demonstration did not take the issue of Trident II dispensing procedures during flight-tests off the table. He reiterated that the objective of the demonstration was the same for all Parties, given that Russian inspectors had expressed two concerns. One was the inability to confirm that the number of reentry vehicles was not greater than the number of warheads attributed, and the second was that the design of the Trident II hard covers did not provide an unobstructed view of the front section. The U.S. understanding was that future use of the measurement device would alleviate these two concerns and comments would no longer be placed in the inspection report. The demonstration was not designed to address the flight-test issue, but the U.S. expectation was that the two Trident II RVOSI issues would not be raised in the future. NEED FOR PROCEDURES FOR ADDED MEASUREMENT ¶15. (S) Boryak asked what the intentions were of the United States in documenting common Trident RVOSI practices. Look asked whether all Parties were clear that the purpose of recording these measurements was to alleviate inspection concerns and that, by reaching agreement, there would be no ambiguities during future inspections. Boryak reiterated that the Russian Federation believed that the objectives of the demonstration were achieved and now the task was to agree on procedures for conducting the inspections. IF AMBIGUITIES CONTINUE, THEN NO INTEREST IN DISCUSSING PROCEDURES ¶16. (S) Look explained that if measurements were taken during inspections and were within tolerance, and ambiguities continued to be written, then the United States was not interested in continuing with the measurement procedures. If the goal of the Parties was that the end result of developing inspection procedures was that no ambiguities were written, then the United States would be willing to discuss such inspection procedures. Boryak explained that, due to the simplicity of the instrument being proposed for use during inspections, there was not a one hundred percent assurance that problems would not arise. Look emphasized that he was not requesting a commitment for the future, but rather resolution of past issues. Ryzhkov chimed in, stating that the American side should propose inspection procedures that answered some fundamental questions like how many inspectors would be allowed to conduct the measurement and what the restrictions and limitations would be during the inspection. ¶17. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶18. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Look Mr. Mullins Mr. Buttrick Mr. Dunn Col(sel) Emig Mr. Foley Mr. Herrick Mr. Johnston Mr. Jones Ms. Kottmyer Mr. Kuehne Maj Mitchner Mr. Sessions Mr. Smith LCDR Woods Dr. Hopkins (Int) Belarus Mr. Grinevich Kazakhstan Mr. Baysuanov Russia Mr. Boryak Col Maksimenko Amb Masterkov Lt Col Novikov Col Razumov Mr. Shabalin Mr. Smirnov Ms. Sorokina Col Yegerov Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) Ukraine Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Taran ¶19. (U) Look sends. Moley